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Abstract 
This thesis consists of three empirical studies that investigate firms’ switch behaviour 
and the change of firm-bank relationship in China’s loan market. The first study 
analyses the duration of firm-bank relationships and examines what drives firms in 
China to switch from one bank loan provider to another. A semi-parametric approach 
from survival analysis – Cox proportional hazard model is used to allow for a 
semiparametric hazard function after parametrically controlling for both time-varying 
and time-invariant covariates of firm-specific financial factors, industry factors, 
ownership characteristics, internal management changes, and external macroeconomic 
factors. Additionally, the thesis explores the impact of the global financial crisis, bank-
financial and ownership characteristics. Moreover, the second study identifies the 
borrowing behaviour of listed firms using a marketing approach, which contributes to 
the cross-disciplinary literature by testing the applicability of a well-known model of 
customer purchasing behaviour, the Negative Binomial Distribution – Dirichlet model 
(or Dirichlet model), to the firm-bank relationship in the loan market. The third 
empirical study in this thesis examines the role of political connection in the firm-bank 
relationship. 
 
Matched data of firm-level data to bank loan duration provides a unique panel data set 
of relationship between China’s listed firms and their lending banks consisting of 2,102 
firms listed on both the Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange in the 
period of 1996-2016. The estimation results provide evidence that the main drivers of 
firms’ switch behaviour come from their credit needs, characteristics of firms and 
lending banks, and change of economic environment as well. Small, young and non-
SOEs, firms with lower leverage, and multiple bank relationships, and non-politically 
connected firms are more likely to switch. Besides, a male CEO, long CEO tenure and 
a CEO switch during the lending relationship increases the likelihood of a switch. 
Understandably, the likelihood of a switch declined during the financial crisis years of 
2008-9. The findings of this thesis imply that in an environment of growing 
commercialization of relationships the firm-bank relationship between state-owned 
enterprise (SOE) and state-owned banks (SOB) in China remains super-stable.  
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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Background and Motivation 
Modern banking theory suggests that firms and financial intermediaries are interested in 
long-term and stable relationships which allocate efficient usage of loans. Increased 
access to bank loans is frequently attributed to closes ties between clients and their bank 
which reduce asymmetric information. Although a close firm-bank relationship is 
beneficial to both firm and bank, this strong bank-firm links can also bring negative 
impacts on firms. A strong bank-firm relationship gives informational monopoly power 
to the lending bank through multiple interactions, which is detrimental to firms such as 
getting hold-up problem and informational captured problem. In particular, this monopoly 
position enables banks to exploit their informational advantage on locking-in their 
existing customers and extracting higher rents through repeated lending.  
 
In general, firms are more likely to change credit provider when their severe financial 
constraints cannot be solved by the current bank. Firms may face trade-offs by comparing 
advantages of maintaining the relationship with their current bank against the potential 
benefits (e.g., better loan condition) of switching to a new bank (Stephan et al., 2012). As 
Boot (2000) suggests that private information plays a crucial role in bank-borrower 
relationships, and the magnitude of private information increase as a bank deals with any 
given clients over time. Indeed, banks accumulate private information, especially soft 
information from repeated interactions with firms over time and build up closer 
relationships with them. Most theories predict that repeated borrowing from a particular 
bank reveals information about the firm’s type and a strong banking relationship can 
reduce the informational problem. While the rival banks do not have this private 
information would charge a higher loan rate when firm switches, this could worsen the 
borrower’s financial constraint. There is broad theoretical and empirical agreement on the 
view that closer and stable firm-bank relationships efficiently build up a unique 
management structure, it not only alleviate the level of information asymmetry between 
firm and bank, but also enables firms to access bank credit easily with lower loan rates 
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and better loan conditions (e.g. Berger and Udell, 1995; Bharath et al, 2011; Boot and 
Thakor, 1994; Cole, 1998; Elsas and Krahnen, 1998). 
 
However, a long-term and stable bank relationship is not the only choice for firms. The 
likelihood of switching is higher when firms face financial constraints which cannot be 
solved by their incumbent bank. A plenty contribution have stressed the inertia effect 
resulting from information capture problems or from the presence of costs associated with 
the search for a new bank or their switch behaviour, and argue that this customer 
relationship allows banks to take their informational advantage over competitors and lock-
in their existing borrower, which enables them to charge higher interest rate to earn higher 
profits as relationship continues (e.g. Sharp, 1990; Rajan, 1992; Boot, 2000; Yin and Wu, 
2015). However, the lock-in effect can be alleviated through either reducing the loan 
amount that borrows from incumbent banks or forming multiple bank relationships (e.g. 
Hubert and Schafer, 2002; Agostino et al., 2012). The main advantage of having multiple 
bank relationships is that the probability of liquidity risk and informational lock-in can be 
effectively diluted, though these multiple bank relationships may induce cost of transaction 
and monitoring. Literally, firms have considered to terminate the incumbent bank 
relationship and switch to other banks to overcome the financial distress when their credit 
needs cannot be fulfilled by the incumbent bank. In addition, a borrower may terminate the 
incumbent loan relationship and switch whenever sufficiently better loan conditions are 
provided by other banks. Besides, firm’s decision to terminate an incumbent bank 
relationship or switch to other lender determines by various factors such as firm’s 
characteristics including ownership structure, transparency, external finance requirement, 
bank’s lending decision and economic environment. 
 
This issue is particularly important for the Chinese economy, even though the occurrence 
of switching behaviour in China is slightly different from those in the Western economies. 
In a Chinese characteristic economy, switching from one loan provider to another does not 
necessarily imply a complete relationship termination with its previous loan provider. 
Hence, using the term “changing” may better reflect the actual meaning of switching under 
this specific context1. The rapid development of the Chinese economy has been matched 
                                                 
1 Both the term “change” and “switch” has been used frequently in this thesis, while a switch in China is 
clarified slightly differs from the existing literature, which captures the firm-bank relationships in a Chinese 
characteristic condition.  
  
 
  3  
 
by the speed of growth of the loan market. While the formal financial sector in China has 
seen the fast growth of the capital market, it remains dominated by the banking industry. 
China has a unique banking system and its banking market is large and continues expanding. 
With concentrated ownership and weak investor protection in emerging markets, the 
management and boards of directors of some listed state firms become less effective 
because they are mainly or partially controlled by the state or local governments. In this 
sense, how bank relations influence the firm’s financial policies and loan decision is 
particularly related in an emerging market. Although many types of banks were begun to 
emerge locally, the state-owned banks were concerned less about the competition because 
of the dominance of state ownership and the size of their assets.  
 
According to the National Bureau of Statistics of China, 54% of total financing for Chinese 
firms were from banks in 2016. Historically, the banking market was dominated by the 
state-owned banks (SOBs) and the economy was almost exclusively made up of state-
owned enterprises (SOEs). These SOBs are also still part of SOEs, even though the recent 
spate of banking reforms have severed the formal links of the SOBs to the socialist plan 
(Chang et al., 2014). It is commonly recognized that the SOEs were favoured over non-
SOEs in access to bank credit due to government’s dual dominance in banking and 
commerce. SOBs often lend to SOEs for political, employment and taxation purposes 
rather than maximization of profits, and the state ownership homogeneity and implicit 
government guarantees result in this lending bias. While non-SOEs were expected to obtain 
funds less easily and pledge more collaterals with a higher loan rate. Lending from SOBs 
to SOEs can be considered as political relationship lending, which represents a significant 
cultural component – “guanxi” of bank-firm relationships in China. Generally, “guanxi" 
includes a mixed concept of business relationship management, political party affiliation 
and personal social networks, this strengthens the traditional concept of “guanxi” in 
Chinese business which cemented the bank-firm relationship between SOEs and SOBs. 
Firms changing their loan provider in this environment would be expected to be rare. 
 
However, the exclusivity and strength of this relationship, and the lack of opportunity for 
the SOBs to diversify, has partly been the reason for their historically high non-performing 
loan (NPL) ratio. With the evolution of SOEs and the reform of the banking industry in the 
1990s, the NPL ratio of the SOEs declined gradually from 17.9% in 2003 to 1.75% in 2016. 
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The growth of the non-SOE sector and the decline in the share of the SOBs in banking has 
signaled the increased commercialization of firm-bank relationships. The improvement in 
the performance of Chinese banks also indicates a greater focus on credit quality and 
repayment ability. The changing environment of greater competition in banking, and 
increased private sector development is likely to strain traditional firm-bank relationships 
giving rise to a higher frequency of change between bank loan providers.  
 
As one of the crucial element of “guanxi” relationship lending, political connections are 
shown to have a significant influence on the overall economy and the economic life of 
individual firms. Public choice literature suggests that rent-seeking, extraction, and 
protection are the main objectives of government intervention. Companies are not expected 
to obtain a substantial competitive advantage or preferential treatment from their political 
connections in countries with a well-functioning legal system. Government officials with 
the power to influence the decision-making of public companies would face a risk of legal 
and political costs if they chose to help companies for private reasons rather than for 
reasons of public interest (Goldman et al., 2009). Generally, this argument seems true, 
anecdotal stories about the potential impact of political connections in the China market do 
exist.  
 
1.2 Research Questions and Contribution 
In China, it is well-known that firms cultivate multiple bank relationships and therefore 
switching from one loan provider to another does not necessarily imply a weakening of the 
firm-bank relationship with the previous provider. Similarly, the literature on switching of 
banks by firms does not necessarily imply that the firm cannot return to its previous 
provider at a future date. Rather than terminating a current bank relationship and switch to 
other banks completely, firms in China may change their bank loan providers frequently, 
while still maintaining a relationship with their previous banks through loan activities or 
other business activities. My study interrogates the literature on switching of bank loan 
provider by firms to develop a methodology to examine the determinants of a change in 
the loan provider within multiple firm-bank relationships. A number of Chinese scholars 
have examined the role of firm-bank relationships and Yin and Mathews (2016, 2017) have 
explicitly modeled the probabilistic causes of a firm-bank switch. These studies ask the 
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question, what is the probability of a firm switching its main credit provider given initial 
conditions of the firm, the conditions of the bank, and the economic environment?  
 
My study addresses the time-varying factors that contribute to a change. In other words, it 
poses the question, what are the determining factors that cause a switch? These factors 
could be changing conditions of the firm, changing conditions of the bank, changing 
conditions of the external environment, or simply a change in the CEO, which requires a 
repositioning of the firm-bank relationship. The answer to this research question provides 
insights into the commercialization of business relationships that follow from the economic 
reform process in China. How have firm, bank, and economic circumstances changed over 
time to warrant a change in firm’s bank loan provider? To answer this question, I use a 
survival analysis (also known as duration analysis) particularly a semiparametric Cox 
proportional hazard model, which to my best knowledge is a first in the Chinese banking 
literature. Survival analysis, has been commonly used in studying and modelling problems 
that include the duration of time before a particular occurrence. The duration models have 
been used to study the passage of time before a firm changes its existing bank loan provider 
to another bank. The change from one bank loan provider to another can be described 
through a hazard function h(t), which determines the rate at which a firm-bank relationship 
termination occurs, conditional on the relationship spell at least until date t. The most 
important advantage of using a hazard function is that it provides a natural way to interpret 
the process that generates duration, and regression models for duration data are more easily 
grasped by observing how covariates affect the hazard rates.  
 
Since it has been recognized that firms in China switch their loan provider, but where do 
they switch to and what else banks they also borrow? A famous Dirichlet approach that 
commonly used in marketing research to explain and forecast consumer’s buying 
behaviour has been extended to my study, while focusing on firm’s borrowing behaviour 
and choice of lending banks. The Negative Binomial Distribution–Dirichlet (Dirichlet for 
short) is a descriptive model that analyse patterns of past behaviour, which has long been 
applied to investigate the change of buyer behaviour, brand switching, brand loyalty and 
repeat purchase markets in the marketing literature, and directly or indirectly describe the 
buying patterns that have been explored for various types of products, and category in many 
countries based on the frequency of past behaviour – how many consumers buy at all, how 
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often they buy, what other brands they buy. In addition to using the Dirichlet model to 
describe firm’s borrowing behaviour, I also incorporate the covariates related to the 
characteristics of firms, executives, banks and economic environment to investigate how 
these factors influence the borrowing frequency, choice and loyalty of firms, as well as 
changing the market share of different groups of banks.  
 
 “guanxi” is believed to be a significant element in firm-bank relationship. To narrow down 
the concept of “guanxi”, my study tends to focus only on firm’s ownership and political 
links. Existing studies have examined firms’ political connections in various aspects, terms 
of borrowing, market valuation, long-term performance, bailout events, taxation policy, 
and government contracts (Faccio, 2006; Goldman et al., 2013; Khwaja and Mian, 2005; 
Fan et al., 2007; Pan et al., 2009). However, how political connection affects the firm’s 
decision on switching credit provider – an important corporate event for firms to evaluate 
their bank relationships – has yet not been examined. A standard Logit model is employed 
to examine the role of CEO’s political connection. 
 
It is commonly recognized that firms in China borrow from multiple banks simultaneously 
and thereby changing from one bank to another does not necessarily mean that weakens 
the relationship with previous banks or even terminates this current relationship. Forming 
a new relationship when a past loan deal with firm’s current bank is outstanding is also 
considered as a switch through adding a new bank relationship. Hence, following the 
definition made by Ioannidou and Ongena (2010) that a Switch is defined as a firm obtains 
loan from a new bank with which it did not have a lending relationship during the previous 
12 months, firm’s switch behaviour in the China market could be defined by either moving 
to other banks (terminating current relationship) or adding a new bank relationship in or 
after a current deal with its incumbent bank.  
 
The study on firm’s switching behaviour, duration of firm-bank relationships, firm’s 
borrowing choices and the role of political ties is quite a handful, which leaves these fields 
unexplored. My thesis seeks to fill these gaps by conducting the research using both listed 
state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs) in China. The main objective of 
my thesis is to provide empirical evidence and fill literature gap for these unexplored fields, 
also improve the understanding of the bank-firm relationship as well as the drivers of firm’s 
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decision on switching. The main contribution of this study is that I firstly use a survival 
analysis to analyse the firm-bank relationship in China, which has been widely used for 
this topic in Norwegian, Portuguese, Greek and French markets (see e.g., Ongena and 
Smith, 2001; Farinha and Santos, 2002; Mavri and Ioannou, 2008; Bouchellal and Castro, 
2016). In addition, my thesis contributes to the cross-disciplinary literature by testing the 
applicability of a well-known model of customer purchasing behaviour, the NBD– 
Dirichlet model, to loan activity between listed companies and banks. Applying and 
extending this marketing approach to analyse the borrowing patterns of listed firms is also 
a first in the literature of China’s loan market. Apart from applying these new measurement 
techniques, my thesis also incorporates various time-varying covariates and investigate 
whether changing the condition of firms, management, banks, and the external environment 
would affect firms’ borrowing choices and their switching bank behaviour. Moreover, 
complementary to a descriptive marketing approach to describe the borrowing behaviour 
in the loan market for the past twenty years, I extend this approach by incorporating 
characteristics of various sets of covariates to help understand borrowing choice made by 
firms, not just the quantity or frequency of selections the firms decide to make. Furthermore, 
management factors are considered in my thesis that includes characteristics of executives 
such as age, gender, tenure, and their political ties, which emphases the role of managerial 
characteristics and provide a comprehensive measurement of political connection that fits 
China condition more.  
 
1.3 Outline 
This thesis consists of six chapters, the second chapter provides a general background of 
state and non-state enterprises operating in China, emphasizes the evolution of state-owned 
enterprises and a rise in the private sector. Next, it gives an introduction of China banking 
system and discusses the lending relationship has changed in recent years.  
 
The third chapter applies a survival analysis and examines the duration of bank-firm 
relationship for different groups of firms (including state-owned, non-state-owned firms, 
large, and small and medium-sized firms) and main drivers to cause these relationship 
changed by using a sample of matched data on bank-firm lending that consists 2,102 China 
listed firms over the period 1996-2016. Besides, it describes the methodology and gives a 
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brief description of how these duration data collected and matched to create a unique firm-
bank relationship dataset. Moreover, it investigates the factors that alter the duration of the 
firm-bank relationship in China.   
 
The fourth chapter extends the switching behaviour of listed firms observed from the third 
chapter, proposes a new methodology – Dirichlet approach to analyze listed firms’ 
borrowing behaviour. In particular, this chapter breaks the sample period into 2 periods in 
order to differentiate the borrowing patterns prior and post-financial crisis in 2008 and 
examine how these patterns change by the financial crisis. Apart from this, performances 
of major bank types operating in China will be presented to help understand the firm’s 
choice of choosing their lending banks.   
 
The fifth chapter explores the role of the firm’s political connection and complements to 
existing literature on the effect of political connection by using the data of CEO’s political 
background. This chapter firstly introduces the major types of political connection in China, 
and it describes measurement and develops the hypothesis. Estimate results and discussion 
will then be presented. 
 
Finally, the last chapter concludes this thesis by summarizing findings from each chapter 
and provides discussion, policy implications and suggestions for further research. 
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2 General Background 
 
2.1 Introduction  
The economic growth in China over the past four decades is unprecedented in global 
economic history. Over the period, the character of China’s economic management has 
evolved from being strictly centrally planned, export-oriented and state driven to one that 
is more market driven and oriented towards domestic consumption. China’s GDP level has 
achieved an average annual growth rate of 10 percent in the past 40 years (National Bureau 
of Statistics of China, 2017). Today, China is the world’s largest economy on a purchasing 
power parity basis. It is the world’s largest manufacturer, exporter and holder of foreign 
exchange reserves. All of these impressive achievements are attributed to the persistence 
and far-reaching changes in China’s economy and society. The Chinese government has 
also committed to reforms in banking, securities and insurance. These included 
diversifying banks’ equity structures and transforming state-owned banks into joint-stock 
banks. Another key element of reform is allowing more foreign participation in China’s 
capital markets. China’s “reform and opening” efforts have also allowed it to enter an era 
of new economic growth.  
China improved its economic growth during the global financial crisis through a massive 
stimulus program, financed almost entirely by an increase in bank lending. However, the 
credit-driven growth in recent years has been criticized in two aspects. First, although the 
stimulus program allowed China to achieve growth averaging well above 9 percent in 2009-
11, growth since has dropped under 8 percent, even as credit has continually expanded, 
which implies that credit has been misallocated (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 
2017). Second, the scale of credit increases in China have frequently been a harbinger of 
financial crises in other economies, typically caused by a sudden stop in credit growth or 
the collapse of an asset bubble (Lardy, 2015) 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the general 
background about the Chinese enterprises from different perspectives and the role of the 
state-owned enterprise. Section 3 outlines the reform of state-owned enterprises and 
dramatic growth in China’s private sector in recent years. Section 4 provides an overview 
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of China’s banking system, outlines the role and characteristics of different types of banks, 
their history and development during the past few decades. Section 5 demonstrates 
borrowing-lending relationships and emphasizes the change of these relationships. Section 
6 concludes this chapter. 
 
2.2 The Role of State-owned Enterprises in China  
Before China’s economic reform in the late 1970s, private economy activity and the role 
of the market were severely constrained and the role of state and state-owned enterprises 
was pervasive. State Planning Commission target output level for major products, which 
in the situation of industrial goods were produced almost wholly by state-owned firms, and 
organized for the supplies of raw material and intermediate goods needed to achieve these 
production targets. Almost all prices were set by the State Price Commission, including 
agricultural products, investment goods, and retail commodities. The Ministry of Finance 
provided funding for investment in most of these state firms through government budgeting. 
In general, more than a third of total output was allocated by the unified state budget, a 
considerably large share for a low-income economy with minimal transfer payments to its 
citizens. 
The non-agricultural sector was largely dominated by state-owned firms in China, a legacy 
of the system of central economic planning launched in the mid-1950s. In industry, the 
state-owned enterprise accounted for only about one-quarter of all firms in 1978, but the 
balance of firms was collectively owned, which almost invariably implies a certain degree 
of ownership that control by provincial or local governments. Apart from this, four-fifths 
of industrial output produced by state-owned enterprises and seven-tenths of industrial 
employment provided by state-owned enterprises, also the state-owned firms dominate the 
lion’s share of industrial fixed assets. Moreover, state-owned units also controlled most 
constituents of the tertiary sector, even though in some cases collective, quasi-
governmental units had a considerable presence as well. 
In the 1980s, most SOEs were assigned a compulsory plan for input, output and 
employment. Until the end of that decade, some SOEs had additional capacity available for 
production of above-plan and were allocated to exchange a small amount of goods in the 
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market. The surpluses of government-controlled firms became the main source of 
government revenue. Due to the distorted price system in the centrally-planned economy, 
SOEs became highly profitable, even though they were not very efficient, and they served 
as a “cash cow” for the government and even for the whole economy in China (Naughton, 
2007). At that period, SOEs were seen as the pillar and the core of the whole economy. 
Most of the state enterprises that are nominally “state-owned” are not actually controlled 
by the central government. Central SOEs are defined as SOEs that controlled by ministries 
of central government such as State-owned Asset Supervision and Administration 
Commission of the State Council (SASAC, which manages more than 100 Central SOEs), 
Ministry of Finance and China Banking Regulatory Commission. The central government 
decides only to keep control of large SOEs and to release more autonomy to small-sized 
SOEs after the development of small enterprises in the mid-1990s, therefore the central 
government will not be able to manage effective oversight of assets of all types of SOEs. 
Apart from central government, the local government obtain the power to participate 
decision making and supervision of local SOEs and exert an effect on financing and 
production materials. Similarly, local SASACs were launched at the provincial and 
municipal level during 2004 and 2005, the authority to supervise local SOEs was delegated 
to local government especially local SASAC. Local SOEs were seen as the core of the local 
economy, which ensures that they could access more financial and political support from 
governments than private enterprises. 
China’s economy has been characterized by a remarkable extent of provincial economy 
autarky due to local protection combined with weak institutional and physical 
infrastructure to facilitate interprovincial trade (Young, 2000). Consequently, this 
argument indicates China had around 30 semiautonomous provincial-level markets rather 
than an integrated national market. Hence, lacking regional economic integration increases 
the possibility that state enterprises in some industries, in some localities could execute 
market power also increase their prices above competitive levels in spite of a comparatively 
large number of state and private enterprises on a national basis.  
It is commonly recognized that state-owned firms in China have substantial market power 
in many sectors, which allows them to control prices and obtain above-normal profits. 
Competition is restrained either completely by state regulations discouraging the private 
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firms enter into these sectors or by a lack of accessibility to bank credit and other sources 
of funding by private competitors, which efficiently preserve incumbent state-owned firms, 
especially in more capital-intensive industries. Although the share on the output produced 
by state firms in the most sector has reduced remarkably, today’s SOEs are more powerful 
than ever, even if fewer in number. Indeed, there was only one Chinese enterprise included 
in the Fortune Global 500 in 1990, but 115 Chinese enterprises made the list by the end of 
2017, three of them were even made it into the top five according to their revenues, which 
are State Grid, China National Petroleum and Sinopec Group. More than 80% of these 
firms were state enterprises or enterprises that under the control of the administration of 
the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council.   
Even in sectors closely related to heavy industry, where one might expect a minority of 
very large state firms to dominate, the opposite is true. For example, until 2015 there were 
937 state-controlled firms in coal mining, 389 in steel production, 263 in nonferrous metal 
ores mining and processing, 152 in ferrous metal ore mining and processing, and so on 
(National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2016). It is difficult to picture that these firms can 
execute extensive market power given that a large number of state participants in most 
sectors. Although it had the possibility that such many state-controlled firms to collude to 
limit production output and increase prices or there were a central government authority or 
party unit implement this function, there is an even larger number of private firms across 
these industries. For instance, there were 3,229 private firms in coal mining industry in 
2015, 6,243 in steel, 915 in nonferrous metal ores and 1,730 in ferrous metal ores (National 
Bureau of Statistics of China, 2016). 
 
2.3 Reform of SOEs and A Rise of The Private Sector 
Due to a number of reasons, state-owned firms’ profits dropped steadily in the 1980s and 
well into the 1990s. Firstly, easing off government’ s monopoly over a wide scale of 
industry brought startup for a large number of new firms, and most private firms entered 
profitable segments of the industrial sector, in which enhancing competition and eroding 
the profits of the incumbent state-owned firms (Naughton, 2007). Moreover, state-owned 
firms commit oneself to an increasing share of their revenues to providing benefits to their 
workers, that including everything from health care and pension to subsidize housing, 
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which is known as the “Five Social Insurance and One Housing Fund”. Though these 
developments put downward pressure on the profitability of state enterprises, before that 
about a fifth of all state-owned firms were suffering financial losses in the early 1980s. 
Besides, the average debt to equity ratio of state enterprises increased steadily over 100 
percent in 1989 and reaching 300 percent by 1994, which could be viewed as another 
indicator confirmed the increasingly precarious financial condition of state-owned firms. 
Eighty-five percent of the liabilities of these firms was bank debt. Due to the fact that state-
owned enterprises were heavily indebted with low profitability that can cover only a little 
more than half of the interest payable on their bank debt by 1994, many state-owned firms 
continuously enlarge their bank loan cover operating losses and/or to finance capital 
investment that obtains returns to amortize the loans. 
The leaders of Chinese SOEs act as both managers and government officials and tend to 
give priority to their political career, requiring that they ensure the security of state assets 
or social stability or duly perform assigned by administrative tasks, while the firm could be 
more profitable if it operated uninhibited in the market (Li and Xia 2008). In other words, 
many SOEs either operate in public sectors where profit maximization is a less important 
object to start with.  In addition, institutional arrangements, include weak incentive 
mechanisms and government interference in corporate decision making are also viewed as 
reasons for poor performance of some SOEs (Park et al., 2006).  
An effort had been made to restructure the SOEs started in the 1990s. China’s government 
offered more freedom and autonomy to its SOEs since the implementation of the new 
Company Law in 1994 which provided a union legal framework for ownership reform. 
From the mid-1990s, the government began allowing SOEs to go bankrupt or be sold to 
private companies if they had lost their competitiveness, in this sense, the state gives up all 
of its shares. Therefore, it becomes unsurprising that the privilege of privatization at that 
time.  Not only the state-owned enterprises but also the sectors dominated by SOEs such 
as textile and coal industry had been restructured during this period. As a result, a large 
number of SOEs left the market. In 2003, a new organization, the State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) was established through the 
consolidation of various other industry-specific ministries to take over the control of large 
SOEs, which is responsible for managing the remaining SOEs, including approving 
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exchanges of stock or assets and appointing top managers, assessing and monitoring firm 
performance, exercising ownership rights of the central government, as well as designing 
legislation related to SOEs.  
The motivation for SOEs reform came not only from economic but also from political 
perspectives, such as the ambition to give a greater role to market forces in domestic 
demand through improved enterprise autonomy, and central government policies to 
promote large businesses with a view to the nation’s strategic integration with the world 
economy. Hence, the establishment of modern, flexible, and efficient corporations is the 
crucial prerequisite to moving to a higher level of the market economy. Although past SOE 
reforms have already brought some achievements in terms of average firm performance, 
detrimental effects from the ownership of state enterprises remain an issue in many areas. 
In spite of reforms, it is still widely believed that China’s SOEs tend to have lower 
performance than private or foreign enterprise in the market. At the same time, their role 
in the market is artificially enhanced by preferential policies and unfair competitions 
supported by both central and local governments (Sheng and Zhao 2012).  
The limit success of the early efforts to improve productivity and profitability in state-
owned firms by increasing enterprise autonomy turned China to the next stage of economic 
reform that focused on the market economy in 1993. Following the idea of “Grasping the 
large and releasing the small”, a number of market-supporting institutions had been created, 
such as fiscal federalism, stressed the separation of state-owned enterprises from the 
government, and most importantly, for the first time introduced the privatization of smaller 
state-owned firms. Privatization of small state-owned firms basically took the form of sale 
of shares to employees, where the sale price of the firm was always equal to the value of 
outstanding bank loans plus other debt.  Hence, these firms were transformed from state-
owned companies into stock cooperative companies, and many later converted to limited 
liability companies after the Company law made it possible in 1994. As money-losing firms 
went bankrupt, were merged with profitable firms or were privatized, the number of state-
owned industrial firms dropped from 127,600 in 1996 to 61,301 in 1999, 19,273 in 2015 
(National Bureau of Statistic of China, 2016).  
Meanwhile, the government implemented a reform of large state-owned enterprises. This 
“Grasping the large” element of economic reform concentrated on corporatization, which 
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was designed to give manager more authority to ensure the interest of managers and 
government owners can be met, and to allow diversification of ownership, sometimes 
through a public listing. Corporatization restructures firm’s internal corporate governance 
and decreasing state shares while preserving state ownership. This corporate forms of 
ownership included transforming traditional state-owned companies into joint stock 
companies (which is also known as shareholding limited companies) or limited liability 
companies. When these firms are listed, the state typically keeps control, as only a small 
portion of the firm’s shares are sold. As early as 1999, more than 10,000 traditional state-
owned industrial enterprises, about a fifth of the total were corporatized. These 
corporatized firms on average were much larger than the remaining traditional state-owned 
industrial firms as they produced about two-fifths of industrial output. The corporatization 
extended beyond the industrial sector. There were 442,000 traditional state-owned 
enterprises in 1996, three-quarters of them outside of the industrial sector. By 2003 this 
number was dropped to 370,000 and continually dropped to only 132,373 by 2015 
(National Bureau Statistics of China, 2016). This remarkable reduction reflects the 
transformation of about 100,000 of these companies into state-controlled limited liability 
and shareholding limited companies, the bankruptcy and exit of small, loss-making 
industrial firms, and the widespread privatization of traditional state-owned firms in some 
components of the service sector. 
Even though “Grasping the large and releasing the small” considerably enhance the role of 
the private sector in many segments of the economy, the state is still the major or dominant 
shareholder for state companies (whether traditional ones or limited liability firms and 
shareholding limited companies) in several domains. Specifically, state firms continue to 
retain a monopoly or close monopoly position in telecommunication services, financial 
services, oil and gas extraction, tobacco and public utilities such as water and electricity 
supply. In short, although the number of state firms has reduced dramatically, the remaining 
firms are much larger with higher market power. 
On the other side, the private sector grew extraordinary rapid throughout the reform era 
even though government policies that limited their development initially, which now 
becomes the main driver of China’s economic growth, employment, and exports and even 
started to contribute to the increase in China’s outbound foreign direct investment in current 
years. In addition to this, an improvement of private enterprises’ access to bank credit made 
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them continue to outperform state-owned enterprises by a wide margin both during and 
after the financial crisis.  
Due to the fact that China always has hybrid forms or ownership, containing collectives, 
cooperatives, and joint ownership that neither belong to state nor private category, it is not 
easy to separate industry, construction and services sectors into state and private domains. 
The private sector plays an important role in generating output, employment and exports 
in the last decades, the definition of private here is the sum of registered private firms and 
individual business. There was a rise in private enterprises and a decline in the role of state 
enterprises, the share of industrial output produced by state firms (including both traditional 
state-owned firms and firms in other registration categories where the state is the majority 
of dominant shareholder) dropped from 78 percent in 1978 to only 21 percent by 2015 
(National Bureau of Statistic of China, 2016). Therefore, understanding the transforming 
ownership arrangements in industries is important to investigate the evolving relative roles 
of state and non-state firms in the Chinese economy. 
State firms retreated in Chinese industry has been across nearly all product lines and the 
industrial output produced by state enterprises declined substantially. For example, there 
were only 6 of 40 branches of industry where state firms produced more than 50% of output 
by 2012. Two of them, electric power and water are natural monopolies in which state 
dominant is common in many market economies. Moreover, the state also monopolizes the 
oil and gas extraction industry, perhaps for strategic reasons, thus three largest national oil 
companies (China National Petroleum, China Petrochemical Corporation and China 
National Offshore Oil Corporation) continue to control over 90% of oil and gas extraction, 
while the one-time dominance of these enterprises in some downstream activities has been 
considerably reduced. In particular, their monopoly position in refining has gradually 
eroded and accounted for less than 80% of refined petroleum by 2015, because the share 
of refining had been split into private and foreign enterprises. In the same way, with the 
collapse of collective construction enterprises and the rapid growth of private sector, non-
state enterprises now controlled this industry, they accounted for about three-quarters of 
employment and two-thirds of the value of construction (National Bureau of Statistic of 
China, 2015).  
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However, unlike in agriculture, industry and construction, there was no change in 
ownership in large swaths of China’s service sector. It has been recognizing that state-
owned and state-controlled firms still completely dominant several key components of 
services sector: finance, which includes banking, insurance, securities, and asset 
management; telecommunications; and some forms transportation (airlines, rail, and ocean 
shipping), which frequently but not always are privately run in a market economy. In 
addition, other services such as education, health, social welfare are mainly dominated by 
the state even in a market economy. Besides,  the state also plays a significant role in 
journalism and publishing, broadcasting and movies, culture and art, and sports, a pattern 
typical in one-party, authoritarian political systems. On the other side, there was a 
significant ownership transformation in retail, wholesale and catering industry. The private 
retailers, wholesale and catering enterprises accounted for two-thirds of all enterprises in 
these industries and accounted for four-fifths of employment and nearly two-thirds of 
revenue by 2008 ((National Bureau of Statistic of China, 2009). 
Basically, this shift can be explained by the evolution of government policy toward the 
private sector and the greater efficiency of private firms. The policy environment in the 
early era of reform was hostile for private non-agricultural sectors, but this gradually 
changed, encourage the emergence of an improving robust private sector, which also 
became the major source of output across wide swaths of the economy. 
 
2.4 Overview of China’s Banking System 
Chinese banks play a vital role in enabling steady economic growth, in fulfilling firms’ 
huge financial needs, and in accomplishing strategic or policy lending activities. The 
banking sector has experienced a reform since 1978, transiting from a sector operated under 
the orders from social plan to an open and modern competitive industry. The Chinese 
banking system was established in the late 1940s and followed a mono-banking system, 
which was entirely dominated by the central bank and combines the roles of central and 
commercial banking. However, this has been changed after the banking system reform. 
Banking institutions in China include: the state-owned commercial banks (SOBs), policy 
banks (PBs), other commercial banks such as joint-stock commercial banks (JSCBs) and 
city commercial banks (CCBs), the rural banks and foreign banks.  
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The reform of the banking industry began in 1978, which establish a two-tier system with 
setting the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) as the central bank. During the early reform 
stage, the ‘Big Four’ state-owned banks were established or re-established between 1978 
and 1984, they are Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), Agricultural Bank 
of China (ABC), Bank of China (BOC), and China Construction Bank (CCB). The four 
state-owned banks were initially referred to “specialized banks” as they were limited to 
serve only their designed sectors of the economy, but they were allowed to operate in all 
domains of the financial market since 1985. There was a high degree of concentration and 
lack of competition in the banking industry before the 1990s, because the four largest state-
owned commercial banks take a dominant position in China’s banking system and served 
as policy-orient lending from the government. However, this changed by the establishment 
of a plenty of new banks and the gradual expansion of the scope of business of existing 
specialized banks in the 1990s. These state-owned banks have become public listed firms 
now and they are in partnership with strategic foreign investors, which indicates their 
operation becomes more and more commercialized.  
The state delegated the establishment of about a dozen new national joint stock banks 
between the mid-1980s and 1990s, the first three of them are China Citic Bank, Shenzhen 
Development Bank and China Merchants Bank. In addition to this, the state started to 
license urban credit cooperatives in 1986, these urban credit cooperatives merged to form 
urban cooperative banks in most cities networks at the beginning of the mid-1990s. 
Subsequently, these institutions became city commercial banks and rural commercial banks, 
the best known of which are Bank of Beijing and Bank of Shanghai. Besides, three policy 
banks were established in 1995 to take over the policy-orient lending activities from the 
big four banks, they are China Development Bank, Export-Import Bank of China, and 
Agricultural Development Bank of China. They are mainly responsible for supporting the 
state planed or invested projects in various domains.  Meanwhile, the implementation of 
Commercial Bank Law of China in 1994 officially defined the largest four state-owned 
banks as commercial banks and stimulate them to be more commercialized. Up until 2015, 
China had more than 500 banks, which includes 5 large-scale state-owned commercial 
banks (includes Bank of Communication and known as ‘Big5’)2, 3 policy banks, 12 joint-
stock commercial banks, 145 city commercial banks, 468 rural commercial banks, 190 rural 
                                                 
2 Bank of Communication (BOCOM) was restructured in 1987 and became the first national state-owned 
joint-stock commercial bank, after that it became one of the largest commercial banks owned by the state.  
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cooperative banks. Apart from this, more than 40 foreign banks had been set up as legal 
entities in China that with 253 branches and subsidiaries (China Banking Society, 2015).  
With the entrance to WTO in 2001, the five years opening up commitment pressured the 
policymakers to modernize China’s financial system and improve the competitiveness. In 
2003, the establishment of the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) took over 
the role of regulating the banking market and should the responsibly of reform and opening 
up. Generally, high non-performing loans (NPLs) is the most glaring issue of the banking 
sector, most of which are accumulated in the Big Four state-owned banks from poor lending 
decisions to state-owned enterprises (SOEs). After the Asian Financial crisis in 1997, 
China’s financial sector reform started to focus on state-owned banks with the purpose of 
improving their efficiency (i.e. SOBs have been restructured and commercialized into 
market-oriented profit entities and lowering the level of NPLs). As a result of concerted 
effort of government and sustained economic growth, the level of non-performing loans of 
commercial banks on average was declining steadily to 1.75% in 2016, which is much 
lower than 10% in fifteen years ago. The table of NPL ratios for different types of banks in 
the last ten years has been attached in Appendix A – Table A1.  
Before the Asian financial crisis, China’s financial industry is in the midst of a reform to 
establish and complete the system, including the central bank’s independence, the recovery 
of major banks and insurance companies and commercialization reform, the establishment 
and development of joint-stock commercial Banks, small and medium-sized financial 
institutions and the establishment of the capital market and securities companies, etc. 
During this period, China’s financial sector played a crucial role to promote economic 
reform, social stability. In particular, the banking sector has made significant contributions 
to the development of the national economy and social stability as well as it was responsible 
for the cost of enterprise and social transformation. More than a decade after the Asian 
financial crisis in 1997, the Chinese government has greatly accelerated the reform of the 
financial sector, including closing large number of small and medium-sized financial 
institutions with financial problem, the restructuring of financial institutions, to speed up 
the joint-stock reform of large state-owned banks, insurance companies, promote the 
reform of rural credit cooperatives, to promote the reform of management system of interest 
rate and exchange rate, and promote external financial legal system, accounting system, 
financial regulation, financial markets and the reform of the financial ecological aspects. 
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More specifically, under the national financial support, by spinning off non-performing 
loans, inject capital, public listing, the state-owned commercial banks taken on a new look, 
gradually improve their corporate governance, risk control ability and profitability, market 
position and strength also increased significantly, as well as the increasing efficiency and 
ability of serving the national economy and social development, which has laid a good 
foundation for the smooth running of national economy and financial stability. 
Due to the historical reasons, major state-owned commercial banks (Big5) dominate the 
banking sector and held nearly 90% of banking assets before the 1990s. Although the share 
of the asset of these banks slipped gradually in recent years and have relatively low growth 
rate on their assets, this group of bank still accounts for the largest share of bank asset today. 
On the other side, the asset growth rate of other types of the bank increased steadily. The 
second largest bank group is the 12 joint-stock commercial banks, and their total assets 
grow to 474,732 billion RMB in 2016, which are usually considered as having higher 
efficiency and better services than large commercial banks. The city and rural commercial 
banks have the largest number of banks in China. These banks usually have relatively small 
size and focus mainly on the supply of financial services in their local regions. Although 
they are small compared to large commercial banks or joint-stock commercial banks, their 
asset growth rates are extremely high and now becomes the third largest group of the bank 
in China, which presumably implies that small banks also have the competitive power 
based on their local networks (relationship with local enterprises). To the contrary, foreign 
banks remains the smallest market share in the past few years, this may due to they lack a 
relationship network and accumulation of information in the local market, and they lack 
branches because their business mainly focuses on large cities in China, which makes them 
difficult to attract new customers thus limit their services. Besides, since policy banks serve 
the policy-oriented financial projects, their market share remains relatively stable in the last 
decade. 
With the growth of other types of banks and competition in this industry, the share of bank 
assets was held by what the Chinese government classifies as the five largest commercial 
banks have gradually declined and are now just less than half. At the same time, joint-stock 
commercial banks, city commercial banks and foreign banks began to take market shares 
from the largest five state commercial banks in recent years. For example, the market share 
of large five commercial banks, joint-stock commercial banks, city commercial banks, rural 
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commercial banks in 2016 is 37.29%, 18.72%, 12.16%, 8.73%, respectively, and the rest 
of market share 18.96% that accounted by policy banks, foreign banks and Postal Saving 
Bank (China Banking Regulatory Commission, 2017). 
 
2.5 Borrowing – Lending Relationship in China 
China has its own characteristics of bank-firm relationship which are different from those 
relationships in other countries. Although China’s Commercial Banking Law has been 
adopted in 1995 to commercialize the operations of the largest four state-owned banks and 
emphasizes that Chinese commercial banks cannot hold equity of publicly listed firms, all 
the major Chinese banks and most of the listed firms are directly or indirectly owned by 
the Chinese government. The major of lending relations was driven by the government in 
the 1990s, from state-owned banks to state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Since the China 
government completely or partially control banks and some listed firms, the bank would 
decrease the incentive of monitoring loans during the lending duration. Hence, it was not 
surprised that this poor lending practice and corporate governance brought higher non-
performing loans and poor financial performance of state-owned banks during that time. 
In a state-controlled banking system like China, banks have long been commanded by the 
government. Therefore, there are naturally close political connections between state banks 
and state-owned enterprises, this natural close relationship between state-owned banks and 
state-owned enterprises can be seen as “guanxi” relationship lending, which represents a 
significant cultural component of bank-firm relationships in China. It is postulated that the 
central and local governments can influence the loan activities of these banks. The state-
owned banks’ decision to grant loans was usually based on unofficial assessment criteria. 
Severe papers provide evidence of SOEs were favoured over non-SOEs in accessing these 
bank loans3, because state-owned banks often lending to SOEs mainly for the purposes of 
political, employment and taxation rather than maximization of profits. Put it differently, 
these banks made a rational lending decision to bias their loans against non-SOEs on the 
basis of higher risks, higher transaction and evaluation costs. Since the Chinese government 
has ownership in both the state-owned commercial banks and state-owned enterprises, its 
                                                 
3 See Wei and Wang (1997); Cull and Xu (2003). 
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paternalistic behaviour may force the state-owned commercial banks are obliged to grant 
loans to the state-owned enterprises. In other words, lending by state-owned commercial 
banks to state-owned enterprises is mainly due to political pressure (from either the central 
or local government). Hence, it is usual to observe that the government directly or indirectly 
control banks to provide financial support to state-owned enterprises in many ways, even 
financing heavily to those poor performances or loss-making firms. This is also known as 
a soft budget constraint, firms do not concern too much about financial risk and they always 
wait for the bailout (Lu, et al., 2005). 
The private sector in China had little access to credit in the early years of the reform era, 
especially the private non-agricultural business. They were fully funded by household 
savings, borrowing from family and friends and other informal sources of finance such as 
rotating credit associations rather than by borrowing from a formal financial system. Banks 
everywhere were extremely unwilling to extend credit to small start-up firms with little or 
no collateral. Until the Company Law came in to effect in 1994, the private sector began 
to develop rapidly, as well as the rapid growth of short-term credit to private firms 
beginning in the mid-1990s. In addition, small enterprises’ “too expensive for financing” 
problem is commonly observed in China. Due to the fact that a large number of small-
medium sized enterprises are young, small, weak and risky in China, their profit margin, 
stability, information credibility are very low, and they have little sense of credit, 
commercial banks would require a relatively higher level of collaterals to protect 
themselves against firm’s default. The direct financing method from an external source of 
formal financing has been constrained by the low capacity of the capital market, sizes of 
SMEs and lack of information disclosure, while it is suggested that relationship lending 
seems like an effective mechanism to mitigate the credit financing constraint and solve the 
financing problem of SMEs in China4. Under the risk and profitability consideration, banks 
may prefer to lend to large firms (Zhou and Li, 2005). In this sense, informal financing 
seems like an effective way of obtaining external funds for this group of firms, which is 
the borrowing that occurs outside the formal financial system that includes loans from 
family members, friends, suppliers, moneylenders (“loan sharks”) and informal banks. The 
main benefit of informal finance is that the information asymmetries between informal 
lenders and their borrowers are less acute because of informal finance relies on 
                                                 
4 See Ge and Tong (2012); Zhang et al. (2013); Zhao and Tan (2012). 
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relationships and reputation, therefore the loan application soften and the requirement of 
collateral easier to fulfil. In addition, to some extent, informal financiers are better 
positioned to effectively monitor and enforce repayment when legal enforcement is 
difficult and time-consuming as in the situation of China’s fast moving economy (Degryse 
et al., 2013). On the other side, formal finance may offer a cheaper source of financing in 
China compare to the expensive loan cost from informal financing. Unlike informal 
financiers, for instance, large commercial banks operate in a widespread geographic 
footprint, face fewer limitations in attracting deposits, and beneficial from the protections 
of deposit insurance.  
Not only the evolution of government policy but also the institutional transformation in the 
financial sector facilitate this increased flow of credit loans to the private sector. Initially, 
state-owned banks have complete domination of the financial sector at the start of reform 
years, so that all loans to the private sector came from state-owned banks. But in the 1980s 
and the early years of the 1990s, these institutions were not appropriate to lend to small 
private firms or individual business, thus state-owned banks then lent money mainly to 
large state-owned enterprises. Two reasons that can explain this lending preferential 
towards the state-owned enterprises, one is that these firms have massive assets that could 
serve as collateral and the other is because lending to these enterprises was either implicitly 
or explicitly guaranteed by the state. Indeed, a large share of the lending of state-owned 
banks was “policy lending” conducted at the direction of the state planning projects (Lardy, 
2014). 
However, the situation began to change with the growth of urban credit cooperatives when 
they had been formally authorized in the mid-1980s. Though the four largest state-owned 
banks had a vast network of offices that covered every city in 1994, urban credit 
cooperatives were able to compete with the existing network of state bank branches by 
providing better services to depositors, mainly non-state enterprises and individuals. These 
urban credit cooperatives were merged to form city commercial banks since the 
promulgation of “Regulation on Urban Cooperative Banks” in 1995, and their share of the 
assets elevated steadily in the 2000s, and they channelled an increasing volume of credit 
loans to the private sector. In addition to this, legal developments also stimulate a rising 
flow of bank loans to small enterprises, mostly private and family business. For example, 
the promulgation of the Property Rights Law in 2007 allowing that moveable assets, such 
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as machinery and equipment and inventories of raw materials, semi-finished goods, and 
finished goods could be used as collateral for bank loans, which increases the accessibility 
of bank loans and thus led to a rise in bank lending to small and private enterprises. 
Using the data on bank lending to enterprises released by the central bank in 2012 that base 
on the nature of the firm’s majority or dominant shareholder and shows that new lending 
flowing to private firms were responsible for an average of 52% of new loans between 
2010 and 2012, while the share of state firms averaged only 32% in the same period5.  
Moreover, the share of outstanding loans of state firms was 56%, more than twice the 26% 
share of private firms in 2009. While the share of outstanding loans of private firms had 
increased by 10% and a fall in the share of state firms in 20126. In short, though the large 
share of loans going to state enterprises in the last few decades, these statistics taken 
together clearly show that privately-controlled firms’ ability to access bank loans 
significantly increased starting in 2010, or even earlier. Chinese private firms now enjoy 
better access to credit than in any previous period in the reform era.  
In the same way, the creditworthiness of private sector elevates gradually in the last two 
decades. The interest coverage ratio is commonly used to measure the creditworthiness in 
market economies, which is the ratio of firm’s earnings before interest and taxed to its 
interest expenses. The private enterprises have been consistently more creditworthy than 
the entire of state-owned and state-controlled enterprises in the mid-1990s, but this 
differential was essentially eliminated for a few years resulting from the improvement of 
state enterprises’ financial performance after their far-reaching reforms in the mid-1990s, 
while private and state enterprises diverged dramatically in the last few years7. Overall, the 
interest coverage ratio of private industrial firms was more than twice higher than the state-
owned enterprises in industrial sector by 2012. Hence, it is not surprising that the private 
sector became an ever more attractive lending market for loan providers particularly those 
profit-oriented financial institutions. 
 
                                                 
5 see Appendix A–Figure A1. 
6 see Appendix A–Figure A2. 
7 see Appendix A–Figure A3. 
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2.6 Monetary Policy  
China’s monetary policy has been in change in recent years. To guide liquidity levels, the 
central bank – People’s Bank of China (PBoC) implement adjustments in its monetary 
framework to pave the way for establishing a short-term PBoC policy rate like that used in 
advanced economies. In China, the PBoC takes large control and influence over Chinese 
interest rates and financial market. The three main responsibilities of PBoC are to 
implement monetary policy, eliminate financial risk and maintain financial stability. The 
PBoC controls China’s monetary policy mechanism currently, which includes benchmark 
interest rates, reserve requirement ratio and open market operations (OMO). Hence, 
changes in these policy instruments could bring crucial macro effects on lending and 
borrowing among banks and firms.  
2.6.1 Interest Rate  
The financial system is crucial to the economy and the interest rate plays a key role in 
effective resources allocation in the financial system. In China, the PBoC sets the 
benchmark deposit and lending rates for all financial institutions. Different from other 
central banks, which only set the overnight rate, the PBoC sets rates for multiple maturities 
and extend from overnight to five years. The PBoC does not have a regularly published 
calendar of rate-setting dates and instead adjust rates at its discretion. Generally, banks 
were obliged to apply these rates to all deposits and loans, while this may bring large 
distortions. Since banks may prefer to lend to low risk, government-connected entities 
while depositors favoured large low-risk banks. To eliminate this issue and allow some 
flexibility to price credit risks, the PBoC allowed banks to offer a range of borrowing and 
lending rates within a narrow band. The PBoC lending rate provides the commercial banks 
a certain degree in setting their interest rates according to their assessment. For the lending 
rates, the ceiling and floor were widened several times before being fully removed in 2013, 
which effectively completely liberalizing bank lending. Hence, commercial banks had been 
free to set lending rates since 2013 and they choose benchmark lending rates were only 
guidelines. On the other side, though the floor of deposit rates has been removed, a quite 
restrictive ceiling still remains until October 2015. Overall, even though the liberalizations 
of deposit and lending rates since 2004 demonstrate progress towards market-determined 
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interest rates, the central bank still control interest rate in reality. Furthering interest rate 
liberalization is necessary for optimizing the allocation of financial resources. 
Although banks’ newfound flexibility to price loans above and below the PBoC benchmark 
rate, nearly 90% of all loans are still priced very close to the benchmark because banks 
hardly to ascertain a suitable market-determined reference rate. In the same way, most of 
the deposits are currently priced around the ceiling of deposit rates. These imply that a 
conflict between weak bank pricing power and a desire to remain net interest margins.   
The development of the PBoC lending rate displayed in Figure 2.1 shows that the PBoC 
lending rate had a sharp decline during two financial crisis periods, then kept stable 
between 1999 and 2005. The development of the PBoC lending rate in 2006 points to an 
improved ability to fine-tune this instrument from the side of the PBoC. Two slight 
increases of the PBoC lending rates followed each other very shortly in that year. Similarly, 
six and five slight increases of the PBoC lending rates in 2007 and 2010, respectively.  
Figure 2.1: Development of the lending rate in China, 1996-2016 
Source: People’s Bank of China (2017). 
Although the lending rates have been liberalized, banks can still obtain excess profits 
because of the low deposit rates. Due to the fact that state-owned banks could obtain funds 
at a comparatively low cost, they lacked the incentive to enhance fund service efficiency 
and thus favoured to provide loans to large state-owned enterprises, rather than to private 
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and small enterprises. Though implementing targeted credit expansion could relax the 
pressure on funds shortage in the agriculture sector and micro, small and medium enterprise 
to some extent, it still unable to radically improve the allocation efficiency of credit 
resources in the long run. In a nutshell, interest rate liberalization was an inevitable 
challenge which China must overcome in order to develop financial market better. 
2.6.2 Reserve Requirements 
In order to control the financial sector liquidity, the PBoC introduced minimum reserve 
requirement in 1984, which specifies the percentage of customer deposits that must be 
placed with the central bank. The PBoC frequently adjusts its reserve requirement ratio 
(RRR) for commercial banks as a tool to stabilize economic fluctuations. These 
adjustments not only influence the overall credit supply but also bring reallocation of credit 
and capital. In the beginning, the PBoC set different reserve obligations for different 
deposits according to their origin and the institution. For example, four state-owned banks 
had to hold 20 percent on deposits of companies as well as 40 percent on saving deposits 
of urban and 25 percent of rural origin. In 1985, the PBoC combined all different reserve 
requirements and set one minimum reserve requirement at 10 percent. In April 2004, the 
PBoC formally introduced a policy of “differentiated required reserve ratio for different 
financial institutions”, which implies that the required reserve ratios for different types of 
financial institutions subject to the differentiated regime. More specifically, to identify the 
importance and unique risks of smaller, rural banks, the PBoC established a separate RRR 
for these banks. Currently, the PBoC has favoured targeted rather than general movements 
in the ratio to tactically affect particular types of banks and regions8.   
Figure 2.2 presents the development of the reserve requirement ratio (RRR) between 1996 
and 2016. Since 2006, the PBoC has changed its RRR more than 40 times and these changes 
have been substantial. As can be seen from this figure, the reserve requirements raised 
dramatically from 8.5% to 21.5% during tightening cycles from 2006 to 2011. Through the 
frequent adjustments, the PBoC had made clear that the ability to adjust reserve 
                                                 
8 In addition to domestic RR, the CBRC adopted the core principles of Basle I and II capital adequacy 
requirements in February 2004. The capital adequacy ratios of the five largest state-owned commercial banks 
were all above 11% since 2009.  Similarly, the levels of capital adequacy of the other main joint-stock 
commercial banks were all above 10.5% since 2009, meeting the requirements of Basel III and CBRC 
regulations (Sources: The banks’ annual reports in 2009, 2010 and 2011). 
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requirements provides an additional and comprehensive policy instrument to the current 
monetary policy tool. 
Figure 2.2: Reserve requirement ratio in China, 1996-2016 
Source: People’s Bank of China (2017). 
2.6.3 Window Guidance  
The PBoC engaged in a crucial relaxing of its policy settings to support flagging economic 
growth recently. For example, cutting the PBoC’s interest rates as a part of a relaxing cycle 
that started one year before October 2015, bring the one-year benchmark deposit and 
lending rates down to the record lows of 1.5% and 4.35%, respectively. In addition, the 
PBoC also repeated reduced the reserve requirement ratio for bank deposits during 2015-
2016, the reserve requirement ratio for large lending institutions dropped from 20% to 
16.5% in 2016. Even so, the real economy failed to respond to these relaxing moves, the 
real GDP growth decelerated to 6.7% in 2016 (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 
2017). The effectiveness of China monetary policy framework recently has been weakened 
by the emerging shadow banking sector. The importance of commercial bank lending also 
has been reduced as the financial liberalization and innovation has driven the development 
of new instruments such as wealth-management products, which also bring a significant 
share of lending coming from non-bank sources, including trust loans and peer-to-peer 
lending platforms.    
0.00%
5.00%
10.00%
15.00%
20.00%
25.00%
Large banks Medium and small-sized banks
  
 
  29  
 
Apart from the price-based monetary policy instrument, PBoC also exerts influence 
through non-standard quantitative monetary policy tool such as guidance, loan quotas and 
targets for the M2 money supply.  The use of quantitative tools has long been the norm in 
implementing monetary policy in China as its monetary policy has always been 
predominantly quantitative in nature. Hence, the PBoC’s has relied on lending quotas 
known as “window guidance” which introduced in 1998 to affect bank behaviour and pump 
money into the economy. It relies on moral suasion rather than strict rules to stress banks 
to adjust the volume and pace of credit supply until a credit growth target is met. In 
addition, it also can be used to optimize the credit structure by moderating banks’ credit 
allocation to sectors and regions consistent with policy targets. Since China is recently 
transitioning to a price-based monetary policy, the role of quantity-based monetary tools 
remains complex.  
Following a working paper from Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research written by 
Chen et al. (2017), the step-by-step development of PBoC’s window guidance policy can 
be summarized according to the corresponding economic circumstance at that period. This 
study uses the information they summarized from quarterly China Monetary Policy Report 
(CMPR) from 2001 onward and form an indicator to measure the window guidance policy 
stance.  Referring to Chen et al. (2017)’s paper, the PBoC’s window guidance policy 
generally can be grouped into five stances, which are strongly discouraging, weakly 
discouraging, no specific direction, weakly encouraging and strongly encouraging. The 
definitions of indicators corresponding to five different stances of window guidance have 
been displayed in Table 2.19. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 See Chen et al. (2017) for more details on the timeline of the window guidance policy stance. 
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Table 2.1: Window Guidance Policy Stance 
 
Source: Quarterly China Monetary Policy Report, and Chen et al. (2017). 
To some extent, the influence of window guidance on loan growth is crucial as its target is 
adjusting the quantity and the pace of lending. Applying the classification of window 
guidance stance made by Chen et al. (2017), new loans to GDP ratio, PBoC’s base rate and 
reserve ratio displayed in Figure 2.3 may offer clues on the relationship between window 
guidance policy and loan growth. It is clear to see that relaxing the PBoC’s benchmark 
lending rate and reserve requirement ratio during periods of encouraging window guidance 
gave rise to a significant growth of lending particularly in strongly encouraging period, 
while the supply of new loans show sharp declines during periods of strongly discouraging 
or stabilizes at a low level during periods of weakly discouraging window guidance as 
interest rate and reserve ratio increased.   
 
 
 
 
Indicator Stance Period Definition 
-2 Strongly 
discouraging 
2003Q1-2004Q4 
2006Q2-2008Q2 
2009Q2-2010Q1 
CMPR explicitly discourage growth of 
total credit 
-1 Weakly discouraging 2005Q1-2006Q1 
2010Q1-2012Q2 
CMPR states the target of optimizing 
credit structure, provides risk warning, 
and/or mentions that banks should 
control the pace of credit growth 
0 No explicit direction 2001Q1-2002Q4 
2012Q3-2014Q2 
CMPR only mentions the target of 
optimizing credit structure and 
separately listing the sectors that should 
be both discouraging and encouraging 
(differentiated approach to credit 
guidance) or no explicit direction of 
credit growth 
1 Weakly encouraging 2014Q3-Present CMPR only lists sectors that to be 
encouraged for the target of optimizing 
credit structure 
2 Strongly encouraging 1998Q1-2000Q4 
2008Q3-2009Q1 
CMPR explicitly encourages the growth 
of total credit 
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Figure 2.3: Window guidance stance and the effect on lending growth 
 
 
Source: People’s Bank of China (2017); Quarterly China Monetary Policy Report, and 
Chen et al. (2017). 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
To summarize, this chapter describes the context of the China market, and provides 
background information of Chinese enterprises with a different type of ownership, 
introduces Chinese banking system and discusses the borrowing and lending relationship 
in China. The analysis and discussion in this chapter suggest three main backgrounds for 
the following research. Firstly, is it commonly know that many SOEs either operate in 
public sectors where profit maximization is a less important object to achieve. Although 
the SOEs could be more profitable if it operated unconstrained in the market, the leaders 
of Chinese SOEs act as both managers and government officials and tend to give priority 
to their political career, which requires that they ensure the security of state assets or social 
stability or duly perform assigned by administrative tasks. In addition to this, institutional 
arrangements, include weak incentive mechanisms and government interference in 
corporate decision explain the reasons for SOEs’ poor performance. 
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Secondly, although the private sector in China had an extraordinary growth in the 1990s, 
the state or SOEs still have the monopoly power in particular domains. While there were 
relatively low barriers to enter some contestable sectors of the economy, thus privately 
registered and privately controlled enterprises have largely displaced state enterprises 
especially in manufacturing and mining as well as construction, retailing, wholesaling and 
catering. While there are barriers to entry into some sectors (banking, supply of natural 
utility, education and heavy industry) due to a natural monopoly, high capital requirement 
or government regulation, even though state firms eroded a little bit due to their reform, 
they can still enjoy the dominant position in most senses. 
Third, SOEs and SOBs have a close and stable relationship due to historical factor. The 
early lending relations was driven by the government that from SOB to SOE. However, 
this lending relation and bank-firm relationships have been changed by the recent banking 
reform and the growth of private enterprises, the distribution of loans to private enterprise 
and their access of credit improved considerably in 2009, or even earlier. State enterprises’ 
greater access to bank loans implies not only a residual bias on the part of banks or small 
private enterprises’ lack of collateral but also state policies that systematically exclude 
private enterprise from entering some of the most capital-intensive sectors in China’s 
economy. In other words, it shows that the state and political connection play crucial roles 
in the firm-bank relationship, as well as in the entire economy in China. 
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3 What Cause China Listed Firms To Switch? Evidence 
Based On A Survival Analysis 
 
3.1 Introduction 
A strong firm-bank relationship is generally accepted as fundamental to smooth access to 
credit at favourable terms. The extant theory suggests that while there is a positive impact 
of relationship banking on easing the credit constraints for firms, it also suggests that 
relationship banking creates the conditions for informational capture and lock-in, that may 
result in unfavourable terms and condition in the loan contract (see e.g., Boot, 2000). The 
incumbent bank may exploit this informational advantage to lock-in the existing borrowers 
and extract higher rent through repeated lending.  
With the fast development of the Chinese economy, the loan market has expanded quickly 
as well. Although the formal financial sector in China constitutes banking market and 
capital market (include bond market and stock market), it is mainly dominated by banking 
industry. According to the National Bureau of Statistics of China, bank loans is the most 
popular funding source in China’s loan market, 54% of total financing for Chinese firms 
were from banks in 2016. It is commonly observed that the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
were favoured over non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs) in accessing bank loans 
because of government’s dual ownership on state-owned banks and state-owned 
enterprises. This can be considered as a “guanxi” relationship lending from SOBs to SOEs.   
The non-performing loan ratio of these government banks remained very high in the 2000s 
due to lending bias towards state-owned enterprises, especially those poor performances, 
less efficient or loss-making SOEs. However, the improvement of the overall performance 
of Chinese commercial banks since the reform process indicates that they are moving 
towards a more commercial sector. Under the condition of asymmetric information and 
likelihood of switch, the duration of the bank-firm relationship and the determinants of 
firms switching are worthy for further exploration. Using a semiparametric Cox 
proportional hazard model from survival analysis and incorporating several sets of both 
time-invariant and time-varying covariates, this chapter analyses the duration of firm-bank 
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relationships and examines the main driver of Chinese firms switch their loan provider. 
The advantage of the semiparametric model, over the parametric probit/logit model, is that 
it allows for a nonparametric hazard function without imposing any functional-form 
restriction, while controlling for changes of those factors when a change happens in a 
parametric way. The assumption of the flexibility of the hazard function identifies two 
interesting features of the switching behaviour with respect to loan duration, which is 
periodicity and a declining trend. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the relevant 
theoretical foundation and empirical studies that relate to asymmetric information. Section 
3 demonstrates the methodology, the measurement issue, the empirical set-up based on 
survival analysis. Section 4 describes the data, and details of creating a matched firm-bank 
(loan) relationship set. Section 5 discusses the estimated results, and Section 6 concludes. 
 
3.2 Literature Review 
3.2.1 Asymmetric Information and Switch Behaviour 
Private information plays a key role in bank-borrower relationships, and it is argued that 
banks accumulate private information, from closer relationships and repeated interactions 
with firms. Rival banks that do not have this private information may charge higher loan 
rates if a firm switches from its existing provider. There is broad agreement that closer 
relationships increase credit availability and reduce the cost of bank loans10. But it is also 
argued that a close firm-bank relationship increases loan cost through information capture 
or from the presence of search costs for new loan providers resulting in rent extraction as 
the relationship matures11. However, the lock-in effect can be diluted through a reduction 
in loan size or the initiation of multiple bank relationships12. Maintaining multiple bank 
relationships provides liquidity insurance to firms and enables them to meet liquidity 
problem (Elsas et al., 2005). Moreover, Jimenez and Saurina (2004) suggest that firms 
borrowing from multiple banks may reduce the informational rents of the incumbent bank.  
                                                 
10  For example Berger and Udell (1995); Boot and Thakor (1994); Cole (1998); Elsas and Krahnen (1998) 
11  See Sharpe (1990); Rajan (1992); Boot (2000); Yin et al. (2015) 
12  See Hubert and Schafer (2002); Agostino et al. (2012) 
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The extant literature focusses on the main factors that prompt a firm to switch lenders. 
Firms with an asymmetric information problem are more likely to enter into new banking 
relationships with different types of banks with the objective of meeting their changing 
needs and improve their information quality (Hadlock and James, 2002). The borrower-
lender relationship is also under threat from rival lenders that may provide a superior 
product or lower cost, therefore a borrower may terminate the relationship with the 
incumbent bank whenever sufficiently better loan conditions are offered by competing 
bank (Petersen and Rajan, 1995). As firms’ borrowing needs increase which cannot be met 
by their incumbent banks, they will switch to other banks, firms may also switch banks due 
to a change in the existing relationship bank such as mergers, or restructuring (Gopalan, et 
al., 2011). 
3.2.2 The Determinants of Relationship Duration  
Turning now to the application of duration analysis in modelling switching behaviour, 
Ioannidou and Ongena (2010) employ a unique data set of Bolivian loans during the period 
of 1999 to 2003 to investigate the loan conditions and bank behaviour when firms switch 
to other lenders. They define the switching firm as one that is granted a new loan from a 
bank with which it did not have a lending relationship in the previous 12 months. Banks 
are categorized into two types, ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ banks. The former is the incumbent 
bank that had lending relation in the prior year, while the latter refers to the bank that did 
not lend to the firm in the previous year. Figure 1 illustrates the definition of a switcher, 
inside and outside banks. Firm A is the switcher and Bank 3 is the outside bank for firm A, 
because Bank 3 lent to other firms but not firm A in the prior year. Bank 1 and 2 are the 
switcher’s inside bank as they had a lending relationship in the previous 12 months. Their 
study focuses on the “time for a change” and they find that the main purpose of firms switch 
to new banks is to obtain a lower rate on their loans, but they also find that the new bank 
will charge higher rates once the firm is informationally locked in by the new bank.   
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Figure 3.1: Definitions of switchers, inside bank and outside banks 
 
                           Bank 1 
 Firm A              Bank 2 
                           Bank 3 
                                                                                               Switching loan                                           
t = -12                  t = 0 
= starting and ending dates of a loan 
Source: Ioannidou and Ongena (2010) 
The duration analysis has been prevailing used in medical and engineering fields for a long 
time, also it has been rapidly spread out to other sciences. In economics, it started to be 
adopted in labour economics to identify the duration of unemployment also it has been 
widely used in the analysis of the duration of business cycle phrases. The duration of bank-
firm relationship and the impact of firm-specific characteristics on the likelihood of 
terminating bank relationships or switching from single to multiple relationships was also 
studied by Ongena and Smith (2001), Farinha and Santos (2002) and Bouchellal and Castro 
(2016).  A basic Weibull model has been employed in their studies in order to find the 
duration dependence of these relationships, i.e. whether the likelihood of relationship 
ending is increasing or decreasing (or stable) over time.  
Using a panel data set of the banking relationships of Norwegian firms, Ongena and Smith 
(2001) find that the likelihood of a firm terminating a bank relationship increased with the 
length of the relationship, suggesting that the benefits from relationship decays with time. 
Using both the parametric (Weibull and Exponential) and semi-parametric (Cox) duration 
model that include firm-specific variables, they show that small and young, profitable, 
highly leveraged “growth” firms, and firms that with more than one bank relationship tend 
to maintain shorter relationships. Apart from this, their study documents a positive duration 
dependence in bank relationships, which implies the likelihood of ending a bank 
relationship increase over time.   Moreover, Farinha and Santos (2002) use a parametric 
duration model to model the switch from a single to a multiple bank relationship. Their 
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results provide evidence that firms with more growth opportunities, greater leverage, less 
liquidity, lower profitability and delinquent bank loans are more likely to maintain shorter 
relationships and initial multiple relationships. Similarly, Bouchellal and Castro (2016) use 
a parametric continuous-time Weibull duration model to explore examine the determinants 
of a relationship closure between 1,185 firms and an important French bank. For each 
relationship spell they control for information on the firm-level characteristics, bank market 
power, pricing conditions, specific bank-firm relationship variables and the economic 
environment. Their findings are consistent with those of Ongena and Smith (2001) that 
confirms older firms, and the firms with higher turnover, default probability and profits 
tend to keep a long relationship with the bank. They also find that the lower the banking 
competition, the higher the likelihood of the bank-firm relationship terminate.   
Apart from the duration analysis on bank-firm relationship duration and choice of single or 
multiple banking relationships, some studies attempt to investigate the determinants of a 
firm’s switching behaviour. According to the results from Stephan et al. (2012)’s study, 
large and highly leveraged firms are more likely to switch their main bank in Ukraine. They 
emphasize that the power of the main bank (measured by equity holdings) is the main driver 
of firm switching behaviour. In addition to this, they also find firms have lower 
performance after switching their main bank because of higher loan rates charged by the 
new bank. A study examines that why firms switch to new banks has been conducted by 
Gopalan et al. (2011), their findings suggest that transparent firms and firms do not have 
an existing relationship with large banks are more likely to form new banking relationships. 
Moreover, they find that firms obtain larger loan amounts when they switch and form a 
new banking relationship to overcome borrowing constraint. They also highlight that firms 
may benefit from their switching behaviour with an improvement in sales growth, capital 
expenditure, leverage, analyst coverage, and public issuance. These literatures have been 
summarized in Table 3.1, including their methodology, sample data and key results.  
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Table 3.1: Determinant of Bank-Firm Relationship Duration and Firm Switch 
Note: +++, ++, + denote positive and significant at 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. ---, --, - denote 
negative and significant at 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. ? means unclear effect, which is shown 
as insignificant in regression. OS, Ongena and Smith (2001); FS, Farinha and Santos (2002); STT, 
Stephan, Taspin and Talavera (2009); GUY, Gopalan, Udell and Yerramilli (2011); BC, Bouchellal 
and Castro (2016). TEM, treatment effect model. Main bank power measured by the share of firm’s 
equity held by its main bank. Times of switch, number of times firms switch banks. Prev. large bank 
is a dummy variable that identifies whether the borrowing firm’s relationship bank is large bank or not. 
The hazard function determines the probability of a firm-bank relationship terminates. 
 
3.2.3 Relevant Studies About China 
Several Chinese studies have examined the effect of bank-firm relationship on cost and 
availability of loans and confirm that a strong and close tie between firm and bank reduces 
Paper OS(2001) FS(2002) STT(2012) GUY(2011) BC(2016) 
Country Norway Portugal Ukraine U.S. France 
Observation 383 1,577 8,514 12,806 1185 
Sample period 1979-1995 1980-1996 2002-2006 1995-2006 2008-2013 
Model Survival Survival TEM FE Logit Survival 
Dependent variable Hazard of a 
relationship 
terminates 
Duration of 
single 
relationship 
Probability 
of switching 
Probability 
of new 
relationship 
Hazard of a  
relationship 
ending 
Firm 
characteristics 
     
Firm age ---   ? -- 
Firm size --- --- +++ +++ ++ 
Firm leverage +++  +++ ?  
Profitability +++ +++  ++ -- 
Sales growth  ---    
Liquidity  +++    
Transparency  ? +++ --- ? 
Default prob.    ? -- 
Indebtedness     --- 
Bank 
characteristics 
     
Bank size  ? --- --- +++ 
Main bank power   +++   
Bank leverage   -   
Bank profit  ?    
Bank liquidity  ?    
Competition     +++ 
Lending relations      
Duration      
Number of 
relationship 
+++    ? 
Times of switch  ---    
Prev. large banks    ---  
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the screening and monitoring costs of lenders and therefore reduce firms’ loan costs and 
enhance their accessibility to bank credit. Zhou and Li (2005) use data on 83 SME firms in 
Guangdong province and document that the average duration of the bank-firm relationship 
is 7 years and 11 years for contracts of upper bound and lower bound interest rate loans, 
respectively. In addition, they find a negative relation between the length of relationship 
and the loan cost and collateral requirement, which implies that longer duration of bank-
firm relationship will reduce the cost of loan and the level of collateral requirement but 
improve the access of loans for these firms13.  
A few studies have focussed on the firm-bank relationship in the case of SMEs. Using 
survey data from the World Bank, He and Wang (2009) conduct an empirical research on 
bank-firm relationship and loan cost for 394 firms in 18 cities in China. They use three 
indicators to measure the relationship between banks and firms, which are the length of 
duration, the scope (or the number of bank relation) and depth of the relationship. They 
show that both the length and depth of the relationship influences the loan cost negatively, 
while the scope of the relationship positively affects the loan cost for SMEs. To put it 
differently, SMEs that have longer and stronger relationship with a single bank will have 
lower loan cost. In contrast, Wu (2005) reports a significantly positive impact on the cost 
of borrowing in the local market using a small sample of SMEs in Jiangsu province. Firms 
with a longer lender relationship duration face a higher cost of borrowing. 
A recent study by He (2013) shows that SMEs with a single banking relationship face lower 
collateral conditions in the loan contract. Although a long and close relationship with the 
bank enables the SME to access bank credit more easily, these firms are more likely to 
suffer the “hold-up” problem that would lead to higher cost of the loan for SMEs. Higher 
loan costs result from private information being captured by the incumbent bank. However, 
in a city focused study, Yin et al. (2015) discover how relationship lending and bank 
competition influences the loan cost for SMEs. Their results show that firms can benefit 
from a less close relationship with the bank and stronger banking competition, which result 
in a significantly lower cost of credit for SMEs. Most importantly, they highlight that it is 
crucial to promote the financial ecological environment development and improve the 
competition mechanism particular for the SMEs credit market in order to reduce the cost 
of the loan and overcome the “too expensive for financing” problem for SMEs. 
                                                 
13 Similar findings are reported in Luo et al. (2011). 
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Furthermore, a most recent study conducted by Yin and Matthews (2018) determine the 
drivers of firms switching in China and suggest that switch behaviour is mainly come from 
firm’s credit needs, characteristics of both firm and bank have a significant influence on 
firms switching behaviour. Besides, they also find that firms are more likely to switch to 
small banks or lower profitability banks, their great study is the first to extend the switch 
literature to a China’s loan market and widen the Chinese literature in this field. 
However, much of the empirical literature on the firm-bank relationship in China focus 
only on a specific geographical area or city in China, and especially the borrowing activity 
of SMEs. My study differs in its geographic coverage and firm size and industry. The data 
used covers 75% of listed firms during 1996-2016 and is more comprehensive and thus 
fills a gap in the literature.  
 
3.3 Methodology 
This section develops the econometric methodology used in analysing the duration of firm-
bank relationship. Survival analysis, also called duration analysis, has been commonly used 
in studying and modelling problems that include the duration of time before a particular 
occurrence. It originates in statistics, analysing the topics such as death in medical diseases 
and failure in mechanical systems, now has been widely spread to economic phenomena. 
For example, the study of duration data has been applied in the labour economics literature 
to the length of strikes, the duration of unemployment, and employment and the time before 
wage goes up. Various scholars (Ongena and Smith, 2001; Farinha and Santos, 2002; and 
Bouchellal and Castro, 2016), have applied survival analysis to examine the duration or 
termination of firm-bank relationships. Following their methodology, this paper employs 
duration models to study the passage of time before a firm changes its existing bank loan 
provider to another bank. Furthermore it investigates the factors that alter the duration of 
the firm-bank relationship in China. The common terminology and general aspects of a 
survival analysis are introduced first in this section, followed by the description of hazard 
function estimators constructed by different approaches that include basic non-parametric, 
parametric and semi-parametric methods. 
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3.3.1 Terminology 
The main object of survival analysis in this chapter is the duration of the relationship 
between firms and banks and firm’s switching behaviour, which is a random variable due 
to the uncertainty of various covariates may cause this relationship changes. The passage 
of time is referred to as a spell, and the spell length is represented by the duration variable 
T. The duration variable T is a non-negative variable denoting the time to a relationship 
termination event for a bank relationship duration, which is defined as the number of 
periods (consecutive months or years) a firm-bank relationship lasts, then 𝑡1 , 𝑡2 ,..., 𝑡𝑛 
represent its observed duration of relationship between firms and banks, where the given 
date in the time line t ∈ [0, +∞].   
The time line could be discrete or continuous, depending on whether the time line is 
infinitely divisible or not. In discrete time, the time line is classified into several periods of 
same length. The time line is discrete due to either (i) the time line is inherently discrete, 
or (ii) failure event occurs in continuous time but duration is only observed in discrete 
intervals. The firm-bank relationship duration data in this study is the second case, since 
the firm could terminate a bank relationship and switch any time within a period, but this 
event can only be observed in a monthly interval. The first observation of a relationship 
duration is recorded at t = 0, a period is nominated by the end date of that period. For 
example, the 1st period means (0,1], the 2nd period means (1,2], and the 𝑛𝑡ℎ period means 
(n-1, n]. Note that the time here means analysis time, rather than calendar time.  
Survivor function is a simple way to demonstrate the behaviour of a spell T. The probability 
distribution of the spell T can be specified by the cumulative distribution function, F(t) = 
Pr (T < t) , indicates the probability of a firm ends its relationship with the bank before time 
t. Thus, the survival function S(t) = 1 – F(t) = Pr (T≥t), yields the probability that the 
relationship spell T lasts at least to date t. In other words, it is the surviving probability of 
a firm continues to cooperate with the incumbent bank beyond date t.  
Alternatively, the switch from one bank loan provider to another can be described through 
a hazard function h(t), which determines the rate at which a firm-bank relationship 
termination occurs, conditional on the relationship spell at least until date t, and is defined 
by: 
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 ℎ(𝑡) = 𝑙𝑖𝑚
∆𝑡→0
𝑃𝑟(𝑡 ≤𝑇 ≤𝑡 +∆𝑡 |𝑇≥𝑡)
∆𝑡
=  
𝑓(𝑡)
1−𝐹(𝑡)
=  
𝑓(𝑡)
𝑆(𝑡)
     (1) 
where f(t) is the density function associated with the distribution of relationship spells. 
From the hazard function, the cumulative hazard function up to date t can be defined: H(t) 
= ∫ ℎ(𝜏)𝑑𝜏
𝑡
0
, which measures the accumulative risk for firm switch during the period (0, t]. 
The hazard function h(t), also called hazard rate, describes a conditional probability, which 
is opposite to the unconditional probability function f(t). The condition here means that the 
relationship between firm and bank successfully survives up to t. The most important 
advantage of using a hazard function is that it provides a natural way to interpret the process 
that generates duration, and regression models for duration data are more easily grasped by 
observing how covariates affect the hazard rates.  
3.3.2 Model Framework 
Three common techniques have been widely used to analyse the duration data, which 
includes the non-parametric method, parametric method and semi-parametric method. 
Non-parametric method simply follows the intuition of letting the data speak for itself 
without making any assumptions about the function form of the distribution. Therefore, the 
effects of covariates are ignored. The most popular non-parametric methods are Kaplan-
Meier estimate of survival function S(t) and Nelson-Aalen estimate of hazard function H(t). 
The Kaplan-Meier estimator is also known as the “product limit estimator” that estimates 
the survival function from survival time data. A plot of the Kaplan-Meier survival function 
is a series of horizontal steps of decreasing trend which approaches to the true survival 
function for that population when a large enough sample is taken. A crucial feature of 
Kaplan-Meier estimator is that it takes “censored” data into account and assumes that all 
the censored subjects do not fail when censoring occurs. The Kaplan-Meier estimate of 
survival function is given by: 
 
?̂?(𝑡) = ∏ (
𝑛𝑗 − 𝑑𝑗
𝑛𝑗
)
𝑗|𝑡𝑗≤𝑡
=  
𝑛1 − 𝑑1
𝑛1
 ×
 𝑛2 − 𝑑2
𝑛2
 × … ×  
𝑛𝑁 − 𝑑𝑁
𝑛𝑁
 
(2) 
Where 𝑛𝑗  is the number of firm-bank relationship at risk (i.e. survive or not censored) just 
or prior to time 𝑡𝑗 , 𝑑𝑗 is the number of observed relationship failures (a switch occurs) 
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during the subsequent period, the product is over all observed failure times less than or 
equal to time t, and 𝑡1 ≤ 𝑡2 ≤ ⋯ ≤  𝑡𝑁 is the analysis time when either failure or censoring 
occurs.  
The Nelson-Aalen estimator is used to estimate the cumulative hazard function from 
censored survival data. The Nelson-Aalen estimate for the cumulative hazard function 
takes the following form: 
 
?̂?(𝑡) = ∑
𝑑𝑗
𝑛𝑗
𝑗|𝑡𝑗≤𝑡
 
(3) 
The sum is over all distinct failure times less than or equal to t. Hence, the Nelson-Aalen 
estimator is an increasing right continuous step function with increments 𝑑𝑗/𝑛𝑗  at the 
observed failure times.  
Parametric method, on the other side, explicitly uses covariates to estimate hazard rate in 
a function form, while Semi-parametric method lies in the middle of the non-parametric 
and parametric method, which does not make any assumption on the function form of 
baseline hazard rate. Different parametric duration models can measure the degree of 
duration dependence and the effect of other variables on the likelihood of a relationship 
ending, the most popular used functional form of the hazard function is the proportional 
hazard model (PHM). This chapter employs both parametric and semi-parametric 
approaches to investigate the impact of covariates on the duration of firm-bank relationship 
within the context of proportional hazard model. The proportional hazard model assumes 
that the hazard rate function can be written as: 
 ℎ(𝑡)  = ℎ0(𝑡)exp(𝛃
′𝐗) (4) 
where ℎ0(t) is the Baseline Hazard Function that captures the data dependence of duration 
and determines the shape of the hazard function with respect to time. The name of 
“proportional hazard” comes from the feature that the hazard function h(t) is proportional 
to exp(𝛃′𝐱), with the baseline hazard function ℎ0(𝑡) common to all observations. X is a 
vector of covariates, could be time-invariant or time-varying explanatory variables, 𝛃 is the 
coefficient vector for X. Exponential individual coefficients have the interpretation of the 
ratio of the hazards for a one-unit change in the corresponding covariate. The hazard ratio 
  
 
  44  
 
is less than 1 if the coefficient is negative, but greater than 1 if the coefficient is positive. 
The sign of estimated coefficient suggests the direction of the effect of the covariate on the 
hazard of switching. 
In parametric analysis, a particular functional form has to be assumed for the baseline 
hazard ℎ0(𝑡), which could be Weibull, Exponential, Log-logistic, Lognormal, Gompertz or 
other distributions. This chapter uses Weibull and Exponential distributions to specify the 
shape of relationship spells. The Weibull hazard function is: 
 ℎ0(𝑡)  = 𝜆𝛼𝑡
𝛼−1  (5) 
A significant feature of Weibull distribution allows for duration dependence, the presence 
of duration dependence in the bank-firm relationship can be tested by estimating the 
parameter 𝛼 . 𝜆 is a constant, and 𝜆   0, t   0. When 𝛼   1 (𝛼 < 1), the Weibull hazard 
function has positive (negative) duration dependence, which indicates that the conditional 
probability of firm switching to other lenders increase (decrease) as the time goes by. In 
addition to this, the exponential distribution has a constant duration dependence, which is 
nested in the Weibull as the case 𝛼 = 1 and shows the testable restriction that the likelihood 
of firm switch is independent of time.  
On the other hand, the proportional hazard can be estimated without imposing any specific 
restrictions on the baseline hazard function through the semiparametric analysis. For 
example, Cox (1972) model is the counterpart of the proportional model in the parametric 
analysis. Instead of imposing a specific function form for ℎ0(𝑡), it is left unspecified in the 
Cox model, while covariates are still explicitly estimated.  One significant property of the 
Cox model is that the baseline hazard function  ℎ0(𝑡) does not influence the estimate of 𝛃, 
hence it is often referred as a “semi-parametric” model.  Since it is not estimating the full 
model, the advantage of using the Cox model is that it can avoid the biases problem caused 
by specifying an inappropriate baseline hazard function. The detailed formulae can be 
found in many statistics textbooks, such as Greene (2003), Jenkins (2004) and Cleves et al. 
(2008). 
Overall, non-parametric method has been considered as too naive to generate reasonable 
results because it does not control for covariates. However, parametric analysis is too 
limited due to its inflexibility in assuming ℎ0(𝑡). Hence, semi-parametric method has the 
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advantage of both, and is expected to generate he most reliable conclusions. This chapter 
will mainly focus on estimating results from semi-parametric approach, while the 
nonparametric analysis will still be performed at the start of estimation. 
3.3.3 Censoring and Truncation 
In fact, termination of the firm-bank relationship or firm’s switch behaviour may have not 
yet occurred by the end of the observation period, or the relationship duration may also 
have lasted for a while before entering the observation. In these cases, there are incomplete 
observations over time. A subject is defined as the process being studied, which is the 
duration of firm-bank relationship in our case. The subject is said to be in observation 
period after it enters and before it leaves the study. A failure is referred to as an event to 
end the duration, implying switch behaviour occurs in this case. Censoring is defined as 
when the failure (switch in this case) occurs and the subject is not under observation, which 
is a partial ignorance about the duration and can be categorized into three types: 
i. Right Censoring: the subject participates in the study for a time, but it is not under 
observation when failure occurs. 
ii. Left Censoring: the failure occurs at some time before the subject entering the 
observation. 
iii. Interval Censoring: rather than observing the exact time of failure, all one know is that 
failure occurs between two known time points – perhaps a short or long interval.  
On the other hand, truncation refers to complete ignorance about the subject over a 
truncated period. Contrasting from censoring emphasizes the information of failure time, 
truncated subjects are not even observed during the truncation period, and it stresses a 
complete ignorance of a subject. There are also three types of truncation: 
i. Right truncation: the subject is under observation for a time, but it leaves the study 
before it fails (indistinguishable from right censoring). 
ii. Left Truncation: the subject has been on risk prior to entering the study, which can be 
viewed as a late entry, often confused with left censoring. 
iii. Interval Truncation: the subject is observed at first, but it disappears for a while then 
reports back to the study after truncation period, which is a variation of left truncation. 
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As Jenkins (2004) has provided a detailed statistical presentation for dealing with censoring 
and truncation in an intuitive graph below, the solid line is the relationship duration under 
observation, with a start (circle) and an end (cross). The dashed part means censoring, 
whereas the blank part means truncation. 
Figure 3.2: Censoring and Truncation 
 
              under observation 
                                                                                                                       time line 
                    normal 
                    --------------                                    |-----------|                              ------ 
 left censored                          interval censored                      right censored 
                                       left truncated          interval truncated                right truncated 
 
3.3.4 Measurement of A Switch 
This section introduces the duration variables and the definition of an ‘event’ based on 
survival. I use the language of the ‘switching’ literature as applied to firm-bank 
relationships, while the meaning of switching in China’s firm-bank relationship differs 
slightly from the existing literature on switching behaviour. In China, switching from one 
loan provider to another does not necessarily imply a weakened relationship or even a 
termination of the relationship with its previous loan provider. The duration variable 
(Duration) is defined as the length (in months) a firm-bank (or loan) relationship lasts. 
Firms that have repeat borrowing from an incumbent bank may have a longer relationship 
duration, the repeat borrowing is defined as a firm that continues to borrow from an 
incumbent bank within twelve months, while borrowing from an existing relationship bank 
after twelve months or even a longer gap will be counted as a new relationship in this 
study14. The event or failure in this study implies a change of loan-provider or switch 
behaviour (Switch) of the firm. Using the definition made by Ioannidou and Ongena (2010), 
a new loan is defined as a switch when a firm obtains a new loan from a bank with which 
it did not have a lending relationship during the past 12 months, while this firm may still 
                                                 
14 In short, if a previous firm-bank relationship has been ended a long time ago (say, 12 months), it takes as 
much effort to collect both hard and soft-information of firm and re-established the new relationship. 
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maintain relationship with its previous lender. Following them, a switching behaviour in 
this study can be summarized as two types:   
1) Firm A borrows from the incumbent Bank A in DD/MM//YY with n year loan maturity, 
but Firm A borrows from a new bank (say Bank B) during this period or after the current 
loan relationship ends with Bank A, then a switch occurs for Firm A. 
2) Firm A borrows from the incumbent Bank A in DD/MM/YY with n year loan maturity. 
After repaying the loan by the end of the maturity date, there was no loan activity in the 
following 12 months or even a longer period, but Firm A borrows from Bank A again after 
12 months or a longer gap, a switch occurs for Firm A because this could be viewed as a 
new relationship. 
Hence, firms “move” to other banks or “add” a new bank relationship during a relationship 
time period or after a period that longer than 12 months is considered as a switch. Firms in 
China may establish a new banking relationship either because they want to maintain 
multiple banking relationships or because they want to switch to a new bank entirely by 
terminating its relationships with its incumbent bank. Coding the failure variable (Switch) 
equal to 1 if the firm has never borrowed from any of the banks of the current deal, as well 
as those re-borrowings from current bank longer than one-year gap, and 0 for repeated 
borrowing from current banks or termination of current bank relationship without 
observable new bank relationship under analyse period. 
3.3.5 Empirical Model 
Base on the theoretical backgrounds mentioned above, the empirical model for estimating 
the hazard of firms’ switch to other lenders using the Cox proportional hazard model can 
be stated as: 
 ℎ(𝑡|𝑥) = ℎ0(𝑡) ∙ exp(β1 ∙ 𝐅 + β2 ∙ 𝐌 + β3 ∙ 𝐁 + β4∙E + interative)                                   (6)
where ℎ0(t) is the baseline hazard function that captures the data dependence of duration 
and determines the shape of the hazard function with respect to duration of relationship. 
This study uses time-invariant and time-varying covariates and controls for firm 
characteristics, management characteristics, bank characteristics as well as the economic 
environment that is expected to be correlated with the hazard of the firm’s behaviour 
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regarding a change in its loan provider. In addition to this, the interactive terms are also 
included to examine the cross effects between ownership of firms or banks and internal or 
external changes. 
Alternatively, Equation 6 can also be transformed into a Logit model that represents the 
hazard ratio: 
  
ℎ(𝑡|x) 
ℎ0(𝑡)
=  exp(β1 ∙ 𝐅 + β2 ∙ 𝐌 + β3 ∙ 𝐁 + β4 ∙ 𝐄 + interactive)                                 (7) 
   
3.3.6 Variable Description 
I use the existing literature as a signpost for the four sets of variables relevant to the firm’s 
attributes that may determine its decision to terminate an existing bank relationship and 
switch to other banks, details of variable definition can be found in Table 3.2. The first 
group of firm’s specific characteristics relate to firm’s size, age, growth opportunity, 
profitability, leverage, liquidity, ability to pledge collateral, and opacity of ownership status 
as well as industrial effect.  
Early studies show that the age of the firm is closely linked to the duration of its relationship 
with a bank but its influence remains ambiguous (i.e. Petersen and Rajan, 1995, Sakai et 
al., 2010). In addition, large firms are assumed to be more transparent and have less 
dependence on bank financing which enables them to initiate a new bank relationship more 
easily. It is also assumed that they have higher bargaining power to negotiate with the bank 
for better loan conditions (Berger et al., 2005). In contrast, Diamond (1984), and Rajan 
(1992) state that small and young firms are more likely to be involved in the information-
capture problem, and thus, bank financing is important to them. Holding the level of 
internal financing constant, firms with more growth opportunities should have greater 
external financing needs, and thus be more reliant on bank financing. Hence, the growth 
opportunity is measured by the sales growth and is expected to have negative impact on 
the likelihood of switching. 
I also consider the firm’s performance and risk level proxied by its profitability, leverage, 
and liquidity. The firm’s profitability (Profit) measured by return on asset, indicates a firm’s 
ability to generate resources and to repay its loans, which allow firms with higher 
  
 
  49  
 
profitability to improve their pricing condition. Therefore, a positive relationship between 
firm’s profitability and its conditional hazard of switching is expected. Since bank credit is 
still the main source for firm financing in China, the leverage level (Leverage) indicates 
the firm’s ability meet its long-term financial obligations. Highly leveraged firms will be 
more dependent on banks than firms with lower debt levels, and thus less likely leave their 
current bank relationship. However, they would consider to form multiple bank relationship 
or switch if their credit needs cannot be fulfilled by their current banks. Cash flows (Cash 
flows) is an indicator that identifies the liquidity risk of the firm which could affect their 
repayment ability, as well as future investment and borrowing. Firms that have higher cash 
flows are less likely to end an existing relationship so it is expected to have negative effect 
on the hazard of switching to other banks.  
Since in general small firms are less transparent and rely heavily on bank credit in China, 
this study uses the ratio of the firm’s tangible assets to its debt as a measure of its ability to 
pledge collateral (Collateral), and the ratio of intangibles assets to total assets as a measure 
of opaqueness (Opaqueness). Therefore, we expect that firms with less capacity to pledge 
collateral and lower degree of transparency are more likely to maintain the current bank 
relationship because it might be difficult to secure a loan from an ‘outside’ lender.  
Other variables in this group are the classification indicators that relate to firm’s 
heterogeneity such as ownership structure, sector dummy and size dummy. As state-owned 
banks still dominate the banking industry in China, it is postulated that the central and local 
governments can influence the loan activities of these banks in the loan market. Generally, 
the equity of the largest state-owned enterprises are held by state or local government 
agencies15. Hence, “guanxi” lending represents an important cultural component of the 
bank-firm relationship in China (see Yin and Matthews, 2017). A dummy variable SOE is 
employed to identify whether a firm is an SOE, coded 1 if the ultimate shareholders of the 
firm include central or local government, state bureaucrats, state-owned legal entities, and 
0 for those non-state-owned enterprises (i.e. private, foreign, or other ownership 
enterprises). A Large dummy is included to identify whether the probability of switch is 
higher for large-sized firms or not. The classification of large and SMEs are based on the 
Statistical Definitions of Large, Medium-sized and Small Enterprises from the National 
                                                 
15 Such as State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), the Ministry of 
Finance, the local Bureau of Finance, and Central Huijin Investment Ltd. 
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Bureau of Statistics of China, which described in Appendix B – Table B1. To control for 
potential industrial effects, I aggregates the firms into eight industries according to the 
Industry Classifying Index Code of listed companies released by China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC)16. 
The second group of variables relates to the characteristics of management. Faccio et al. 
(2016), find that female CEO tend to avoid riskier investment and financing opportunities, 
also firms run by female CEOs have lower leverage, less volatile earnings, and a higher 
chance of survival than firms run by male CEOs. Following their study, I control for the 
gender of the CEO (Gender) and identify whether it would increase the hazard of making 
a change decision. Other management characteristics include the executive’s age (CEOage) 
and length of tenure (Tenure).  
A number of China studies have confirmed that CEO turnover has negative effects on 
private firms’ performance17. A change of CEO can influence the strategic direction of a 
firm’s operation and a firm’s relationship with its existing loan provider. An indicator 
variable (Change) has been used to capture the effect of CEO change on firm’s hazard of 
changing loan provider. Generally, a change in CEO can be expected to lower the hazard 
of a firm switching, because CEO turnover brings management instability and increase 
firm’s uncertainty. Conversely, in the context of China, it could be the case that a new CEO 
brings with it established relationships forged by ‘guanxi’ in a previous position, thus 
increasing the likelihood of a change in loan provider18.  
The third group of covariates relate to the characteristics of banks. Due to the non-
availability of financial data for some lending banks, particularly for those relatively small 
banks or banks’ sub-branches in small cities or less developed area, I use the ownership of 
banks to characterize the impact of bank variables on the hazard of firm switching. The 
lending banks have been classified into six subgroups according to their ownership 
structure, which are five large-scale state-owned commercial banks (SOB, also known as 
Big5), policy banks (Policy), joint-stock commercial banks (JSCB), city commercial banks 
(CCB), foreign banks (Foreign), other banks include rural commercial banks, urban or rural 
                                                 
16 These are: agriculture (Agri), mining (Min), manufacturing (Manuf), construction (Constr), transportation 
(Transp), energy (Energy), real estate (RE) and services (Serv). Coded 1 for each particular industry 
classification (agriculture, mining, manufacturing, construction, real estate, services), 0 otherwise. 
17 For example, Yu and Xu (2016); and Yin (2017). 
18 Where CEO data is unavailable I use information on the Chairman. 
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credit cooperatives, and financial institutions (OB). To emphasize the effect of bank 
ownership, a variable nonSOB combines all the types of lending banks except the five large 
SOBs. 
Lastly, the fourth set of covariates relate to the macroeconomic environment, which include 
monetary policy instrument and crisis dummy variables. China’s monetary policy has 
frequently changed in recent years, existing literature do not provide evidence that 
monetary policy effect on changing lending and borrowing relationship or firm’s switch 
behaviour. It is worth to examine this effect by incorporating monetary policy instruments. 
The PBoC frequently adjusts reserve requirements and the benchmark deposit and lending 
rates to stabilize economic fluctuations. Three instruments which including two price-
based (Lending rate and Reserve) and an informal quantitative-based (Guidance) monetary 
tools have been employed to measure the effect of changing the stance of monetary policy 
on firm’s switch behaviour. Because this study focuses on lending and borrowing 
relationships, the interest rate is denoted by the RMB one-year benchmark lending rate 
rather than RMB 1-year benchmark deposit rate. The reserve requirement denoted by the 
reserve ratio for large and small financial institution. In addition, following Chen et al. 
(2017), five dummy variables have been used to proxy five stances of non-standard 
monetary policy tool window guidance, definitions of each stances has been shown in 
Appendix B–Table B2. 
On the other side, in response to the financial crisis, the central government launched a 
stimulus package of 4 trillion RMB that included policies to loosen control on banks so 
they can expand credit in late 2008. The stimulus plan was mainly targeted in key areas 
such as rural infrastructure and transportation that are dominated by SOEs that can be 
traced to state control over its banking system and corporate sector. It is found that the 
effectiveness of China’s stimulus plan stems from the contribution of the SOEs. During the 
recession period, SOEs expanded their borrowing, investment and production capacity and 
generated a rapid recovery of aggregate demand with credit provided by the SOBs. This 
study includes a crisis dummy (Crisis) as well as several interactive terms that capture the 
cross effects between crisis dummy and ownership of firms or banks, also the cross effects 
between CEO turnover and ownership of firms or banks. 
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Table 3.2: Description of The Variables 
Variables Description Unit Sign 
Switch Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm switches 
its loan provider, 0 otherwise. 
-  
Duration Duration of a firm-bank relationship lasts. Month  
Age Age of the firm when the firm switches. Month +/- 
Size Natural logarithm of year-ended total asset deflated by 
the Chinese GDP deflator. 
CNY + 
SOE Dummy variable that takes value 1 when the firm is 
state-owned enterprise, 0 otherwise. 
- - 
Profitability Ratio of net profit on total assets. % + 
Leverage Ratio of long-term debt to total assets. % +/- 
Cash flows Ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets. % - 
Growth Ratio of sales growth.  - 
Collateral Ratio of tangible assets to total debt. % + 
Opaqueness Ratio of intangible assets to total assets. % - 
 
Industry  
Eight sector dummies that takes value 1 when the firm is 
operating in the sector of Agriculture /Mining 
/Manufacture /Construction /Energy /Transport /Real 
estate /Service, 0 otherwise. 
- +/- 
CEOage Age of CEO when the firm switches. Year +/- 
Gender Dummy variable that takes value 1 when the firm is run 
by a male CEO, 0 otherwise. 
- + 
Tenure Tenure of CEO when the firm switches. Month - 
Change Dummy variable takes value 1 if there is a change in 
CEO in a current relationship, 0 otherwise. 
 - 
SOB Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the lending bank is 
the five large state-owned commercial banks (also 
known as Big5), 0 otherwise. 
- +/- 
JSCB Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the lending bank is 
joint-stock commercial bank, 0 otherwise. 
- +/- 
CCB Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the lending bank is 
city commercial bank, 0 otherwise. 
- +/- 
nonSOB Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the lending bank is 
not the largest state commercial banks (Big5). 
- + 
Lending rate PBoC’s one-year benchmark lending rate.  % + 
Reserve PBoC’s reserve requirement ratio. % + 
 
 
Guidance  
Five dummy variables represent five stances of window 
guidance policy that take value -2 for strongly 
discouraging period, -1 for weakly discouraging period, 
0 for no explicit direction, 1 for weakly encouraging 
period and 2 for strongly encouraging period, 0 
otherwise.  
% + 
Crisis Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the year of 
switching in crisis year 2008 and 2009, 0 otherwise. 
- - 
Change*Firm(
or Bank) 
Cross effect of CEO change dummy and different types 
of firm or bank. 
- +/- 
Crisis*Firm(or 
Bank  
Cross effect of crisis dummy and different types of firm 
or bank 
- +/- 
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3.4 Data and Sample 
3.4.1 Data Source 
The data used in this study is mainly accessed from the China Stock Market and Accounting 
Research (CSMAR) database of Shenzhen GTA Data Technology Co., Ltd. GTA CSMAR 
is a unique, comprehensive database of China stock returns, covering all companies listed 
on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange and provides the most 
accurate, reliable and useful financial data that includes the data on China stock markets, 
bank loan, financial statements and corporate governance.  
My study uses the data of listed companies which include state and non-state-owned 
companies. Due to the complex ownership policy, structure and penetration of the state, 
SOEs are often less isolated from the legal framework applicable to other companies. It is 
also argued that SOEs focus more on social outcomes and aim at non-commercial goals 
rather than maximization of firm value or profit. To avoid this bias, this study employs the 
data of listed firms19. An advantage of using listed firms is that they have to provide a high 
degree of transparency and disclosure of information due to the legal structure of stock 
exchanges, which ensures their financial data more reliable than that of non-listed SOEs.  
I collect data on four categories from China Listed Firms Research Series data: Bank loan, 
Financial Statements, Corporate Governance and Equity Nature. The loan data describes 
the relationship between borrower (firms) and bank is annually collected from Bank Loan 
category that includes the name of the lending bank, loan duration, borrowing amount, 
starting and ending date of loan relation. In addition, the data of firm-specific variables is 
collected from Balance Sheet Statement, Income Statement and Statement of Cash Flows 
from the Financial Statement categories. As regards the industry and ownership 
classification indicator, the data is collected from the Sector and Equity Nature categories. 
Moreover, the data of CEO’s characteristics are collected from the Executive information 
from the Corporate Governance category20. As regards the monetary policy instruments, 
                                                 
19 In order to be a listed firm, a SOE must be restructured into a stock company through the sale of shares to 
other companies, legal entities or its employees firstly. Next, the SOE sells a part of shares (usually 1/3) to 
the general public. Hence, shares of SOE have been split into two parts: non-tradable shares of state or state-
owned legal entity, and tradable shares of individual investors or private enterprises. Once firms become 
publicly listed, they have to focus on the interest of shareholders. 
20 Apart from using the CSMAR database, the 20 years data of GDP deflator and exchange rates (USD, BGP, 
EUR, AUD, HKD AND JPY) are collected from the World Bank.  
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the 1-year benchmark lending rate and reserve requirement ratios can be accessed from the 
website of the People’s Bank of China (PBoC), the step-by-step development of PBoC’s 
non-standard window guidance policy can be found from the quarterly China Monetary 
Policy Report and the indicators of five guidance stances can be referred from the 
definitions made by Chen et al. (2017). To distinguish different sizes of firms in my sample, 
I base on the definition of Large, Medium-sized and Small Enterprises made by National 
Bureau of Statistics of China, which uses both of the operating income and number of 
employee as indicators and specify the correspondent value for different groups of size for 
firms that operating in different industries.  
3.4.2 Details of Matched Firm-Loan-Bank Data 
To perform a survival analysis, the data must be converted into duration format that 
includes the start and end date of a relationship duration. Firstly, using MATLAB program 
to deal with the firm-level data and matching these data to the loan (lending – borrowing) 
data. The loan data shows that the bank loans could be obtained either from a single or 
multiple lenders. In addition, this loan data consist the information of the stock code of 
sample listed firms, name of lending banks, lending deals, and starting and ending date of 
loan relation. However, the information on this time span of lending relationship is not 
complete, as well as other deal indicators. For example, some of the observations have one 
missing loan indicator, but some of the observations have two or more missing loan 
indicators. Besides, some observations have missed the starting or ending date of loan 
relationship or even both of this duration information. For this loan data, the announcement 
date (date of loan announcement listed company released on the publication specified by 
the stock exchange) is about two to ten days prior to the start date of loan borrowing. For 
those observations missing the ending date of the loan, these could be calculated by using 
the starting date plus loan contract period. 
Secondly, the data for firm’s specific characteristics and other variables such as deflator 
and exchange rates collected from the CSMAR database and World-Bank across the 
sample period from 1996 to 2016 has been matched to the loan data through MATLAB 
program. Concatenating the firm’s ID (stock code) and the starting year of loan borrowing, 
the corresponding firm’s characteristics in a specific year for a specific sample listed firm 
have been matched to firm’s loan data at the start of loan relationship. One thing should be 
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pointed out here is that the firm’s switching behaviour cannot be identified without the 
information of lending bank, therefore this study drops those observations that without 
information of lending banks, the financial firms are excluded as well.  As a firm-bank 
relationship has been counted as one observation, a firm with multiple bank relationships 
enters as two or more observations. Due to some lending deals indicator and firm’s specific 
variables data are not available for particular firms in some periods, finally, there is an 
unbalanced panel matched dataset with 18,233 relationships including 2,102 Chinese listed 
firms. 
After matching all the firm-level variables for each firm to the loan data, a clean dataset 
that contains matched firm-bank information of loan relations and firm-specific 
characteristics have been created. Next, I use STATA program to analyse this clean dataset 
and perform the survival analysis as well as the analyses in the following two chapters.  
3.4.3 Censoring  
Not knowing when a firm-bank (or loan) relationship starts, or when it ends, or both, 
implies that it is unable to observe the true duration of the relationship for these 
observations. There is not necessary to adjust left censoring in our data because all these 
relationships start in or after 1996. However, without the adjustment of right censoring, the 
estimation of the proportional hazard models produces biased and inconsistent estimates of 
model parameters. Some relationships do not end within the sample period, or some firms’ 
switch behaviour of changing loan provider do not occur by the end of my observation 
period, thus I adjust right censoring when I generate the duration of these firm and bank 
relationships. 
3.4.4 Descriptive Analysis 
In my sample, 69% of these loan relationships with large firms, 31% with small and 
medium firms, and 44% with state-owned firms while 56% with non-state-owned firms. 
This complete matched dataset include 1,326 large firms and 776 medium and small sized 
firms, more than half of the sample listed firms come from private sector or controlled by 
foreign firms. The distribution of loans among different groups and summary of sample 
listed firms by ownership and size have been shown in Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4, 
respectively.  
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Figure 3.3: Distribution of loans among different groups 
   
Figure 3.4: Total number of firms 
 
With respect to the sector, more than half of the sample listed firms running in 
manufacturing sector that accounts for 59% of these firm-bank relationships. The second 
and third largest groups of sectors are the service and real estate sector, which account for 
16% and 7% of these relationships, respectively. Despite the largest three groups of sectors, 
the number of firms that running in other sectors such as mining, energy, transport, 
construction and agriculture have been summarized in Figure 3.5. Moreover, lending banks 
measured by ownership has been displayed in Figure 3.6, borrowing from the five large 
state-owned commercial banks (SOBs or Big5) or joint-stock commercial banks (JSCBs) 
account for one third of these borrowing -lending relationships, the third largest type of 
lending bank is city commercial banks (CCB) with 16.94% lending relationships. Due to 
the borrowing relationships with foreign banks, policy banks and other banks account for 
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quite small proportions, I only include the largest three types of Chinese banks in the 
survival analysis. 
Figure 3.5: Number of firms in different sectors 
 
Note: Agri denotes Agriculture sector; Min indicates Mining sector; Manuf denotes Manufacturing 
sector; Constr denotes Construction sector; Energy denotes Energy sector; Transp denotes 
Transportation sector; RE denotes Real Estate sector; Serv denotes Service sector. 
 
Figure 3.6: Types of lending banks 
Note: SOB denotes five large State-owned Commercial Banks; JSCB denotes Joint-stock 
Commercial Banks; CCB denotes City Commercial Banks, PB denotes Policy Banks; FB denotes 
Foreign Banks; OB denotes other banks includes Rural Commercial Banks, Rural Cooperative 
Banks, Rural Credit Cooperatives, and other financial institutions. 
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By organizing the duration data in spells, where a spell describes the number of months of 
a firm-bank relationship, it can be seen in Figure 3.7, that the mean duration of these bank-
firm relationships is 27.38 months, but they last longer in the group of large firms (about 
28.33 months) than in the small and medium firms (around 25.33 months, on average). In 
addition, these relationships last on average 30.97 months in the group of state-owned firms, 
which is relatively longer than non-state-owned firms that is 23.55 months. The survival 
analysis shows that the likelihood of switching over the subsequent year after surviving 
one year is 75%, after three years 50%, after eight years 25%. A benchmark model will be 
estimated by including all sets of covariates as well as interactive terms. Due to the fact 
that SOEs access to preferential lending while small firms are less easily to obtain funds 
relative to other firms, separate regressions for different groups will be considered in this 
study, which includes subsamples of SOEs, non-SOEs, large, and medium and small firms 
(SMEs). Furthermore, robustness test will be performed by adding the number of bank 
relationships (Number) and geographical effects, and separate regressions that without or 
with the additional sets of variable. 
Figure 3.7: Mean duration among different sizes or ownership of firms 
 
Table 3.3 presents summary statistics on duration, lending, and firm-characteristic 
variables. The average relationship duration is 2 years, the shortest duration is 3 months 
and the longest duration is 30 years. The average loan value is 305000000 CNY, the highest 
loan value is 1250000000000 CNY and the lowest is 10000 CNY. The largest total asset is 
640000000000 CNY, while the smallest total asset 91600000 CNY. To smooth the data 
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and reduce the probability of getting heterogeneous problem, the natural logarithm of total 
asset has been taken in this study, which could be viewed as a proxy of size of firm.  The 
average firm is 14 years old, with youngest firm that less than one 1 year and oldest firm 
that 33 years when they switch. With respect to the characteristics of executives, 95% of 
the sample of firms are running by male CEOs and the average duration of a CEO’s tenure 
is 3 years. Most firms remain multiple bank relationships during the sample period, 48.16% 
of the listed firms changed their lender after their previous borrowing. The main reason for 
the high incidence of switching and multiple bank relationships is that adding a new bank 
relationship during a relationship time period or after a period that longer than 12 months 
is considered as a switch. 
Table 3.3: Descriptive Summary 
Variable        Obs. Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Duration (month) 12,620 27.378 27.583 0.033 396.263 
Loan (CNY) 14,494 305000000 2060000000 10000 125000000000 
SOE  17,132 0.445 0.497 0.000 1.000 
Large 18,233 0.677 0.468 0.000 1.000 
Age (month) 18,232 171.656 68.119 9.904 398.466 
Size (log) 18,130 22.143 1.165 18.333 27.185 
Profit (%) 18,169 2.339 16.269 -677.605 66.419 
Leverage (%) 16,286 6.687 9.292 0.500 84.477 
Cash flows (%) 18,168 9.845 9.738 2.332 94.655 
Growth (%) 17,842 0.714 21.199 -0.984 1880.750 
Collateral (%) 17,376 1982.171 25934.310 33.607 2622215 
Opaqueness (%) 17,717 4.981 6.683 0.000 82.987 
CEO age (year) 14,052 48.194 6.458 28.000 74.000 
Gender  14,058 0.950 0.218 0.000 1.000 
Tenure (month) 14,035 40.157 36.419 1.000 216.000 
Change 12,702 0.290 0.454 0.000 1.000 
Crisis 18,233 0.092 0.289 0.000 1.000 
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3.5 Empirical Results 
Turning to the empirical results, estimation is conducted in a series of stages. This section 
firstly show the results of nonparametric analysis by plotting the Kaplan-Meier survival 
function and Nelson-Aalen Cumulative hazard function, then it plots the baseline hazard 
function for different ownership enterprises, next it present the estimated coefficient results 
from Cox proportional hazard model and lastly it shows the robustness check. 
3.5.1 Non-parametric Analyses 
Without making assumptions about the functional form of survival and cumulative hazard 
function, and the effects of covariates, the Kaplan-Meier survival estimate and Nelson-
Aalen cumulated hazard estimate for the overall sample of listed firms, state and non-state 
groups, large, medium and small groups have been plotted in Figure 3.8–3.10. These results 
confirm that state-owned firms and large firms’ bank relationships have a longer duration 
and a better survival experience than non-state-owned firms and medium and small-sized 
firms. Alternatively, the hazard of switching is correspondently higher for non-SOEs and 
SMEs. 
Figure 3.8: Survival and hazard function (Full sample) 
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Figure 3.9: Survival and hazard functions for state and non-state firms21 
 
Figure 3.10: Survival and hazard functions for large firms and SMEs22 
  
3.5.2 Semi-parametric Analysis – Cox Proportional Hazard Model 
For the baseline hazards, the baseline hazard contribution from semiparametric Cox model 
have been shown in Figure 3.11. The term baseline generally means that these are the 
functions when all covariates are set to zero, the baseline hazard function describes the 
conditional probability of switching purely due to the duration of firm-bank relationship. 
A baseline hazard contribution is defined at every analytical time t at which a switch (or 
failure) occurs and is undefined at other times. The hazard contribution shows the effect of 
one switch occurs on the hazard rate, though baseline hazard rate have some spikes at some 
                                                 
21 state = 1 indicates SOEs, state = 0 indicates non-SOEs. 
22 large = 1 indicates large firms, large = 0 indicates SME firms.  
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period, it is monotonically increasing and reaches to 1 by the end of analysis time, because 
all firms have switched at the end under this censored data. 
Figure 3.11: Baseline hazard contributions 
 
After obtaining the baseline hazard contributions, a smoothing operation is performed and 
the estimated hazard function for SOEs and non-SOEs is shown in Figure 3.12. Under a 
Cox model, all failure times contribute to the estimate of the baseline hazard, not just those 
of which SOE=1, and the baseline hazard may in turn be converted to be the hazard for any 
covariate pattern using proportionality assumption. Generally, the Cox model shows that 
the probability of SOEs changing their loan provider (switch) is relatively lower than non-
SOEs. Two features of changing firm-bank relationship have been captured by the hazard 
function, one is a downward trend in the Cox proportional hazard function that indicates 
the probability of a firm switching its credit provider is declining over time. And the other 
is a periodicity pattern which suggests that the hazard of a firm switching is higher at the 
specific periods such as in one year or end of analysis period.  
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Figure 3.12: Cox proportional hazard function23 
 
Using the Cox proportional hazard model to estimate the effect of the firm-specific 
characteristics and other covariates on the conditional probability of a switch to other 
lenders, the estimation results are reported in Table 3.4. Instead of reporting the hazard 
ratios generated from the survival analysis, the estimated coefficients will be reported 
because it gives the immediate direction of covariate effects. Exponential coefficients can 
be interpreted as the ratio of the hazards for one-unit change in the corresponding covariate. 
There are two ways to interpret the signs on the coefficient estimates represented by β in 
the empirical model. First, each coefficient estimate indicates the partial impact of a 
covariate on the hazard of firm changes its lender, holding duration constant. Second, due 
to the hazard rate being inversely related to the duration, a positive (negative) coefficient 
estimate implies a shorter (longer) relationship duration.  
Column (1) shows the results for the benchmark model which including all sets of 
covariates. The results from the benchmark model demonstrate that only the coefficients 
on Age, Size, SOE, Leverage, Tenure, Change, SOBs, CCBs, Lending rate, Reserve and 
Crisis are statistically significant. From the signs of the estimated coefficients, this chapter 
can infer that, young and small firms, firms with a longer CEO tenure, and also firms that 
experience a new CEO are more likely to change bank loan provider (switch). However, 
                                                 
23 SOE = 1 indicates SOEs, SOE = 0 indicates non-SOEs. 
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by controlling for the ownership and size of firms, the results indicate that both SOEs firms 
and larges firms are less likely to switch but tend to keep stronger and longer lasting 
relationships with the banks, which proves that the observed difference in the mean 
duration of firm-bank relationships between state and non-state firms, and also between 
large, medium and small firms observed in the descriptive statistics, is statistically 
significant. The coefficients of SOE show that the hazard of changing loan provider is 9.79% 
lower if it is a state-owned firms24, this effect is stronger for subsample of large firms. 
Additionally, the conditional likelihood of a change (switch) is significantly lower for firms 
with a higher level of leverage and, it seems that those less risky firms benefit from better 
loan conditions than smaller and less profitable firms, and therefore suffer less from the 
information monopoly of the banks. This could also be the result of mutual interest of these 
firms and the banks to maintain their relationships. However, the cash flows becomes 
insignificant when additional sets of regressors are added in the benchmark model (see 
Colum (3), (5) and (7) in the robustness test result in Table 3.5 for significant coefficient).  
Similarly, the proxies for the firm’s profitability, growth opportunity, ability of collateral, 
and degree of transparency, are not significant although correctly signed. 
Regarding the managerial characteristics of firms, it is seen that while there is a positive 
and significant impact of CEO’s tenure on the hazard of switching, the quantitative effect 
is very small, a 1-year increase in CEO’s tenure increase the hazard of switching by only 
0.1% and therefore can be considered as statistically significant but economically 
insignificant. However, a CEO change implies that the firm that experiences a change in 
the CEO during a current bank relationship has an increased hazard of changing loan 
provider. An arriving CEO may bring with it the baggage of previous relationships with 
banks developed in their previous position. It is likely that firms that have a new CEO, 
especially those with political connections, are more able to use their connections to access 
better credit conditions, increasing the probability of a switch. The insignificant 
coefficients of age and gender of firm’s CEO show no evidence that firms run by male 
                                                 
24  Given the Cox proportional hazard function  ℎ(𝑡)  = ℎ0(𝑡)exp(𝛃
′𝐱) , then hazard ratio  
ℎ(𝑡|x)
ℎ0(𝑡)
=
exp(𝛽 SOE). For example, if the exponential coefficients generates the hazard ratio <1 means that 1 unit 
change of a particular covariate would lower the hazard of switching by (1-hazard ratio)*100 percent, while 
if the hazard ratio  1 means the covariate would increase the hazard of switching by (hazard ratio-1)*100 %. 
The signs of the estimated coefficients directly indicates a positive or negative effect of particular covariate 
on the hazard of changing loan provider. 
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CEOs have a higher probability of changing their loan provider than firms run by female 
CEOs in China in survival approach. 
When ownership of the bank is considered, the coefficients on the SOB and CCB are 
statistically significant, with a negative and positive sign, respectively. It is easy to 
understand that firms borrowing from the five large SOBs (also called Big5) are more likely 
to maintain long and stable relationships. The hazard of changing loan provider for firms’ 
that are SOBs is 32.83% lower than those firms that do not borrow from SOBs, and this 
effect is stronger for the subsample of non-SOEs. The implication is that having bank 
relationships with the five large SOBs make these non-SOEs less likely to change their 
credit. However, firms that borrow from city commercial banks (CCBs) have a hazard of 
switching 16.88% higher than firms that do not borrow from CCBs. The reason for a switch 
not only depends on firms, but also on banks. From the bank’s perspective, CCBs may not 
be willing to continue with the loan-relationship. This may be due to several possibilities. 
A firm’s performance may have deteriorated during the lending relationship period, which 
may give a negative signal to the incumbent bank, resulting in an unsuccessful loan 
renewal. Alternatively, the bank may react strategically and build up stable relationships 
with particular types of firms or particular sectors.   
Turning to the external effect of the economic environment, the results show that changes 
in PBoC’s benchmark lending rate and reserve ratio have a significant impact on the hazard 
of changing a loan provider. The higher the lending rate or reserve ratio, the higher the 
likelihood of firm switching, in particular this macro impacts is more significant for non-
SOEs’ switch behaviour. Moreover, the influence of changing lending rate on firms switch 
probability is greater than changing the reserve requirements, which is 8.33% and 1.61% 
respectively. Nevertheless, the results from survival analysis shows that there is no 
significant impact of informal window guidance on firm’s switch behaviour or duration of 
firm-bank relationship. Moreover, the crisis dummy variable coefficient shows a negatively 
significant effect on a firm’s probability to switch for all types of firms (see Colum (1)-
(6)). Not surprisingly firms are less likely to switch during the financial crisis period 
between 2008 and 2009. One surprising finding is that the interaction terms shows that if 
there is CEO turnover and firm’s lending banks are large SOBs, the likelihood of switching 
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tends to be higher, and this effect is particularly significant in state-owned firms group25. 
This higher switch probability could possibly be the case of a SOE-SOBs relationship 
changing to another large SOB through the political connection or cultural “guanxi” route. 
Column (2) shows the variable ‘nonSOB’ to control for ownership which covers policy 
banks (PB), joint-stock commercial banks (JSCB), city commercial banks (CCB), foreign 
banks (FB) and other types of lending banks (OB)26. A positive and significant coefficient 
of nonSOB confirms that if a firm’s existing lending bank is a non-SOB, they are more 
likely to change loan provider banks. In addition, Columns (3) to (6) present the results for 
the groups of ‘SOEs’, ‘non-SOEs’, ‘large’, ‘medium and SMEs’, respectively. Some 
differences are observed. It can be seen that the age of the firm is only significant in the 
subsample of large firms. In other words, younger large firms are less likely to switch 
compared to medium and small firms. This lower hazard of switching loan provider is not 
found in state or non-state groups, because the age of firms does not significant in terms of 
ownership, but it does matters in terms of size. Consistent with the benchmark result, the 
higher a firms’ leverage and previous borrowing from the SOBs, the lower the hazard of 
changing loan provider for the four groups of enterprise, and they were all less likely to 
switch during the crisis period.  
While change in CEO and borrowing from CCBs increases the likelihood of a change in 
loan provider (switch) for these groups, this effect is not significant for SMEs. In addition, 
the coefficient on the SOE dummy shows that state ownership lowers the hazard of large 
firms switching, but no similar effect is found in SMEs. These implies that the switch 
behaviour of SMEs are not determined by their ownership structure, whether they have a 
CEO change or relationships with non-SOBs. Interestingly, the coefficient of Opaqueness 
(or degree of transparency) is statistically positive and significant in the non-SOEs and 
SMEs groups, implying that the opacity associated with non-SOEs or SMEs, increases the 
hazard of switching, which contradicts the expectation that less transparent firms are more 
likely to stay with their incumbent relationship because it might be difficult for them to 
access loan from ‘outside’ bank27.  
                                                 
25 Furthermore, the coefficient of most interactive terms are not significant in this study, only ‘Change*SOB’ 
shows significant result. 
26 The analysis in this column combines all types of lending banks as non-SOBs except for the five large 
SOBs (or Big5). 
27 This could be a bank ‘push’ effect than a firm ‘switch’ effect in that the bank may encourage the firm to 
look elsewhere for the renewal of a loan. 
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Table 3.4: Estimate Results of Cox Proportional Hazard Model 
Note: ***, **, * denote significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Column (1) 
presents the results of the benchmark model using semiparametric Cox model; Column (2) re-
estimate the benchmark model while uses a new variable ‘nonSOB’ to denote the ownership 
of lending banks which includes all types of banks except the five large SOBs (Big5); Columns 
(3) and (4) present separate results for the group of ‘state-owned’ firms and ‘non-state owned’ 
firms, respectively; Columns (5) and (6) shows separate results for the group of ‘large’ firms 
and ‘SMEs’ firms. The results of adding different sets of regressors have been displayed in 
Table 3.5. 
 
Variable (1) 
Benchmark 
(2) 
nonSOBs 
(3) 
SOEs 
(4) 
non-SOEs 
(5) 
Large 
(6) 
SMEs 
Firm       
Age -0.001** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001** -0.000 
Size -0.072*** -0.074*** -0.067** -0.074***   
SOE -0.103*** -0.105***   -0.126** -0.100 
Profit 0.004 0.004 -0.003 0.008** 0.003 0.004 
Leverage -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.007** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.006** 
Cash flows -0.003 -0.003 -0.007 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 
Growth -0.000 -0.000 0.007 -0.000 -0.001 0.001 
Collateral -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
Opaqueness 0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.005** -0.001 0.004*** 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Management       
CEOage 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.002 
Gender -0.036 -0.040 -0.044 -0.022 -0.067 -0.053 
Tenure 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001 0.001*** 0.002*** -0.000 
Change 0.225*** 0.221*** 0.174** 0.265*** 0.337*** 0.041 
Bank       
SOB -0.398***  -0.361*** -0.439*** -0.398*** -
0.320*** 
JSCB 0.026  0.103 -0.039 0.018 0.125 
CCB 0.156***  0.157** 0.147** 0.201** 0.155 
nonSOB  0.460***     
Environment        
Lending rate 0.080*** 0.079*** 0.051 0.115*** 0.091*** 0.112** 
Reserve  0.016** 0.016** 0.012 0.017 0.015 0.004 
Guidance 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.015 0.005 0.023 
Crisis -0.396*** -0.394*** -0.324*** -0.465*** -0.379*** -0.365** 
Change*SOB 0.243***  0.214** 0.094 0.148 0.111 
Obs. 7,570 7,570 3,140 4,430 5,150 2,420 
Mean duration 27.38 27.38 30.97 23.55 28.33 25.33 
  
 
  68  
 
3.5.3 Robustness  
To check the robustness, I control for the city effects and the number of bank relationship 
and use the Cox proportional hazard model to analyse the effects of these covariates. This 
allow for the possibility that economic development policy, and financial environment 
varies across cities and provinces in China by controlling for a city effect on firm-bank 
relationship and firms switching behaviour. According to the geographical location of 
firms, this study uses four location dummies to examine whether firms located in the most 
developed areas in China are more likely to switch lenders, as they are assumed to be 
granted loans more easily in these areas.  
As Elsas (2005) suggests, exclusivity gives rise to a lower degree of direct competition 
between banks, which allows for unique access to valuable information and eases the 
realization of the economic benefits associated with relationship lending, for example, 
efficient renegotiation of loan contract. It is argued that there is a negative correlation 
between the number of banks in a multiple bank relationship and the incidence of 
relationship lending or repeated lending. Hence, a variable Number has been employed to 
measure the number of bank relationship to examine its effect on Chinese firms’ switch 
behaviour.  
The results of robustness test are shown in Table 3.528. Column (1) replicates the results of 
benchmark model from Table 3.3 – Column (1). Column (2) shows the results of robustness 
check by adding the variable ‘Number’ and four city dummies, they are ‘Beijing’, 
‘Shanghai’, ‘Guangzhou’ and ‘Shenzhen’.  Columns (3) to (8) show the estimated 
coefficients for adding additional sets of covariate. As can be seen from this table, the main 
results are maintained. Firms that have multiple bank relationships are more likely to 
switch, the more relationship they have, the higher the likelihood of switching. It is not 
hard to understand because more bank relationships implies a firm is less loyal to its main 
bank, thus the likelihood to have multiple bank relationships or switch lender is higher. In 
addition, firms located in Shanghai has lower hazard of switching, this could be interpreted 
as firms located in the international financial centre of China may enjoy more stable bank 
                                                 
28 In addition to the semiparametric analysis, I also estimated the hazard function by parametric methods. 
The results using both Weibull and Exponential specification are almost in line with the results from using 
semiparametric analysis – Cox proportional hazard model. The results are available on request.  
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relationships and they are less likely to suffer financial difficulty. As suggested by 
Ogloblina (2012), financial centres are the locations where important financial institutions 
are gathered and where there is considerable mobilization and redistribution of financial 
resources. International Financial Centres (i.e. London, New York, Hong Kong) are 
characterized by liquid markets and provide a wide range of financial services. Many 
international banks and important financial supervision institutions place their headquarters 
within these financial centres. These IFCs provide investors various opportunities and 
benefits such as low transaction costs, low risks and easy access to the capital (ŞİT and 
KARADAĞ, 2018). Allowing for these location advantage, a lower probability of changing 
loan provider in Shanghai indicates that firms located in the financial centre of China enjoy 
a better financial environment and their credit needs can always be fulfilled by their current 
credit provider to maintain their high liquidity levels. 
Although the signs of other three city dummies are positive these effects are insignificant. 
Overall, the results of adding and dropping different regressors are almost in line with the 
results from benchmark model for some covariates, but some of the coefficients vary 
slightly. For example, adding additional regressors increases the effect of firm size and 
CEO change, while reduces the effect of state ownership and leverage. Nevertheless, using 
these four location dummies indicates the limitation of this robustness test because the 
number firms from these four cities only accounts for one-third of the sample. Hence, the 
city effects are tenuous.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  70  
 
 
Table 3.5: Robustness Tests 
 
Note: ***, **, * denote significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Column (1) 
replicates the results of benchmark model from Table 3.4; Column (2) shows the results of 
robustness check by adding the ‘number of bank relationships’ and ‘city dummies’ (Beijing, 
Shanghai, Guangzhou and Shenzhen); Columns (3) to (8) present the results of adding different 
sets of variables (firms’ characteristics, managerial characteristics, bank characteristics, crisis 
dummy and interaction terms) additionally. More specifically, Columns (3), (5) and (7) presents 
the results prior to the robustness test, while Columns (4), (6) and (8) are performed to check the 
robustness. 
 
Variable (1) 
Benchmark 
(2) 
Robustness 
(3) 
 
(4) 
Robustness 
(5) 
 
(6 ) 
Robustness 
(7) 
 
(8) 
Robustness 
Firm         
Age -0.001** -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
Size -0.072*** -0.078*** -0.054*** -0.064*** -0.061*** -0.075*** -0.069*** -0.077*** 
SOE -0.103*** -0.097** -0.167*** -0.164*** -0.146*** -0.139*** -0.122*** -0.115*** 
Profit 0.004 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 
Leverage -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** 
Cash flows -0.003 -0.003 -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.005** -0.005** -0.006*** -0.006*** 
Growth -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
Collateral -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
Opaqueness 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Management         
CEO age 0.000 0.000   0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Gender -0.036 -0.060   0.015 -0.011 -0.013 -0.036 
Tenure 0.001** 0.001*   0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Change 0.225*** 0.200***   0.218*** 0.240*** 0.232*** 0.245*** 
Bank         
SOB -0.398*** -0.399***     -0.431*** -0.433*** 
JSCB 0.026 0.016     0.005 -0.006 
CCB 0.156*** 0.141***     0.142*** 0.126** 
Environment          
Lending rate 0.080** 0.085**       
Reserve  0.016* 0.015*       
Guidance  0.010        
Crisis -0.396*** -0.397***       
Change*SOB 0.243***        
Robustness         
Number  0.023***  0.027***  0.025***  0.025*** 
Beijing  0.091  0.101*  0.144**  0.075 
Shanghai  -0.305***  -0.195**  -0.313***  -0.300*** 
Guangzhou  0.112  0.165  0.170  0.147 
Shenzhen  0.029  0.014  0.023  0.004 
Obs. 7,570 7,570 9,753 9,753 7,570 7,570 7,570 7,570 
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3.6 Conclusion 
Using 18,233 firm-bank loan relationship matched data during 1996-2016, this paper has 
used survival analysis to investigate the causes of the changes to firm-bank relationship 
and the hazard of a firm changing its bank loan provider which we define as a ‘switch’. A 
switch is defined as a firm borrows from a bank that it did not have a loan relationship in 
the prior 12 months. The estimated results provide evidence that the main drivers of firms’ 
switching behaviour are a mixture of their credit needs, the attributes of firms and bank 
ownership-type, as well as the macro-economic environmental factor. 
Controlling for time-varying and time-invariant covariates related to firm’s characteristics, 
management characteristics, bank characteristics and the external factor, this chapter finds 
small and young firms, and less leveraged firms are more likely to terminate an incumbent 
bank relationships and switch to other banks, which opposite to the finding of Ongena and 
Smith (2001). Controlling for industry, firms operating in the real estate sector have a 
relatively higher hazard of switch banks, compared to other sectors. In addition, this chapter 
finds that the characteristic of executives have significant positive effects on the hazard of 
firms switching. For example, the hazard of firms switch will be higher if firm’s CEO 
changes during a relationship time, also their tenure will increase the likelihood of 
switching banks. In particular, the impact of changing CEO on the hazard of switching is 
greater for non-SOEs and large enterprises, compared to SOEs or SMEs.  
Moreover, borrowing from City Commercial Banks (CCBs) increases firm’s hazard of 
switching, while having loan relationship with the five large-scale state-owned commercial 
banks (SOBs or Bigg5) make firms more likely to maintain longer and stable bank 
relationship thereby less likely to switch. Besides, all these firms are found to be less likely 
to switch lender during the financial crisis period between2008-2009, because the negative 
effect and uncertainty caused them not easy to change lender, particular for SMEs. SOBs 
and SOEs have super stable firm-bank relationships, as for the rest; small, young and non-
SOEs, firms with lower leverage, and multiple bank relationships, and operating in the real 
estate sector are more likely to switch. Firms that borrow from non-SOBs are also more 
likely to switch. Significantly, a long CEO tenure and a CEO switch during the lending 
relationship increases the likelihood of a switch.  
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4 Understanding The Borrowing and Lending Behaviour 
Using the Dirichlet Benchmarks 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The failure of the US investment banking giant Lehman Brothers September 2008 brought 
about an episode of the financial crisis that led to the hardest economic recession since the 
1930s Great Depression. To stabilize financial systems and to stimulate economic recovery 
the governments had to step in with a variety of acute measures. Regulatory action during 
the crisis emphasized the active state involvement in the financial sector can have positive 
influence, even though it is also recognized that there may be negative consequences of 
government ownership in the longer-term. Therefore, finding a balanced role for the state 
in finance has become a crucial issue in the post-crisis era, which has raised academic and 
policy debate. The state-ownership plays a major role in China, alongside non-state 
domestic and foreign banks, which provide a good context to study. Against this 
background, this chapter aims to contribute to the debate by investigating how ownership 
features affect bank share and borrowers’ borrowing choice. 
In September 2008, after the outbreak of the global financial crisis, China’s economic 
growth rate drop rapidly, exports experienced negative growth, a large number of migrant 
workers returned to their hometowns, and the economy faced a risk of a hard landing. In 
response to this crisis, the Chinese government introduced ten measures to further expand 
domestic demand and promote steady and rapid economic growth in November 2008, 
which is also known as “A four trillion stimulus package plan”. Initially, the 
implementation of these ten measures will require an investment of 4 trillion RMB by the 
end of 2010. The Chinese government has continuously improved and enriched the policies 
and measures to respond to the global financial crisis over time, and gradually formed a 
package plan against the global financial crisis. One of these ten measures is to increase 
financial support for economic growth, for example, to remove restrictions on commercial 
banks’ credit scale, expand the scale of credit, increase the support for key projects, and 
small and medium-sized enterprises. 
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Specifically, for the purpose of increasing the money supply, maintain the adequate 
liquidity of the banking system, the Chinese government quickly responded by adopting a 
series of response measures including multiple reductions in deposit and lending 
benchmark interest rates and deposit reserves (from September 2008, the central bank 
lowered the deposit and loan benchmark interest rates five times, and lowered reserve 
requirements four times), reduced the refinancing rate and rediscount rate of financial 
institutions twice, as well as the promotion of the renminbi (RMB) credit, increase the 
amount of loans. The measures are conducive to improving the enthusiasm of banks for 
issuing loans, particularly state or government projects and state-owned enterprises will 
thus be more likely to obtain capital, and then invest the funds in projects that will help 
stimulate economic activities. Meanwhile, the adjustment of monetary policy eased the 
SMEs’ financing problem. 
 
Changes in lending and borrowing relationship between firms and banks, and firms’ switch 
behaviour are important for analyzing firms’ borrowing behaviour and patterns. Base on 
the evidence form the survival analysis in the previous chapter, there are nearly half 
(48.16%) of the listed firms switch their credit provider during their existing loan 
relationship or after terminating the relationship with their incumbent banks. Monitoring 
and analysis of firms’ borrowing behaviour are crucial for investigating firms’ borrowing 
patterns such as borrowing frequency, size of borrowing, choice preference, loyal borrower 
etc. and enable banks to identify highly switch firms thereby target them. 
 
Marketing theories used to interpret buying behaviour have been successfully applied to 
other consumer behaviours. Various types of marketers have developed multiple forms of 
evidence that describe the role of marketing theory can have in assisting to understand 
consumer buying behaviour and social change. Examples involve retail store choice, brand 
switch, brand loyalty, and physical activity behaviour (Graham et al., 2012; Huang et al., 
2007; Sharp et al., 2002; Mayer-Waarden and Benavent, 2006; Wilson et al., 2017). 
However, these marketing literature focused on specific types of goods market, category 
and products, few have applied to other markets such as the loan market.  
 
A commonly used model in commercial marketing known as the Negative Binomial 
Distribution – Dirichlet model, describes the regularities of consumer behaviour and 
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predict brand choice through analysing a series of measurements of purchase behaviour.  
The NBD-Dirichlet (also called “Dirichlet”) approach has mainly been applied to 
demonstrate and identify patterns of consumer purchase behaviour in previous literature 
(Ehrenberg, 1972; Graham et al., 2012; McCabe et al., 2013; Sharp, 2010). The fit of the 
NBD-Dirichlet to consumer purchase data provides significant implications for 
understanding consumer behaviour and appropriate marketing strategies. Due to the 
consistent fit of the model across different brands, countries and time period, the NBD-
Dirichlet model is also known an empirical generalisation, which have also been extended 
to issues not relevant to purchasing, such as engagement in leisure-time activity (Hand and 
Dall'Olmo Riley, 2016; Scriven et al., 2015) and health-related behaviours (Gruneklee et 
al., 2016; Wilson et al., 2017). However, to the best of my knowledge, there is no research 
have applied the Dirichlet analysis to borrowing and lending behaviour or firm’s switching 
lender behaviour. 
 
To field this gap, this chapter tends to extend the scope of the Dirichlet benchmark to a new 
context of borrowing and lending behaviour between firms and banks, particularly firms’ 
switch behaviours in China. The purpose of this chapter is to widen the scope of the 
Dirichlet approach through its application to borrowing and lending activity, describe and 
analyse Chinese listed firms’ borrowing frequency and provide evidence to possibly help 
banks to recognize potential firms switch then target them in order to avoid customer loss. 
Fitting the NBD-Dirichlet model to loan data of firm-bank relationship provides a novel 
approach to investigate borrowing and lending behaviour. In addition, applying the NBD 
to loan activity data will describe (1) whether the NBD model is efficient to describe and 
forecast firms’ borrowing patterns in loan activity behaviours on the basis of previous 
behaviour and (2) whether the Dirichlet pattern is evident for firms’ borrowing behaviours.    
 
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 emphases the role of state ownership in the 
banking and corporate sectors in China. Section 3 presents a brief overview of the Dirichlet 
benchmark, discusses the underlying principles of this model, reviews this methodology 
through its application from various marketing literature and describes the main regularities 
of consumer buying behaviour. Section 4 describes how the Dirichlet approach and its core 
assumptions can be replicated and extended to a novel context of borrowing and lending 
behaviour, the dataset and standard metrics used in the analysis along with an overview of 
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the fitting procedure will be shown in this section. Section 5 discusses patterns observed 
from the loan data of listed companies and presents the estimation results of covariates 
effects. Section 6 discusses the implications for lending banks, for lending strategy and for 
theory development. Section 7 concludes. 
 
4.2 The Role of State Ownership   
The influence of ownership impacts on miscellaneous dimensions of bank behaviour has 
been a key concern for both researchers and policymakers. A plenty of studies have 
examined various issues including the link between bank ownership and performance 
(Bonin et al., 2005; Jiang et al., 2013); economic growth (La Porta et al., 2002); lending 
behaviour (Jia, 2009); and loan rates (Sapienza, 2004).  
The reform of economic and banking sector started in 1978 which aimed at stimulating 
development by transforming from a planned economy to a market economy. In particular, 
the reform in the second stage focus on government retreated from direct enterprise control 
by combining a socialist market with a modern corporate system. Making the transition 
from a planned economy to a market economy, the primary task for Chinese enterprise 
reform is to split SOEs from the government. To promote this separation, many large and 
medium-sized SOEs were transformed into publicly listed firms through two Stock 
Exchanges. Nevertheless, there were more than 70% of China’s listed companies remained 
ultimately owned by the State and controlled by the controlled by central or local 
governments through the shareholding chain in 2004. Rather than being involved in day-
to-day affairs, the State now serves as the owner. State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC) at the central and local levels 
were established to supervise firm operation and represent the State’s interest. These 
SASACs control directly or indirectly the shares of listed companies through SOEs. 
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 illustrate two typical examples of the ultimate control structure for 
listed firms from sample data. 
 
 
 
  
 
  76  
 
Figure 4.1: Ultimate control structure of China Railway Group Ltd. 
China Railway Group Ltd. (601390) is a state-owned listed company that is ultimately 
controlled by the central SASAC, which reports to the State Council. This SASAC controls 
the listed company through an SOE – China Railway Engineering Corporation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: China Railway Group Limited Annual Report (2012) 
 
Figure 4.2: Ultimate control structure of Guangxi Guidong Electric Power Co., 
Ltd. 
Guangxi Guidong Electric Power Co., Ltd. (600310) is a state-owned listed company that 
is ultimately controlled by the local SASAC of Guangxi Hezhou City Government. This 
local State Asset Management Bureaus controls the listed company through an SOE – 
Guangxi Zhengrun Development Group Co., Ltd 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Guangxi Guidong Electric Power Co., Ltd Annual Report (2012) 
Since the State is the ultimate ownership of most SOEs is prevailing in China, the 
relationship between ownership structure and firm value becomes even more complicated. 
The interest of the State may conflict with firm profitability as it also plays the role of 
regulator. For example, Fan et al. (2012) investigate that a local government that is 
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the 
State Council (SASAC) 
China Railway Engineering Corporation 
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burdened by poor fiscal policy conditions or running in a region with a high level of 
unemployment may require local government-owned enterprise to subsidize public 
expenditure or improved employment, but neither action of which is a profit-maximization 
objective. Apart from this, to some extent, it is politicians rather than professional managers 
who represent the government and who ultimate control firms. Such politicians are not 
chosen and promoted for their management experience or specific industry knowledge, but 
rather because of their commitment to the government (Wang and Xiao, 2009). Hence, 
splitting business operations from government control could reduce political costs because 
decentralization provides more autonomy to firms’ decision-making.  
The banking system in China is the major and the most important external financing source 
for enterprises because non-bank financings are comparatively rare due to the immature 
capital market. The banking system is dominated by the government and served as a policy 
tool for addressing national and social priorities. In particular, existing scholars argue that 
large and state-owned enterprises have priority to access to bank loan as credit access may 
be determined by political considerations and connections rather than on a commercial 
basis. Monetary policy and bank loan supply are frequently implemented to stimulate 
economic growth in emerging economies. Following an expansionary monetary policy 
during the financial crisis period, a substantial increase in bank loan supply between 2009 
and 2010. 
The intuition behind the view of supply-side effect can be summarized from previous 
literature as follows. First, due to the asymmetric information problem, some firms are 
constrained to the public debt market and thus have to rely on bank lending. This impaired 
access to capital and bank-dependent firms are usually small or unrated firms (Kahle and 
Stulz, 2013), which also considered to be unable to substitute bank lending to other external 
financing sources. In contrast, large firms and firms with higher credit ratings are not 
sensitive to bank loan supply because they can access external funds much more easily if 
bank loan supply is not available. However, the bank-dependent firms in China also include 
large firms and state-owned firms, because state-owned banks have preferential treatment 
on state-owned enterprises. 
The market share and profit level of the major six types of bank in China have been shown 
in Figure 4.3 and 4.4 respectively. The large state-owned commercial banks (SOB or Big5) 
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group takes the dominant role with the largest market share among six main types of banks 
in China’s banking system. However, with the rapid development of other types of banks 
and market competition, the share of the SOBs declines from 58.03% in 2003 to 37. 29% 
in 2016. As the second and third largest group banks, the joint-stock commercial banks 
(JSCB) and city commercial banks (CCB) accounts for 18.72% and 12.16% in 2016, 
respectively, with average annual market share growth rate of 4.44% and 6.67%, 
respectively. In particular, the share of rural commercial banks (RCB) grows dramatically 
since 2003, with an average annual growth rate of 50.42% and accounts for 8.73% share 
of the market. On the other hand, the share of policy banks (PB) drops from third to fourth 
largest group of banks in 2016, as well as the smallest foreign banks (FB) group, remained 
as the least competitive bank group in China. Since policy banks mainly serve the 
government-oriented financial projects, their market share is quite stable over the last 
fifteen years. Foreign banks experienced challenges facing the new market and a decline 
in market share under the rapid growth and competition of Chinese local peer banks in the 
last two decades. Following the issuance of the Regulation of the People’s Republic of 
China on the Administration of Foreign-funded banks in 2007, foreign banks are allowed 
to submit an application to restructure their branches into incorporative bank registered in 
China and has equal treatment as their Chinses peers. Although the asset scale of foreign 
banks undergoing rapid expansion, capital share of these banks decreased due to the global 
financial crisis and the fast development of local banks.  
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Figure 4.3: Markets shares of major groups of banks 
 
 
Note: SOB indicates five largest State-owned commercial banks (Big5); JSCB indicates Joint-stock 
commercial banks; CCB indicates City commercial banks; RCB indicates Rural commercial banks 
PB indicates Policy banks; FB indicates foreign banks. 
Source: China Banking Regulatory Commission Annual Report (2007, 2017). Data in details 
attached in Appendix C – Table C1. 
As regards the profitability (measured by return on equity) of these six types of banks 
shown, joint-stock commercial banks and large state-owned commercial banks are the most 
profitable banks in China, with very similar return on equity ratios of 13.21% and 13.17% 
in 2016, respectively. Although the large state-owned commercial banks were considered 
as less profitable SOEs due to their poor performance and low efficiency before the reform 
decade, the banking reform in 2000 made them become more profitably and efficiently. 
For example, the government has divested approximately 1.98 trillion RMB of large 
commercial banks’ non-performing loans, help them to restructure their ownership 
structure and brought in strategic foreign investors. In addition, all of the five large SOBs 
have listed themselves on stock exchange, which forced them to operate on a more 
commercialized basis. Moreover, city and rural commercial banks have close profit trend 
with ROEs of 12.21% and 11.77%, respectively, which shows that local or small banks are 
still able to compete with large banks. However, foreign banks group is the least profitable 
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bank group in China, with a profit level of around 5%. Overall, these figures presumably 
describe that although the five large SOBs are still dominated the banking system with 
largest market shares and high profitability, other bank groups are continually developing 
and expanding, particularly the local and small banks. These banks become more and more 
competitive based on their local networks (i.e. close relationship with local enterprises), 
provision of good customer service and efficient operation.  
Figure 4.4: Profit level (ROE) of major groups of banks 
 
Note: SOB indicates five largest State-owned commercial banks (Big5); JSCB indicates Joint-stock 
commercial banks; CCB indicates City commercial banks; RCB indicates Rural commercial banks 
PB indicates Policy banks; FB indicates foreign banks. 
 
Source: Calculate from the data in China Banking Regulatory Commission Annual Report (2007, 
2017). Data in details attached in Appendix C – Table C2. 
 
4.3 Overview of the Dirichlet 
This section reviews a very famous Dirichlet approach that commonly used by marketer 
and academic marketing researcher, summarises the general patterns of consumer buying 
behaviours based on last few decades’ empirical evidence, then describes basic 
assumptions of this model and the way it applies.  
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4.3.1 The Use of the Model 
The patterns of consumer behaviour can be described by a single statistical model – the 
NBD – Dirichlet (Dirichlet for short) model. Many marketers and academics literature have 
employed data on repeat purchase in many countries from consumer and business panels, 
developed a range of commonly used, time-based, repeat purchase statistics, which 
includes market share, penetration, average purchase frequency, share of category 
requirement (total category purchases), sole loyal (100% loyal) buyers, repeat purchasing 
rate etc. to compare both brand performance and characteristics of product categories. The 
Dirichlet model also emphasises the importance of non- and light buyers (consumers who 
have not purchased the brand, or have purchased it infrequently in the given time period), 
relative to heavy buyers (consumers who purchase the brand many times in the time period), 
while the Dirichlet model shows that actually most consumers are non- or light buyers with 
only a few heavy buyers (Romaniuk, 2011). 
Beyond that, Dirichlet norms have been used as benchmarks in exploring many other 
marketing issues, such as cannibalization (Lomax et al., 1996), price sensitivities 
(Ehrenberg et al., 1997b; Scriven and Ehrenberg, 1995), consumer loyalty programs (Sharp 
and Sharp, 1997) and subscription markets (Sharp et al., 2002). In addition, these can also 
be used for diagnostic purposes, to investigate whether a brand is operating the way it 
should be, or was budgeted to, and to assess the effect of marketing interventions.  
In addition, the Dirichlet approach provides norms for stationary markets and help 
interpreting change in the market. Without having to match the results against an empirical 
“control sample”, theoretical norms for the stationary market also offer a baseline for 
interpreting change (i.e. non-stationary situations). Examples in the early papers 
documented that questions like whether an increase in sales came from attracting more 
buyers or from existing buyers buying more. 
Moreover, the Dirichlet model can also help with decision making and understanding the 
nature of markets. The generalized empirical knowledge summarized by the Dirichlet 
model also provides a better understanding of the nature of consumer goods markets. 
Examples are including even though the number of customers which a brand has differs 
dramatically, it is still predictable with the length of time-period analyse; brand loyalty 
exists but is low and not exclusive; aspects of loyalty such as repeat-buying and multi-
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brand buying are directly related; competitive marketing inputs (pricing, advertising, etc) 
only show up in the brand’s market shares and there is no significant segmentation in most 
branded goods markets. In a word, the Dirichlet methodology – the empirical patterns, the 
mathematical model, and the fundamental theory also has wider implications for the 
understanding of consumers, brands, differentiation and positioning, advertising, sales 
promotion, etc. 
4.3.2 Background  
Generally, the patterns of consumer behaviour can be unsurprisingly described by a single 
statistical model – the Negative Beta Distribution-Dirichlet model, which is a simple model 
that comprises just a few well-based assumptions. Different from the NBD model that is 
used on a single product or brand, the NBD-Dirichlet (Dirichlet hereafter) is a more 
comprehensive stochastic preference model and is used to predict brand shares and 
purchase frequencies, which not only captures purchase incidence as described by the NBD, 
but also brand choice (Ehrenberg et al., 2004). Basically, the Dirichlet describes 
stochastically when a purchase of the product-class is made and which brand is chosen. 
These regularities of choice are well described by a single model of choice behaviour using 
the Dirichlet Distribution. The theory and application were firstly described in Goodhardt 
et al. (1984)’s paper read to the Royal Statistical Society. The crucial feature of the 
Dirichlet model is that it can describe the various observed brand performance patterns, 
and in that sense, it also helps interpret and forecast them. Researchers and marketers have 
used the results from the Dirichlet model as benchmarks or norms for consumer repeat 
buying measures. Hence, the role of Dirichlet has gained increasing space in early and 
recent discussions of consumer behaviour models as a convenient extension of the 
univariate beta-distribution (Goodhardt et al., 1984). 
A good fit of the model indicates that regularities of purchasing behaviour are consistent 
over time and future regularity can be predicted based on past regularities of behaviour. 
The consistent fit of the Dirichlet model across plenty marketing contexts involving buying 
of goods and services (Ehrenberg et al., 2004; Graham et al., 2012; Huang et al., 2007), use 
of gambling service (Lam and Mizeerski, 2009), phone subscription (Lee, 2009), 
attendance at sporting and cultural events (Trinh and Lam, 2016), and emphasizes the role 
of habits and repeated routines in physical activities behaviour (Wilson et al., 2017). 
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4.3.3 The Application of the Dirichlet Model 
The Dirichlet is a theoretical statistical model that has been widely used and replicated for 
modelling purchase incidence and consumer choice, which is a simple model that 
comprises just a few well-based assumptions. It simply assumes that each customer has a 
certain propensity – a probability in the model – to buy a given brand. This probability is 
postulated to be steady for the time being but varying across heterogeneous consumers. 
The model is defined for steady state and non-partitioned markets where market shares are 
stationary and there is no clustering of particular brands. The model proposes only to 
demonstrate what markets are like when they are approximate steady and non-partitioned. 
Though where the market is not quite steady, or where there is some clustering, the 
Dirichlet mostly still holds and it gives useful benchmarks. 
4.3.3.1 Basic assumptions 
Dirichlet model is a zero-order static stochastic model which contains four probability 
distributions that can be used to specify individual purchasing structures. One concerns 
consumers and the other concerns brands. First, the zero-order process reflected by NBD-
Dirichlet assumes that brand purchase decisions are as if random, that means each decision 
is assumed to be independent of the last purchase decision (Goodhardt et al., 1984). The 
brand choice at each purchase occasion can be determined as a probability based on past 
behaviour. Secondly, the model assumes a stationary market, that is, stable over time. This 
stationarity assumption enables benchmarking of population-level consumer behaviour and 
assessment of marketing activity and predictions about future patterns of behaviour 
(Ehrenberg et al., 2004). 
Specifically, consumers are considered as highly experienced, so they are hardly affected 
by a further purchase or seeing yet another advert. Therefore, consumers they can behave 
as if they have, for the time being, stable habitual personal purchase propensities, that 
implies they have stochastic probabilities for when they buy and what brands they choose 
on different occasions. One important feature pointed out by this model is that a consumer's 
probability of buying a specific brand would not be influenced by what other brands the 
consumer is also purchasing. On the other hand, brands are featured in the model by their 
purchase probabilities and thus their market shares. Apart from that, the model does not 
specify whether brands are functionally differentiated or not, or differently marketed, this 
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is all involved in the model’s steady-state purchase probabilities. These notations are 
captured in the theoretical model by five specific distributional assumptions: two 
assumptions concern consumer heterogeneity for purchase frequency and for brand choice, 
two concern the probabilistic incidence of particular purchase of the product and of a brand, 
and the last one concerns the statistical independence of these two aspects. According to 
Goodhardt et al. (1984), the five key theoretical assumptions can be summarized as follows: 
 For purchase incidence  
i. The individual household purchasing incidence over time follows a Poisson 
distribution with mean 𝜆𝑖 for the ith consumer; 
ii. The purchase frequency vary between consumers follows a Gamma distribution. 
 For brand choice 
iii. The brand choice over a sequence of purchases for the ith consumer among the 
available brands follow a multinomial distribution; 
iv. These heterogeneous consumers’ brand choice probabilities follow a multivariate 
beta distribution (also called the Dirichlet distribution) across consumers; 
v. Purchase incidence (i & ii) and brand choice (iii & iv) are independent of each 
other.  
In addition to these assumptions, the model assumes the market is stationary or 
approximately stationary and without partition. A stationary market implies that consumers’ 
buying propensities remain approximately stable from one period to another. The 
commonly used measures to parameterize the Dirichlet model are market share and the 
penetration. A non-partitioned (or non-segmented) market indicates that the proportion of 
particular buyer’s purchases accounted for any one supplier is not relevant to how the buyer 
allocates their purchases among the remaining suppliers (subject to the mathematical 
constraint that the individual choice probabilities must sum to one) (Goodhardt, et al., 
1984). Put it differently, non-partitioned market can be viewed as no special clustering of 
particular suppliers within the product category, which can be observed through the 
duplication of purchases between particular suppliers, i.e. the proportion of buyers of 
Supplier A who also purchase from Supplier B. If any of the assumptions are violated 
through the extension of the time periods observed, then the model estimation result will 
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no longer fit the data and a boundary condition will have to be considered.  The Dirichlet 
is dependent upon an assumption of fixed consumer choice propensities “for the time being” 
which can be viewed as fixed probabilities within a given time-frame. 
4.3.3.2 How to apply the model 
To apply the model, it has to be calibrated for the chosen product category and brand. Each 
of the suppliers (in this case it is the loan provider) is used to generate the model parameters, 
and the individual supplier parameters are then combined as a weighted average based on 
market share. The model requires only a few numerical inputs, typically the penetrations 
and the average purchase frequencies of the category and of one particular brand. Brand’s 
market shares have also necessary to be inputted when estimating any brand’s performance. 
To simultaneously model the number of purchases for each branding a category over a 
fixed time, the Dirichlet combines these assumptions in two probability density functions, 
one is the negative binomial distribution (NBD) describing purchase incidence, and the 
other is Dirichlet multinomial distribution (DMD) for brand choice. The method of fitting 
the model follows the procedures in Goodhardt et al. (1984) and Ehrenberg (1988).  
After fitting the NBD-Dirichlet model, it is used to predict a series of metrics for the time 
period of analysis with different lengths. These metric predictions can then be compared to 
the observed measures. Typical predicted measures include penetration of purchasers, 
average number of purchases from the supplier per buyer, share of category requirements, 
percentage of sole buyers, duplication of purchase, etc. (Ehrenberg et al., 2004). 
Having derived the set of supplier’s performance measures, it is necessary to test whether 
the model is valid, i.e. the predicted values estimating from the Dirichlet model are indeed 
a good match to the observed values. 
4.3.4 Main Regularities of Consumer Buying Behaviour Based on Marketing 
Literature 
Stochastic theories of consumer choice have been used to describe, model and explain 
regular patterns of buyer behaviour, which have been observed across a wide variety of 
consumer markets, from packaged goods to durables (see Uncles et al., 1995). In addition 
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to this, the Dirichlet model not only summarizes various aspects of buying behaviour and 
also provide interpretative norms in practice for both stationary and non-stationary markets. 
The Dirichlet successfully provides theoretical measures of market performance which 
closely match those observed in practice in a wide range of consumer markets throughout 
the world. Bhattacharya (1997) examines the factors that relate to the deviations of brand’s 
actual loyalty levels from theoretical norm in packaged good market. The Dirichlet model 
provides a robust, parsimonious approach to forecasting repeat purchase behaviour. 
Referring to the paper by Goodhard et al. (1984), the model is based on a set of five key 
assumptions regarding purchase incidence and brand choice. Besides, Huang et al. (2007) 
extend traditional NBD-Dirichlet model and incorporates explanatory variables to 
investigate what they choose, how often and why they choose these three issues 
simultaneously in Chinese goods market, hence the borrowing behaviour of firms can be 
fully reflected. In regard to repeat purchase and loyalty analyses, Meyer-Waarden and 
Benavent (2006) use the NBD–Dirichlet model to test the impacts of loyalty programmes 
on repeat purchase indicators, which has contributed to elaborating and outlining certain 
empirical regularities using the theory of repeat buying, such as penetration and average 
purchase frequency per brand and per category can be used to predict various aspects of 
loyalty behaviour. 
The Dirichlet also provides a technique for expounding market structure and differentials 
between repertoire markets (high incidence of split loyalty, few sole buyers, less 
independence) and subscription markets (low incidence of split loyalty, many sole buyers 
and more independence). Comparing relationships in markets structured by high 
independence with those of low independence provides insights into the nature of 
interdependence and the multidimensionality of buyer-seller relationships29 . Although 
most brands have only temporary gains and losses in share from the long-term data, they 
may gain customers one year and lose them the next, the customers themselves have not 
changed in their buying propensities. Using the shampoo category as an example, Bennett 
and Graham (2011) find that repeat buying for brands was very stable over both long and 
short term which closely related to the market shares of the brands, though there are also 
some exceptions, mostly small. In addition, although they did not provide evidence of any 
permanent brand growth or decline, they find that both the short and long-term measures 
                                                 
29 See Sharp, et al.(2002); Zerbini and Castaldo (2007). 
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of repeat purchasing are very similar, this may due to the growth or decline of brand share 
is accounted for by gain and loss of customers, not changes in their loyalty (repeat buying 
rates). Overall, the underlying structure of brand purchase can be captured both by short 
and long-term purchasing data, both of which implies that brand loyalty and switching are 
mainly driven by how big the brand is, which could possibly be interpreted as choice for a 
particular consumer mostly between what seems to him or her to be close substitutes, 
otherwise there would difficulty be a choice issue. 
The fundamental finding in regard to individual consumers’ varied buying behaviour is that 
whichever way the data are aggregated, they reflect regular patterns. These patterns gradual 
came to identify over the years, followed by various replications across different products, 
years, and countries to develop their generalizability. The key brand performance metrics 
that underpin in the model can be broadly categorized into two groups. These are 
penetration, which is how many people buy the brand in the time period and loyalty, which 
is the weight or frequency of purchase in the same time period. The main brand metrics 
produced by the Dirichlet model capture how many people buy each brand, how often they 
do so, and which other brands they also buy (Goodhardt et al., 1984). The basic pattern 
observed is that all brand performance measures differ together based on brand size, which 
is reflected in loyalty measures such as repeat buying and brand switching that are 
depending on market share rather than specific brand or customer attribute. Various 
replication studies of consumer behaviour patterns in over fifty years of research have led 
to empirical generalisations of marketing science, these recurring patterns are documented 
in routine panel data metrics such as brand performance and purchase frequency, and in 
loyalty measures such as repeat purchase and share of category requirement. In fact, most 
brand performance measures are just about normal most of the time, but it helps to better 
understand the main recurring patterns (Graham, et al., 2012). For example, 
 Brand share is constrained by the Law of Double Jeopardy. This means that small 
brands have fewer buyers and these buyers buy the brand slightly less often relative 
to bigger brands. Although the market shares and penetrations of competing brands 
differ significantly across categories they are closely correlated. On the other side, 
purchase frequency tends to be similar across competing brands, even though 
slightly lower for smaller brands (Ehrenberge et al., 1990). This implies that the 
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brand size determined by the penetration (number of customers that a brand has), 
far more than by how loyal those customers are.  
 
 Your buyers are the buyers of other brands who occasionally buy you. The pattern 
of polygamous loyalty has also been observed in various categories in the data 
around the world. A majority of customers are experienced category buyers and 
purchase habitually from a portfolio of brands with which they are familiar over 
time. Rival brands are viewed as highly substitutable, thus loyalty becomes 
polygamous and in aggregate, any brands’ customers buy rival brands more often 
in a period. The average portfolio size reflects both the competitiveness of the 
category and the loyalty of the purchasing. The duplication of brand purchase is 
consistent with its penetration. Generally, brand switching decreases consistent 
with brand penetrations, larger brands attract more potential switching buyers. This 
pattern is captured in the Duplication of Purchase Law and expressed as: 
𝑏𝑌|𝑋 = 𝐷𝑏𝑌 
where 𝑏𝑌|𝑋 is the proportion of brand X buyers who also bought Y in the observed 
period, 𝑏𝑌  is the penetration of Y in the same period and D is a duplication 
coefficient which is approximately constant across all the brands in the category. 
This law describes that brands are undifferentiated and substitutable and the 
incidence of purchase is relevant only to the number of buyers rather than any 
particular positioning derived from a close segmentation and targeting strategy 
(Bennett and Graham, 2011). 
 Hard-core loyalty exists, but mostly among light buyers. Generally, loyalty is 
usually split between brands and thereby not specific to any particular brand, 
instead, normally brands of similar size in any category attract similar loyalty. Most 
consumers choose from a portfolio of brands over a range of purchases, favouring 
one over other but buying each regularly if infrequently. Sometimes they may 
switch from a particular brand, add a new one, or downgrade a former favourite, 
whereas relatively rare customers are sole-brand buyers (100% loyal) and those that 
tend to be the lightest category buyers. Existing marketing literature provides 
evidence for the existence of hard-core loyalty, mainly among light buyers. In any 
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period the number of sole loyal consumers is comparatively low but they buy 
infrequently. They are likely to be loyal simply due to they don’t buy much and 
thereby have few opportunities to switch. However, the proportion of hard-core 
loyal buying for each brand may increase with the longer observation period, but 
this would be expected as the result of increasing incidence of very light buyers, 
rather than exceptional loyalty (Ehrenberg, 1972).  
 
 Duplication is consistent with brand penetration. Brands share customers 
predictably consistent with penetration. More of any brand’s consumers buy larger 
competitors and fewer buy the smaller competitors in any period. Besides, due to 
the fact that households purchase habitually, these regularities hold over time and 
are difficult to change permanently (Graham, et al., 2012) 
 
4.4. Methodology 
Given the model’s past success of explaining consumer behaviour and referring to the 
Dirichlet framework developed in Goodhart et al. (1984), this chapter tends to replicate and 
extend this approach to the borrowing behaviour of listed companies in China’s loan market 
through incorporating a set of covariates. In particular, questions like “Is the reason for 
choosing a particular bank consistent with the reason for firms are loyal to banks? What 
else banks they also borrow from? What factors would affect firm’s bank-choice and their 
repeat borrowing?” can be addressed by the estimation through the Dirichlet approach. If 
borrowing and lending activity between firms and banks do fit the NBD-Dirichlet patterns, 
then it would suggest a more predictable behaviour of repeat borrowing and switch to other 
lenders. Uses of this model can benchmark borrowing behaviour and evaluate the successes 
of loan approval, and loan management. 
4.4.1 Probability density functions 
As mentioned above, the Dirichlet model combines two probability density functions. First, 
the frequency of borrowing for the overall loan product category K is assumed to follow a 
Negative binomial distribution (NBD). Second, borrowing from individual banks 
𝑅1, 𝑅2, … , 𝑅ℎ is assumed to follow a Dirichlet multinomial distribution (DMD) conditional 
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on the number of borrowing for loan category, K, having a specific value k. The NBD and 
DMD distributions are assumed to be otherwise independent. 
This chapter firstly apply the NBD model to firms’ borrowing frequencies over a time 
period, that means borrowing frequency k of a given listed firm in successive time periods 
follow a Poisson-distribution with the parameter 𝜆: 
 𝑓(𝑘) =  
𝑒−(𝜆)𝜆𝑘
𝑘!
        with mean 𝐸[𝑘] = 𝜆 (1) 
The mean borrowing frequency λ of different firms vary in the long run and their 
distribution is a Gamma-distribution with density function: 
 
𝑓(𝜆; 𝛾, 𝛽) = 𝜆𝛾−1  
𝑒
(−
𝜆
𝛽
)
𝛽𝛾Γ(𝛾)
 
 
(2) 
where 𝛾 and 𝛽 are the shape and scale parameters of the gamma distribution, respectively. 
The shape parameter is a heterogeneity parameter which describes the variation in 
borrowing of the category across consumers.  
Combining Equation 1 and 2 yields the probability density function for the NBD: 
 
𝑓𝛾,𝛽(𝑘) =
Γ(𝛾+𝑘)
Γ(𝛾)𝑘!
𝛽𝑘
(1+𝛽)(𝛾+𝑘)
      for k = 0,1,2,… 
 
(3) 
Next, the NBD-Dirichlet model is applied to the frequency of borrowing from multiple 
lenders over a time period, which means that the total borrowing of all firms follow the 
Negative binomial distribution (NBD) and the loan choice among different lending banks 
follows the Dirichlet multinomial distribution (DMD). The probability density function of 
the NBD is as in (3), where k is the loan borrowing frequency. 
Let there be h types of lending bank, thus the DMD has h parameters, one for each bank 
group. These parameters are 𝛼1,𝛼2, … , 𝛼ℎ where each is positive. Over the listed firms let 
the borrowing from each bank group be a set of random variables 𝑟1, 𝑟2, … , 𝑟ℎ. Then the 
sum of these borrowing frequencies is the overall bank loan borrowing frequency: 𝑟1 +
𝑟2 + ⋯ 𝑟ℎ = 𝐾. The Dirichlet model assumes that the borrowing from each bank group, 
conditional on the bank loan category borrowing frequency, follow a Dirichlet multinomial 
distribution; i.e. 𝑟1, 𝑟2, … , 𝑟ℎ conditional on K has a DMD. The probability density function 
of DMD is: 
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 𝑓𝛼1,𝛼2,…,𝛼ℎ (𝑟1, 𝑟2, … , 𝑟ℎ|𝑟1 + 𝑟2 + ⋯ + 𝑟ℎ = 𝑘)
=
Γ(∑ 𝛼𝑗
ℎ
𝑗=1 )𝑘!
Γ(∑ 𝛼𝑗
ℎ
𝑗=1 + 𝑘)
∏
Γ(𝛼𝑗 + 𝑟𝑗)
𝑟𝑗! Γ(𝛼𝑗)
ℎ
𝑗=1
 
 
(4) 
where h is the number of lending bank groups, which are six types of lending bank in this 
study,  𝑟𝑗  is listed firm’s borrowing frequency for jth group of lending bank, 𝛼𝑗  is the 
parameter of the DMD distribution, the sum of the 𝛼 parameters 𝑆 = ∑ 𝛼 is a heterogeneity 
parameter that describes the variations in the preference for lending banks across firms. 
Combining these two probability density functions from Equation 3 and 4 to create a single 
probability density function that specifies the borrowings of all bank brands in a bank loan 
product category over a period of time. The Dirichlet model is a probability density 
function for the borrowings of all lending banks in a product category over a period of time. 
Hence, the probability density function of the NBD-Dirichlet (or Dirichlet) model is: 
𝑓𝛾,𝛽,𝛼1,𝛼2,…,𝛼ℎ  (𝑟1, 𝑟2, … , 𝑟ℎ)
= 𝑓𝛾,𝛽(𝑘)𝑓𝛼1,𝛼2,…,𝛼ℎ (𝑟1, 𝑟2, … , 𝑟ℎ|𝑟1 + 𝑟2 + ⋯ + 𝑟ℎ = 𝑘) 
       =
Γ(𝛾 + 𝑘)
Γ(𝛾)𝑘!
𝛽𝑘
(1 + 𝛽)(𝛾+𝑘)
Γ(∑ 𝛼𝑗
ℎ
𝑗=1 )𝑘!
Γ(∑ 𝛼𝑗
ℎ
𝑗=1 + 𝑘)
∏
Γ(𝛼𝑗 + 𝑟𝑗)
𝑟𝑗! Γ(𝛼𝑗)
ℎ
𝑗=1
 
 
(5) 
There are h+2 parameters: 𝛾, 𝛽, 𝛼1,𝛼2,…,𝛼ℎ .  Together with market share, the sum of 𝛼 
parameters overall bank brands, the S parameter determines the level of loyalty.  
4.4.2 Brand Performance Measures 
For each brand performance measures (BPMs), this chapter distinguishes the observed 
sample statistic (calculated directly from a dataset) and the underlying population 
parameter (which cannot be directly observed but is a component of the statistical 
distributions for the population). Basically, the mean of a random variable X is ?̅? is the 
observed average of the sample. 
The formula for calculating each BPM sample statistic from data is easily determined from 
the definitions. However, the precise functional form for the underlying parameter of each 
BPM, and most significantly the relationships between the functional forms of different 
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BPMs have not been examined in the borrowing and lending literature. A significant 
contribution of this chapter is reviewing these functional forms and their relationships with 
different BPMs, which is important because it makes possible the statistical analysis of the 
influence of borrower characteristics on the parameters of the functional forms, and thereby 
on the BPMs.  
The precise notation needs to be used to proceed. Due to a large number of different lending 
banks in my sample, I classify the banks into six groups and examine the performance of 
these groups of banks rather examining the performance of a single bank. There are h 
brands in the bank loan category (there are six groups of banks, they are large state-owned 
banks, joint-stock commercial banks, city commercial banks, policy banks, foreign bank, 
and other banks). This chapter analyses a fixed period that from 1996 to 2016. Over the 
sample listed companies, let there be h random variables, 𝑅1, 𝑅2, … , 𝑅ℎ, are the proportion 
of borrowings, by each listed company, from each bank group. Over these sample listed 
companies, the total borrowings of the bank loan category by each firm is another random 
variable, the sum of borrowings over all bank groups (K=∑ 𝑅𝑗
ℎ
𝑗=1  ). All these random 
variables, R and K, are counts and therefore are non-negative integers. The precise 
definition of BPMs have been described by the following, which includes brand size 
(market share, penetration), borrow frequency and loyalty-related measures (SCR, 100% 
loyal and repeat borrow): 
 Borrowers (here are sample listed firms) – This is the unit for which the loan 
borrowing data is recorded. Due to the availability of loan data from CSMAR database, 
this study considers about 75% China listed companies who are potential borrowers, 
regardless of whether or not they borrow.   
 Bank loan category borrower and bank brand borrower – A bank loan category 
borrower is a firm who makes at least one borrowing for the loan product category 
over the observation period. A borrower of a particular bank brand (say bank group j) 
is a firm who makes at least one borrowing from that bank group. By definition, a 
borrower of a bank group j is a borrower of the bank loan category, while a borrower 
of a bank group j may or may not be a borrower of another bank group. 
 Market share for bank group j – Total borrowings of bank group j as a proportion of 
the total borrowings of the bank loan category. 
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 Penetration for bank group j – The proportion of firms who are borrowers of bank 
group j. In particular, it is the proportion of borrowing from bank group j at least once 
in a given period, it increases with the analysis period T. 
 Borrowing frequency for the bank loan category – the number of borrowings by the 
listed companies over a specified time period. Each company has a separate borrowing 
frequency for each bank group. The borrower’s loan category borrowing frequency is 
the sum of firm’s number of loan borrowing from six groups of bank. For listed firm 
i, borrowing time from each individual bank group are: 𝑟𝑖,1, 𝑟𝑖,2, … , 𝑟𝑖,ℎ , and loan 
category borrowing time is 𝑘𝑖 .  Hence, the number of bank group borrowings 
are: 𝑅1, 𝑅2, … , 𝑅ℎ and overall bank loan category is K, where K= ∑ 𝑅𝑗
ℎ
𝑗=1 . 
 Average borrowing ratio for bank group j – The borrowings of bank group j averaged 
over all borrowers. 
 Borrowing frequency for bank group j – The average borrow frequency of bank group 
j among borrowers of that group, it also increases with T, but generally more slowly 
than the penetration. 
 Sole borrower (100% loyal) for bank group j – The proportion of borrowers of bank 
group j who borrow only from that bank group (including firms who only borrow 
once).  
 Share of category requirements (SCR) for bank group j – SCR is defined as: 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 𝑗
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑏𝑦 𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑠
 
 Repeat rate for bank group j – The proportion of borrowers of bank group j at the last 
borrow occasion who re-borrow from the same group of banks at the next borrow 
occasion. 
The parameters for the brand performance measures (i.e. the theoretical estimates of the 
BPMs as functions of 𝛾, 𝛽, 𝛼1, 𝛼2, … , 𝛼ℎ) can be derived on the basis of the assumptions of 
the NBD and DMD in the Dirichlet model. The observed and theoretical values will be 
presented in the following section, and Mean Absolute Deviations (MAD) were used to 
determine the fit of the model. The observed BPMs are simply calculated using the BPMs' 
definitions, while the theoretical BPMs are calculated using the Dirichlet predicted 
formulas and a set of values for Dirichlet model parameters. The formulas for the Dirichlet 
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theoretical BPMs are shown in Table 4.1. In general, according to the Dirichlet approach 
modelling by Goodhardt et al. (1984), deviations are considered as significant if they are 
above +/- 3% for penetration, +/- 0.3 for purchase frequency, and +/- 3% for share of 
category requirement. A low value of S (<0.2) means low proportion of switching and high 
levels of sole loyalty; higher values of S means more split loyalty purchase behaviour (Li 
et al., 2009). 
Table 4.1: Formulas of the Dirichlet Theoretical BPMs 
Brand Performance Measures 
 
Formula 
 Market share for bank group j  𝛼𝑗
𝑆
 
 Penetration for bank group j   
∑ 𝑓𝛾,𝛽(𝑘) (1 −
Γ(𝑆)Γ(𝑆 − 𝛼𝑗 + 𝑘)
Γ(𝑆 + 𝑘)Γ(𝑆 − 𝛼𝑗)
)
∞
𝑘=1
 
 Average borrowing ratio for bank 
group j 
𝛼𝑗𝛾𝛽
𝑆
 
 Borrowing frequency for bank group j Average borrowing ratio for bank group j 
Penetration for bank group 𝑗  
 
 
 Sole borrower (100% loyal) for bank 
group j 
∑ 𝑓𝛾,𝛽(𝑘) (
Γ(𝑆)Γ(𝛼𝑗 + 𝑘)
Γ(𝑆 + 𝑘)Γ(𝛼𝑗)
)∞𝑘=1
Penetration for bank group 𝑗
 
 Share of category requirements (SCR)  
for bank group j 
Average borrow frequency for bank group 𝑗
∑ 𝑓𝛾,𝛽(𝑘)𝑘 (1 −
Γ(𝑆)Γ(𝑆 − 𝛼𝑗 + 𝑘)
Γ(𝑆 + 𝑘)Γ(𝑆 − 𝛼𝑗)
)∞𝑘=1
 
 Repeat rate for bank group j 𝛼𝑗 + 1
𝑆 + 1
 
4.4.3 Likelihood Functions and Model Estimation 
Let there be a sample of n firms, let 𝑥1,𝑖, 𝑥2,𝑖, … 𝑥ℎ,𝑖 be the borrowing of firm i and let 𝑘𝑖 be 
the sum of these borrowings over h bank groups. Then Equation 3 and 4 can lead to the 
likelihood functions in the following Equation 6 and 7. 
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Log-likelihood function for the NBD: 
𝐿𝐿𝛾,𝛽 = ∑{ln[Γ(𝛾 + 𝑘𝑖)] − ln[Γ(𝑘𝑖 + 1)] − ln [Γ(𝛾)] + 𝑘𝑖 ln(𝛽)
𝑛
𝑖=1
− (𝛾 + 𝑘𝑖) ln(1 + 𝛽)} 
 
(6) 
 
Log-likelihood function for the DMD:  
𝐿𝐿𝛼1,𝛼2,…,𝛼ℎ =  ∑ {{ln [Γ (∑ 𝛼𝑗
𝑗
)] + ln[𝛤(𝑘𝑖 + 1)] − ln [Γ (∑ 𝛼𝑗 +
𝑗
𝑘𝑖)]
𝑛
𝑖=1
+ ∑ ln [
ℎ
𝑗=1
Γ(𝛼𝑗 + 𝑥𝑖,𝑗)] − ln [Γ(𝑥𝑖,𝑗 + 1)] − ln [Γ(𝛼𝑗)]}   
 
 
(7) 
As in equation (5), the joint probability density function is the product of the two separate 
density functions for the NBD and DMD. Likewise, the joint log-likelihood function is the 
sum of two separate log-likelihoods, i.e. 𝐿𝐿𝛾,𝛽 + 𝐿𝐿𝛼1,𝛼2,…,𝛼ℎ . For a given data set the 
parameter estimates are those values that maximize the joint log-likelihoods. However, 
each log-likelihood can be maximized separately because there are no parameters in 
common to both log-likelihood functions. Hence, the distribution parameters 𝛾, 𝛽 can be 
estimated from Equation 6 and 𝛼𝑗 for j = 1,2,…h from Equation 7. 
 
In addition, this chapter extends the Dirichlet model to include covariates to estimate the 
correlates of a set of characteristics, such as ownership, firm attributes and whether they 
have a CEO change. The Dirichlet distribution is a multivariate generalization of the beta 
distribution and is appropriate for estimating the correlates of a set of proportions that each 
lie between zero and one, and sum to one. Imposing these restrictions on the joint model 
makes the estimates more efficient than a series of separate OLS or Logit regression. 
Incorporating covariates to the probability density function of Dirichlet is: 
𝑓(𝑦1, … , 𝑦ℎ) =
Γ(∑ 𝛼𝑗
ℎ
𝑗=1 (𝑋))
∏ Γℎ𝑗=1 (𝛼𝑗(𝑋))
∏ 𝑦𝑗
𝛼𝑗(𝑋)−1
ℎ
𝑗=1
 
 
(8) 
where 𝑦1  through 𝑦ℎ  denote vectors of proportions, for example, the proportion of 
borrowings from SOBs and other groups of banks (in which case h equals six). X is a vector 
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of covariates, Г is the gamma function. Taking the log and summing over observations 
gives the log-likelihood function: 
 
𝐿𝐿 = ∑ 𝑙𝑛 (∑ 𝛼𝑗(𝑋)
ℎ
𝑗=1
) − ∑ 𝛤 (𝛼𝑗(𝑋)) + ∑ 𝛼
ℎ
𝑗=1 𝑗
((𝑋) − 1)𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑗
ℎ
𝑗=1
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
 
(9) 
 
where N is the number of observations in the dataset. Alpha in this model as a multinomial 
logit function of the covariates X: 
𝛼𝑗(𝑋) =
exp (𝛽𝑗𝑋)
1 + ∑ exp (𝛽𝑗𝑋)
ℎ
𝑗=1
𝜑 
(10) 
 
where φ is an ancillary scale parameter. 
 
The main variable of this study includes dummies for state ownership, CEO change, and 
firm-level characteristics). The estimated proportions are therefore modeled as a function 
of log firm’s age, size, profit, leverage, cash flows, and a set of dummy variables indicating 
state ownership and CEO change. 
 
Following an Excel workbook created by Rungie (2003), I fit the Dirichlet model to a 
dataset and the estimate the parameters of NBD and DMD using likelihood theory through 
Excel. “Solver” is an important function in Excel which will estimate the parameter values 
which maximize log-likelihood. Adding a “Solver” in Excel to firstly calculate log-
likelihood function in Excel for a particular set of parameter values and then differ the 
parameters to find the maximum for the log-likelihood function. Obtaining the parameter 
values of 𝛾, 𝛽, 𝛼1, 𝛼2, … , 𝛼ℎ, 𝑆 for different sample periods, the theoretical BPMs can be 
calculated using these parameter values and formulas of Dirichlet BPM defined in Table 
4.1. In addition, Stata program will be used when extending the Dirichlet approach through 
incorporating the covariates30. 
4.4.4 Variables and Sample 
The modelling framework described above develop a substantial filed of marketing 
analysis. Broadly speaking, a brand might obtain sales through a large number of the 
                                                 
30 This chapter uses the “dirifit” command in Stata, with the alternative parametrization recommended by 
Buis et al. (2010) in the presence of covariates. 
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customer choosing it occasionally or through a small concentration of customers choosing 
it very frequently and consistently (Sharp, 2010). This chapter can compare brand 
performance measures that capture contrasting option including growing penetration, 
average borrow frequency, or share of category requirement. 
Using the bank loan data, financial data, ownership structure and executive data of listed 
companies from the CSMAR database, which records 2,102 listed firms’ borrowing 
behaviour during 1996-2016 in China. In addition to a full sample that under this long 
analysis period, two sub-periods based on the financial crisis in the year of 2008 are 
considered in order to verify changes in firms’ borrowing behaviour and their relationships 
with banks. Finally, there are 825 and 1,948 listed firms in the subsamples of pre-crisis and 
post-crisis, respectively. The variable description has been presented in Table 4.2. The 
information is typical of the revealed preference data that capture the borrowing patterns 
of listed firms and the performance of banks in China. For illustrative purpose this chapter 
categorizes the banking sector into six types of bank based on their ownership structure, 
which are the five large-scaled State-owned banks (SOB/Big5), Joint-Stock Commercial 
Bank (JSCB), City Commercial Bank (CCB), Policy Bank (PB), Foreign Bank (FB), and 
Other Banks (OB)31. Moreover, firms internally switch behaviour brings a deeper within-
group analysis for the five largest SOBs (Big5). Besides, the occurrence of the financial 
crisis has a significant influence on the economy, this study also uses two subsamples to 
identify the covariates effects pre and post the financial crisis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
31 The remaining banks are classified into a bank group labelled “OB”, which include Postal Saving Bank, 
Rural Commercial Banks, Rural Cooperative Bank, Rural Credit Cooperatives, asset companies, and other 
financial institutions. 
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Table 4.2: Variable Description  
Variables Description Unit 
Switch Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm switches 
its loan provider, 0 otherwise. 
- 
Age Age of the firm when the firm switches. Month 
Size Natural logarithm of year-ended total asset deflated by 
the Chinese GDP deflator. 
CNY 
SOE Dummy variable that takes value 1 when the firm is 
state-owned enterprise, 0 otherwise. 
- 
Profit Ratio of net profit on total assets. % 
Leverage Ratio of long-term debt to total assets. % 
Cash flows Ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets. % 
CEOage Age of CEO when the firm switches. Year 
Gender Dummy variable that takes value 1 when the firm is run 
by a male CEO, 0 otherwise. 
- 
Tenure Tenure of CEO when the firm switches. Month 
Change Dummy variable takes value 1 if there is a change in 
CEO in a current relationship, 0 otherwise. 
- 
Number  The number of CEO change. - 
SOB Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the lending bank is 
the five large state-owned commercial banks (also 
known as Big5), 0 otherwise. 
- 
JSCB Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the lending bank is 
joint-stock commercial bank, 0 otherwise. 
- 
CCB Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the lending bank is 
city commercial bank, 0 otherwise. 
- 
PB Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the lending bank is 
policy bank, 0 otherwise. 
- 
FB Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the lending bank is 
foreign bank, 0 otherwise. 
- 
OB Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the lending bank is 
other banks, 0 otherwise. 
- 
 
 
 
4.5 Results 
4.5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4.3 compares a dozen performance measures across six groups of banks in bank loan 
category and show several apparent patterns. Firstly, market shares and penetrations 
decline greatly from State-owned banks (SOB) to Foreign banks (FB). To the contrast, the 
loyalty measure either remain broadly the same from bank group to group or decline far 
less. In general, these statistics indicate that smaller bank group not only have far fewer 
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borrowers than the larger bank group but also show somewhat lower average borrow 
frequencies (i.e. lower repeat borrowing). This tendency reflects “double jeopardy” (DJ) 
effect in this analysis. In addition, the borrowers (here the listed companies) are very 
heterogeneous. On average, two in six of bank group’s borrower borrowed it five or more 
times, which implies DJ effect again: smaller bank groups have even less heavy borrowers. 
Moreover, the average SCR of a bank group over three sample period is quite low; e.g., 
about 16.7%, this implies that any bank group’s borrower mostly borrows from other bank 
group showing these listed firms’ multibank borrowing behaviour.  
As regards bank loyalty, there are only 4% of a bank group’s customers were 100% loyal 
for the full sample, with even fewer for small bank groups such as Policy Bank and Foreign 
Bank (DJ effect again), though the proportion of sole loyal firm is relatively higher in the 
period of pre-crisis subsample. In fact, sole loyal or 100% loyal borrower is the light 
borrower in bank loan category, because they do not have many chances to be disloyal. 
This could possibly be interpreted either by these firms credit needs always can be fulfilled 
by their incumbent bank or it is difficult for these firms to switch their lender at current 
moment due to the banking environment prior the crisis. Furthermore, the length of the 
analysis period could affect the bank’s penetration and the level of loyalty of their 
borrowers. In general, a bank’s penetration being much higher in a long period than in a 
short period is less than pro rata due to the occurrence of repeat-borrowing. To the contrary, 
loyalty-related measures are much lower in a longer period. Table 4.3 clearly shows that 
the proportions of sole loyal borrowers of each bank group in full sample analysis are 
smaller than subsamples of either pre or post-financial crisis period. For example, the sole 
loyal borrowers of SOB reduces from 30.1% to only 11.1%, this is because the analysis 
period of full sample is longer than Pre08 subsample.
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Table 4.3: Brand Performance Measures 
 
Note: SOB indicates five large State-owned commercial banks (Big5); JSCB indicates Joint-stock commercial banks; CCB indicates City 
commercial banks; PB indicates Policy banks; FB indicates foreign banks; OB indicates other banks include Postal Saving Bank, Rural commercial 
banks, Rural cooperative bank, Rural credit cooperatives, asset management companies, and other financial institutions; Pre08 indicates the 
analysis period prior financial crisis (1996-2008); Post08 indicates analysis period post-financial crisis (2009-2016); Full indicates analysis period 
between 1996-2016; 5+ indicates firms borrow more than five times; SCR indicates share of category requirement.
Bank 
group 
 
Market Share 
(%) 
  
Penetration 
(%) 
  
Borrowing 
Frequency 
  
5+  
(%) 
  
SCR 
(%) 
  
100% loyal  
(%) 
  
Repeat rate 
(%) 
 
 Pre08 Post08 Full Pre08 Post08 Full Pre08 Post08 Full Pre08 Post08 Full Pre08 Post08 Full Pre08 Post08 Full Pre08 Post08 Full 
SOB 46.8 45.5 45.6 77.1 77.3 80.5 3.1 6.0 6.8 34.2 36.1 38.5 57.7 38.8 41.2 30.1 10.4 11.1 47.6 51.2 64.9 
JSCB 16.6 22.5 21.8 52.7 69.5 71.1 1.5 5.0 5.2 8.4 30.4 31.2 27.4 32.3 31.7 10.8 6.1 5.5 29.7 53.7 55.3 
CCB 8.3 9.8 9.6 23.7 47.6 47.3 0.4 2.1 2.1 0.1 12.6 12.7 8.1 13.6 13.0 2.9 4.1 1.1 8.6 32.4 32.4 
PB 20.9 10.0 11.4 9.6 18 18.3 0.1 0.5 0.5 0.1 2.7 3.1 2.8 3.2 3.2 1.9 1.0 0.8 3.3 10.0 10.1 
FB 0.8 2.0 1.8 4.7 16.9 16.7 0.1 0.5 0.5 0.1 2.9 2.9 1.3 3.4 3.2 0.2 0.5 0.4 1.3 9.2 8.9 
OB 6.7 10.2 9.8 10.1 36.2 35.1 0.2 1.3 1.3 0.4 8.0 7.9 3.1 8.4 7.8 2.1 4.3 2.9 3.6 21.5 19.6 
                      
Average 16.7 16.7 16.7 29.7 44.3 44.8 0.9 2.6 2.8 7.2 15.2 16 16.7 16.6 16.7 8 4.4 3.6 15.7 29.7 31.9 
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4.5.2 Duplication Analysis 
What else banks they also borrow from? Most borrowers of a bank also borrow from some 
others, such as two or more other lending banks. As noted early in Table 4.3, overall about 
1 in 25 firms of a bank group were 100% loyal and the average share of a bank group’s 
category requirement was about 17%. For banks, the corresponding multi-bank borrowing, 
which is similar to consumer’s multi-brand purchasing has traditionally been modeled by 
the ‘Duplication of Purchase Law’. The following duplication Table 4.4 shows that how 
many borrowers of bank group X also borrow from bank group Y. This pattern has now 
found to hold also for differential groups of banks, irrespective of the banks’ attributes. The 
attribute effects seem to be captured by banks’ market share and penetration, consistent 
with the similar flat market share-driven loyalty patterns earlier. The rows of the 
duplication table show that how many firms also borrow from other types of banks 
(outflow), and the columns show the proportion of other bank group’s borrower also 
borrow from it (inflow). 
The penetration shows that 80.5% of sample listed companies borrowing from the five 
SOBs (Big5) at least once over the sample period, and over 80.5% of the borrowers from 
any other bank group also borrow from the Big5 (SOB) in the full sample (85.5% or so). 
At the same extreme, 16.7% in all borrow from the group of foreign banks (FB), and again 
a similar proportion (21% or so) of the other bank groups’ borrower also borrow from 
foreign banks.  Similarly, the duplication level for other bank groups: JSCB, CCB, PB, FB 
and OB are 81.7%, 54%, 24.2%, 21% and 38.3%, respectively. In addition, the duplication 
patterns for two subsamples are consistent with the patterns in full sample, though the 
duplication level of borrowing is relatively lower in the subsample of pre-crisis, this may 
possibly due to firm’s switch probabilities are lower, fewer sample firms and loan 
relationships compared to post-crisis period. Generally, firms are more likely to borrow 
from the Big5 (SOB) not only because of their massive assets and high penetration but also 
because of the lending market still significantly dominant by these banks. 
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Table 4.4: Duplication Analysis (Externally) 
Note: SOB indicates five largest State-owned commercial banks (Big5); JSCB indicates 
Joint-stock commercial banks; CCB indicates City commercial banks; PB indicates Policy 
banks; FB indicates foreign banks; OB indicates other banks include Postal Saving Bank, 
Rural commercial banks, Rural cooperative bank, Rural credit cooperatives, asset 
management companies and other financial institutions. 
 
   
 
% who also borrow from… 
 
  
 % of borrowers of… SOB JSCB CCB PB FB OB 
       
Panel A: Full sample       
SOB - 72.4 46.9 19.4 16.2 33.0 
JSCB 82.1 - 51.6 19.2 18.0 33.7 
CCB 85.7 83.0 - 21.8 21.5 38.2 
PB 87.3 76.1 53.7 - 29.5 43.4 
FB 89.1 87.3 64.9 36.2 - 43.1 
OB 83.3 89.9 52.9 24.4 19.7 - 
Average duplication 85.5 81.7 54.0 24.2 21.0 38.3 
Penetration 80.5 71.1 47.3 18.3 16.7 35.1 
       
Panel B: Pre-Crisis       
SOB - 45.8 20.5 7.8 4.6 7.6 
JSCB 68.2 - 26.7 8.3 4.1 8.1 
CCB 67.5 61.9 - 5.2 4.6 12.4 
PB 64.0 46.7 10.7 - 9.3 16.0 
FB 74.4 48.7 23.1 17.9 - 20.5 
OB 63.2 40.8 31.6 15.8 10.5 - 
Average duplication 67.4 48.8 22.5 11 6.6 12.9 
Penetration 77.1 52.7 23.7 9.6 4.7 10.1 
       
Panel C: Post-Crisis       
SOB - 73.5 48.6 20.1 17.1 34.2 
JSCB 81.2 - 51.8 19.4 18.5 34.4 
CCB 83.5 84.4 - 22.9 22.5 38.2 
PB 86.1 76.8 36.1 - 29.5 42.7 
FB 88.3 86.7 64.8 34.8 - 42.2 
OB 79.1 71.8 50.9 22.5 18.8 - 
Average duplication 83.6 78.6 50.5 23.9 21.3 38.4 
Penetration 77.3 69.5 47.6 18.0 16.9 36.2 
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Apart from firm switches from one type of bank to another, it could be possible that firms 
would consider switching internally within a group of bank. For example, the nature and 
close relationship between Chinese SOEs and SOBs suggest that an SOE may switch from 
one SOB to another SOB through political “guanxi” connection route. Therefore, for 
illustrative purpose, another duplication analysis is performed to examine the level of 
duplication borrowing for internally switching, which has been reported in Table 4.5. 
Although the economic reform and market transition improve competition and 
commercialization of financial market gradually in the last few decades, the banking sector 
still dominant by the five large-scale state-owned commercials banks (SOB/Big5). Hence, 
it is unsurprising that the market share of five SOBs still accounts the largest share of the 
market. Many firms have been observed that switch internally to other banks within the 
same group. Ranking these banks according to their market shares and penetration, about 
58% of borrowers from other SOBs also borrow from the Bank of China. The duplication 
matrix demonstrates that 51.3% of Bank of China (BOC) customers also borrow from 
Industrial and Commercial Bank (ICBC), and 44.6% also borrow from Agricultural Bank 
of China (ABC). The level of duplication borrowing is consistent with these banks’ 
penetration level, and this duplication patterns are also consistent in both pre and post-crisis 
period. The duplication level is higher in the post-crisis period because the size of the 
sample and number of borrowing and lending relationship are larger than the pre-crisis 
period, as well as a higher probability of switching in this period. Overall, high duplication 
of borrowing and choices among these five SOBs are very similar because they are 
historically the most powerful banks even on today’s china banking market, while Bank of 
Communication and Agricultural Bank of China are less attractive due to their lower 
penetration and limit services.
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Table 4.5: Duplication Analysis (Internally) 
      
  % who also borrow from…    
% of borrowers of… BOC ICBC CCB BOCOM ABC 
      
Panel A: Full sample      
BOC - 51.3 48 47.4 44.6 
ICBC 57.3 - 52.7 48.0 45.4 
CCB 57.6 56.6 - 50.3 47.7 
BOCOM 56.5 55.5 52.7 - 48.4 
ABC 62.1 56.6 55.3 52.2 - 
Average 58.4 55.0 52.2 49.5 46.5 
Penetration 56.4 52.4 47.9 43.4 40.9 
      
Panel B: Pre-Crisis       
BOC - 40.1 37.8 30 29 
ICBC 33.3 - 34.1 24.5 25.3 
CCB 37.6 40.8 - 26.6 30.3 
BOCOM 39.9 39.3 35.6 - 29.4 
ABC 37.1 38.2 38.8 28.2 - 
Average 36.9 39.6 36.6 27.3 28.5 
Penetration 37.1 45.4 36.8 27.9 29.5 
      
Panel C: Post-Crisis      
BOC - 48.2 45.2 27.2 43.3 
ICBC 59.7 - 52.2 48.7 46.3 
CCB 57.9 54.0 - 50.2 46.4 
BOCOM 59.4 51.7 51.5 - 47.0 
ABC 62.9 54.3 52.7 52.0 - 
Average 60.0 52.0 50.4 44.5 45.7 
Penetration 49.0 39.6 38.3 37.3 33.7 
Note: BOC indicates Bank of China; ICBC indicates Industrial and Commercial Bank of 
China; CCB indicates China Construction Bank; BOCOM indicates Bank of 
Communications; ABC indicates Agricultural Bank of China.  
 
4.5.3 Theoretical BPMs Estimated By the Dirichlet Approach 
There are only four numerical inputs are required, typically the penetrations and the borrow 
frequencies of the bank loan category and particular bank group. While other variables such 
as inputs of listed firm attributes do not have to be explicitly specified when estimating the 
theoretical values of BPMs. This is due to the model is for the stationary market which 
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assumes these effects will usually already have been included in the bank’s market shares, 
which in turn influence the bank’s other performance measures. Alternatively, they will 
present as deviations in the model predictions, which then need to be explained. Market 
shares and the five BPMs of interest are presented in Table 4.6, together with Dirichlet 
theoretical values. Bank groups are ranked by market share, which enables to see that 
penetrations are lower for brands with smaller market shares, as are SCRs (in line with the 
double jeopardy effect). 
Table 4.6 summarises the fitting of the Dirichlet model to borrowing behaviour from 
multiple bank groups, comparing observed (O) and theoretical (T) values of brand 
performance measures in the loan product category for three samples and it clears shows 
the fit of the Dirichlet model to frequency of borrowing average across six groups of 
lending banks. The observed BPMs for each bank groups is firstly using the definitions 
mentioned earlier in this chapter, which has been reported in Table 4.3. The theoretical 
prediction values are then estimated by the Dirichlet BPMs’ formulas using an Excel 
Workbook. The model fits well overall, being mainly unbiased (observed and theoretical 
means are roughly identical), which implies that the Dirichlet model can be used as a basic 
framework for understanding listed firms loan borrowing behaviour in Chinese lending 
market. The observed values and the theoretical values of most performance measures are 
almost identical. Deviations from the Dirichlet-predicted theoretical norms are fairly rare, 
mostly small and irregular. However, there is some significant deviation still presented.  
Generally, the fitting was good for the dataset, as the theoretical predictions for some BPMs 
are closely matched the “observed” values for the full sample and two subsamples, also the 
mean absolute deviation (MAD) is very small for BPMs except share of category 
requirement and repeat rate.  However, there is still no clear guidelines for interpreting the 
deviation of loyalty measures, hence these considerably large bias in SCR and repeat rate 
do not sufficiently mean that the Dirichlet model cannot describe the loyalty of borrowers.
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 Table 4.6: Observed and Theoretical Brand Performance Measures 
Note: O indicates observed values as in Table 4.3; T indicates the theoretical Dirichlet model estimate 
values, MAD indicates mean absolute deviation; * indicates a significant deviation based on Goodhardt et 
al. (1984) and Li et al. (2009); SCR indicates share of category requirement; SOB indicates five largest 
State-owned commercial banks (Big5); JSCB indicates Joint-stock commercial banks; CCB indicates 
City commercial banks; PB indicates Policy banks; FB indicates foreign banks; OB indicates other banks 
include Postal Saving Bank, Rural commercial banks, Rural cooperative bank, Rural credit cooperatives, 
asset management companies, and other financial institutions. 
 
                  Brand size measures     Loyalty-related measures 
Bank group 
Market 
share 
Penetration Borrowing 
frequency 
SCR 
100% loyal 
(Sole loyal)   
Repeat 
rate 
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
Panel A: 
 Full sample 
           
  O T O T O T O T O T 
SOB 45.6 80.5 79.6 6.8 6.9 41.2 45.7 11.1 6.9 64.9 50.3 
JSCB 21.8 71.1 73.6 5.2 5.1 31.7 34.8 5.5 4.7 55.3 40.8 
CCB 9.6 47.3 49.9 2.1 2.1 13 18.6 1.1 2.3 32.4 25.3 
PB 11.4 18.3 19 0.5 0.6 3.2 11.9 0.8 1.5 10.1 17.3 
FB 1.8 16.7 17.2 0.5 0.5 3.2 11.7 0.4 1.4 8.9 17 
OB 9.8 35.1 36.4 1.3 1.3 7.8 14.9 2.9 1.8 19.6 21.1 
MAD   1.4  0.0  6.2*  1.5  8.9 
Panel B:  
Pre-Crisis 
           
SOB 46.8 77.1 73.5 3.1 2.9 57.7 60.7 30.1 24.5 47.6 63.1 
JSCB 16.6 52.7 53.6 1.5 1.5 27.4 38.0 10.8 11.4 29.7 40.9 
CCB 8.3 23.7 23.4 0.4 0.5 8.1 24.9 2.9 6.6 8.6 25.3 
PB 20.9 9.6 9.7 0.1 0.2 2.8 21.6 1.9 5.6 3.3 20.7 
FB 0.8 4.7 4.8 0.1 0.1 1.3 20.7 0.2 5.3 1.3 19.3 
OB 6.7 10.1 10.2 0.2 0.2 3.1 21.8 2.1 5.6 3.6 20.9 
MAD   0.9  0.0  14.6*  3.7  16 
Panel C:  
Post-Crisis 
           
SOB 45.5 77.3 77.4 6.0 6.2 38.8 43.6 10.4 10.8 51.2 48.7 
JSCB 22.5 69.5 72.5 5.0 4.9 32.3 35.5 6.1 5.1 53.7 41.6 
CCB 9.8 47.6 50.0 2.1 2.1 13.6 19.8 4.1 2.6 32.4 26.7 
PB 10.0 18.0 18.6 0.5 0.6 3.2 12.6 1.0 1.6 10.0 18.1 
FB 2.0 16.9 17.6 0.5 0.5 3.4 12.5 0.5 1.6 9.2 18.0 
OB 10.2 36.2 37.4 1.3 1.3 8.4 16.1 4.3 2.1 21.5 22.5 
MAD   1.3  0.1  6.7*  1.2  6.4 
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The five largest SOBs (Big5), still takes the dominant position with a 45.6% share, they 
also have the highest borrowing frequency, at 6.8 this is typically high, both as observed 
and as predicted by the model in full sample and subsamples. In addition, Table 4.6 also 
show this predictable relationship with market share for three other commonly used 
loyalty-related measures, which includes the share of category requirement (SCR), the 
incidence of 100%-loyal borrowers of the variant and the incidence of repeat-borrowing. 
In all cases, the five SOBs also have the highest loyalty levels, both as observed and 
predicted by the model. In addition, the result shows that a group’s share of category 
requirements is less than 50%, implying that its borrowers mostly borrow from other bank 
groups, except the case of SOBs in the subsample of pre-crisis period.  Moreover, in a 
shorter period such as two subsample period, some loyalty-related measures (borrow 
frequency and repeat borrowing) are considerably lower than in a longer period – full 
sample period, while more 100%-loyal borrower and higher SCR in the pre-crisis period. 
The model typically responds well to there being less chance in the shorter period for 
switching loan provider at all but also higher opportunity of being loyal. The model closely 
predicts for both the lower and higher loyalty measures for a specific analysis period, the 
relationship of loyalty with market share is therefore rather robust.  
This theoretical prediction describes the general fit of the model by presenting how it 
occurs under many different circumstances, always following the same simple high-to-low 
observed and high-to-low theoretical patters. The double jeopardy relationship seen in 
observed data was clearly captured in the model, as penetration decreased with market 
share. Small bank groups suffered twice as expected, having fewer borrowers, who 
borrowed from those groups of banks less often. The mean absolute deviation for share of 
requirement and repeat rate is high for all samples, these relative large MADs were driven 
by the large deviation between observed data and theoretical predictions. The model over-
predict or under-predict some of these performance measures in three sample periods, 
although some significant deviation has been observed from loyalty-related measures (SCR 
and repeat rate), the Dirichlet model appears to be able to describe the borrowing patterns 
of listed firms in China. 
The fit of the Dirichlet model to firms borrowing from multiple groups of lending banks 
suggests that the well-known double jeopardy pattern observed in consumer-packaged 
goods can be extended to borrowing and lending relationships. The double jeopardy 
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patterns indicate that brands (here is bank group) vary more in terms of penetration than 
loyalty. The results in this study also show this effect, there is a greater variation in the 
number of borrowers (penetration) across six bank groups than in the frequency of 
borrowing (loyalty). 
4.5.4 Covariates Effects 
Eight covariates are considered, two of them are dummies of state ownership (SOE) and 
whether there is a CEO change, which coded as 1 if a listed firm is SOE and has CEO 
change during a current relationship period, the remaining covariates regarding to firm-
level characteristics that include firm size, age, profitability, leverage, liquidity and the 
number of CEO.  Potentially, all these covariates might influence firm’s borrowing choice 
and switch behaviour. When firms borrow more and frequently from particular types of 
lending banks may be because they are SOEs which implicitly and explicitly guaranteed 
by the government, they are mature firms with large asset served as collateral or could be 
small and young firms with the relatively lower level of profitability and liquidity.  
I fit the Dirichlet model to the data using the Stata. The iterative process for maximizing 
the log-likelihood functions described above gives a log-likelihood value for the 
unconstrained model with all covariates. In addition, the model also examines how the 
BPMs change as the covariates vary from its mean value to the mean plus one standard 
deviation. Table 4.7 shows the covariate impacts on market share of six types of lending 
banks. The estimated Dirichlet model shows the effects of covariates on the distribution of 
market share. As can be seen from these estimated results, the state ownership increases 
the likelihood of choosing five large SOBs, but decreases the likelihood of choosing JSCBs 
and CCBs, this implies if the firm is an SOE, then the switch is biased towards SOB and 
away from JSCB and CCB. For example, the reported marginal effect indicates that state-
owned firms have a 3.4 percentage points higher than non-SOEs to choose SOB as their 
lending bank, while 3.8 and 1.4 percentage points lower than non-SOEs for choosing JSCB 
and CCB, respectively. It is unsurprising that state-owned enterprises’ borrowing choices 
favour to SOBs due to historical reason and their naturally close relationships.  
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Apparently, the size of listed firms has a significant impact on firms’ choices of their loan 
providers, though the direction of this effect varies across six types of lending bank.  Large 
firms are more likely to borrow from CCBs, policy banks, foreign banks and other banks, 
though this effect is very small, while small firms prefer to choose five SOBs and JSCBs 
to borrow. Specifically, a 1% decline in the share of SOBs is associated with a 3 percentage 
point increase in the size of the firm, while a 1% in the increase in the share of CCB is 
associated with a 0.6 percentage points increase in firm size. Apart from this, although the 
age of the firm shows a slightly significant effect on the share of SOBs and other banks, 
these effects are very little which could be ignored. Moreover, the five SOBs and JSCBs 
are more likely to be chosen by highly leveraged and low leverage listed firms, respectively. 
On the other side, a CEO change, number of CEO, firm’s profitability, and cash flows do 
not show significant impact on the firm’s borrowing choice and preference. Consistent with 
the finding from Chapter 3, these significant result shows that firm’s borrowing pattern and 
choice determined by firm’s attributes as well as its ownership structure, which also implies 
that firms’ behaviour of switching to other loan provider determined by these factors.  
Splitting the full sample into two subsamples based on the occurrence of the financial crisis 
in 2008, the Dirichlet model estimation also generates some new findings. First, the state 
ownership, size of firm and leverage have significant influence on listed companies’ 
preference of their lending banks during the post-crisis period, and the signs of these effects 
are consistent with the analysis for full sample, but this effect is less or not significant in 
the pre-crisis period. Moreover, the age of firm matters firm’s choice of switch before the 
crisis, but it becomes insignificant after the crisis, even though this effect is too little to 
consider. 
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Table 4.7: Estimate Results of The Dirichlet Model 
 
State-owned 
Bank (Big5) 
Joint-Stock 
Commercial 
Bank 
City 
Commercial 
Bank 
Policy 
Bank 
Foreign 
Bank 
Other 
Banks 
Panel A: Full sample 
      
SOE 0.034** -0.038*** -0.014** 0.005 0.001 0.010 
CEO change -0.011 0.007 0.002 0.003 -0.004 0.002 
Firm size -0.030*** -0.003* 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.013*** 
Firm age -0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000** 
Profit 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Leverage 0.001* -0.002*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
Cash flows 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
CEO number 0.000 0.006 0.005 -0.007 -0.002 -0.001 
N 1117      
Panel B: Pre-Crisis   
 
  
SOE -0.018 0.015 -0.006 0.006 -0.002 0.005 
CEO change 0.023 -0.006 -0.008 0.002 -0.004 -0.008 
Firm size -0.016 -0.01 0.005 0.008 0.003 0.009* 
Firm age 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Profit -0.003 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Leverage 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Cash flows -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
CEO number -0.008 0.021 0.006 -0.010 -0.005 -0.004 
N 448      
Panel C: Post-Crisis    
 
  
SOE 0.024 -0.041*** -0.010 0.006 0.002 0.019 
CEO change 0.007 -0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.000 -0.004 
Firm size -0.016** -0.004 0.003* 0.005** 0.005** 0.007** 
Firm age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Profit 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Leverage 0.001 -0.002*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
Cash flows 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
CEO number -0.011 0.004 0.003 -0.001 -0.003 0.008 
N 980      
Note: ***, **, * indicates a 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, marginal effects are reported. 
 
On the other hand, this chapter attempts to investigate the internally switch among the five 
largest state-owned commercial banks (SOB or Big5). From the firm’s loan data, firms are 
not only observed to switch externally to other bank groups but also switch internally 
within an existing bank group. Using the share of five largest state-owned commercial 
banks (SOB/Big5), I also explore the impact of firm characteristics on the firm’s borrowing 
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choice among the Big5. Though the covariate effects in six bank groups’ analysis are not 
significantly found in the analysis of internally switching within the five large SOBs, this 
analysis still provides two interesting findings. First, large firms prefer to borrow from 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) and Bank of Communications 
(BOCOM), though this effect is only significant in the full sample analysis. Second, firms 
experience a CEO change in an existing bank relationship are more likely to choose Bank 
of Communications (BOCOM), but less likely to choose China Construction Bank (CCB) 
during the post-crisis period, this could possibly due to executives’ political background or 
personal connection with these banks. Due to the shares of these five largest SOBs are very 
similar to each other, it is difficult to explain the effect of change a new CEO for firms 
choice of lending banks within Big5. Estimate results of internally switching analysis are 
shown in Appendix C – Table C3.  
Having investigated the firms switch probability and identified firms borrowing patterns, 
an interesting question would ask where do they switch to? By what percentage? In fact, it 
is very hard to answer these question in this study for the following reasons. Firstly, most 
firms in China are maintaining multiple bank relationships simultaneously in a specific 
period or even over the whole sample period, when firms switch they would switch not 
only to single but also multiple lenders simultaneously, without terminating current bank 
relationships, which brings challenges to define a complete switch properly, as well as the 
proportion or weight of relationships that reflects where they switch from and where they 
switch to. Nevertheless, this chapter summarises the switching statistics in Table 4.8, as 
well as a distribution of switch in Figure 4.5, which describes the customer flowing out to 
other bank groups. These statistics generated only from the first switch occurs, without 
considering issues like whether the firm ends its previous bank relationship, or whether the 
firm switches to single or multiple banks, or whether a firm returns to the previous bank 
after switching. In line with the bank group’s market share, firms are more likely to switch 
to five SOBs than other bank groups, and less likely to switch to foreign banks, this pattern 
is also consistent in the subsamples of both pre and post-crisis period, though the 
proportions of switch are relatively lower in the subsample of pre-crisis, particularly there 
was only 4.6% firms switch to foreign banks, this may because foreign banks are less 
competitive and have fewer branches which mainly based in coastal areas before the 
financial crisis thus limits their business. Although the switching table and figure provide 
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only an outflow of borrowers without knowing where they come from, it gives a general 
picture of the listed firms’ switch behaviour in terms of flowing. 
Table 4.8: Switching Analysis 
 
Figure 4.5: Distribution of switching behaviour 
 
 
Note: SOB indicates five large state-owned banks (Big5); JSCB indicates joint-stock 
commercial banks; CCB indicates city commercial banks; PB indicates policy banks; FB 
indicates foreign banks; OB indicates other banks include Postal Saving Bank, Rural 
commercial banks, Rural cooperative bank, Rural credit cooperatives, asset management 
companies and other financial institutions. 
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   % switch to…    
 State-owned 
bank 
Joint-stock 
commercial 
bank 
City 
commercial 
bank 
Foreign 
bank 
Policy 
bank 
Other 
Banks 
Full sample 77.2 76.9 49.0 17.7 20.0 37.1 
Pre-Crisis 57.5 63.1 28.9 4.6 11.1 11.3 
Post-Crisis 74.2 78.6 49.7 19.3 20.7 39.0 
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4.6 Discussion and Implications 
Firms’ loan borrowing behaviours are different from decision-making of consumer buying 
or attendance of social events which undertake consciously. Loan suppliers need to 
understand the true prevalence of frequent and infrequent borrowers, which enables them 
to understand whether these borrowers vary in terms of motivation, barriers, or whether all 
borrowers can benefit from creating more reminders and support for firms to engage in 
loan activity in a range of context. Executives in the banking industry should implement 
their strategies and policies by changing the attitudes and perceived behavioural control of 
their target firms. In order to increase revenue from supplying loan, marketing of loan 
supplying should focus not only on keeping relationships with existing well-performing 
firms, but also those previously non-or irregular firms. Although the irregular firms only 
borrow loans occasionally, they are important to banks, and the previous non-borrower are 
even more important especially those firms with good credit quality, high profitability and 
growth opportunities, as they are the potential borrower for banks enable them to build up 
a strong and stable relationship with their customers. Further, it is important that the loan 
suppliers broaden their focus from firms’ performance, attitudes and behaviour, to also 
consider less rational drivers of behaviour, also loan lending marketers should not ignore 
these non-borrowers when communicating their marketing activity as in the future they 
become important in contributing to loan revenue.  
The central government only responsible for one-fourth of stimulus plan, while the 
remaining balance is mainly from bank loans. It must be pointed out that most of the 4 
trillion stimulus economic plans are headed by state-owned enterprises (e.g. it is reported 
that the two large state-owned enterprises China National Railways and China Railway 
Construction, have occupied the main part of the 6000 billion RMB railway infrastructure 
investment), whereas the share of private enterprises has been very small. These lending 
activities were mainly conducted by the five large state-owned commercial banks (Big5) 
due to the historical reason that a natural and close relationship between SOEs and SOBs, 
this helps to explain Big5 has relative high borrow frequency by listed firms during the 
post-crisis periods, as well as their high levels of duplication borrowing. 
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Finally, the fit of the NBD-Dirichlet model to loan borrowing activity behaviour 
recommends that the NBD-Dirichlet model may apply to other context and data, for 
example, other financial activity behaviours – mergers and acquisitions, public listings, 
bond issuance etc. 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
This chapter adopts a behavioural paradigm to describe borrowing patterns and choice of 
listed firms and shows that stochastic preference models can describe borrowing behaviour 
and preference of credit suppliers in both single bank group and loan category level. All 
dimensions of the Dirichlet approach can be applied to loan activity provide a better 
understanding of borrowing and lending relationship in China. Using loan data across the 
last twenty years, the model describes the widely observed patterns of near-steady state 
borrowing behaviour and provides empirical evidence that the NBD patterns are evident in 
listed firms’ borrowing behaviour. Apart from this, this chapter offers important 
suggestions for the measurement and reporting of borrowing behaviours. Moreover, the 
moderate fit of the Dirichlet model described in this study shows that listed firms borrowing 
behaviour can be well described and predicted, which implies that previous borrowing 
behaviours and preference seem to play an important role in firms’ borrowing choices and 
their switching. 
In this, the model consistently predicts fairly complex patterns and BPMs from simple and 
limit inputs. In addition, it also helps to explain the patterns, namely, that under 
approximate steady-state conditions, traditional loyalty-related measures for competitive 
banks are unaffected by other marketing-mix inputs, other than directly through changes in 
the bank’s market share. The fit of the Dirichlet model to listed companies’ loan borrowing 
from multiple bank groups suggests that the well-known “double jeopardy” pattern 
observed in consumer-packaged goods can be extended to borrowing and lending 
relationship in China’s loan market. Bank groups with large market share (i.e. large SOBs, 
JSCBs, and CCBs), their borrowers are more loyal to them with higher borrow frequency, 
compare to the borrowers of smaller groups of bank (i.e. policy banks, foreign banks, and 
other banks), whose customers are less loyal and borrow less frequently. The results of 
double jeopardy pattern demonstrate that bank groups vary more in terms of penetration 
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than loyalty that implies there is a greater variation in the number of listed companies 
(penetration) across the lending banks and lending activities than in the frequency of 
borrowing (loyalty). Apparently, the borrowing frequency is higher while the loyalty-
related measures are lower in the post-crisis period compared to the pre-crisis period in 
both observed and theoretical values because low probability of switching in pre-crisis 
period indicates there may be less opportunity to change lender (or being unloyal) in the 
that period. 
In addition, this chapter generalises the Dirichlet model by incorporating the characteristics 
of firms. In so doing the model is substantially expanded to provide an output on how firm-
specific characteristics are related to market shares of lending banks. The model estimation 
results show several findings. First, state-owned enterprise and firms prefer to borrow from 
large state-owned commercial banks (SOBs or Big5), which implies a super stable 
relationship between SOBs and SOEs. In other words, it also reflects the lending preference 
of Big5 that they are more likely to lend to state-owned enterprises, relative to non-SOEs. 
Second, apart from the ownership effect, the size, age, and leverage also have significant 
impact on firms’ choice on choosing their loan provider, though these covariates effects 
vary little among full sample and two subsamples of the pre and post financial crisis periods. 
While the level of profitability, liquidity, number of CEO and a dummy indicates that 
whether there is CEO change did not show significant effect in this analysis. Third, the 
duplication and switching analysis show that the level of duplication borrowing of large 
five SOBs is the highest, following with the second and third largest groups of the bank,  
joint-stock banks, and city commercial banks. The preference of firm switch lenders also 
follows this pattern. This tells that the largest three groups of bank always take the best 
position in the loan market, particularly the five large SOBs, even though their shares 
declining gradually in the last decades, they are still the most powerful and competitive 
banks in the banking sector. Fourth, duplication and covariate analysis for firms internally 
switching within the SOB group suggest that firms borrowing choice among five SOBs 
(Big5) are not determined by firms’ attributes at any time of borrowing, also their 
preferences of borrowing from SOB is similar from one to another, though there is an 
exception for choice of Bank of Communications and China Construction Bank related to 
firms executive change, which need to be further investigated.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
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5  Changing Loan Provider: The Role of Political 
Connection 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The incentive for corporations to become politically connected has been recognized 
among economists for many years and has become a more controversial issue of 
borrowing and lending relationships among firms and banks. As various studies have 
noted, the benefits of being a political connected corporation takes various forms, 
including preferential treatment by government-owned enterprises such as banks 
(Backman, 1999; Chan et al., 2012; Cull and Xu, 2005;  Khwaja and Mian, 2005), 
preferential treatment of government bailout (Faccio et al., 2006), lighter taxation (Pan 
et al., 2009), preferential treatment in competition for government contracts, relaxed 
regulatory oversight of the corporation in question, or stiffer regulatory oversight of its 
competitors (De Soto, 1989), and many other forms.  
It has been widely suggested that politically connected firms have preferential access 
to debt financing, at least in some countries, and these politically connected (but 
publicly traded) firms have higher leverage ratios than their non-connected peers (e.g. 
Cull and Cu, 2005; Faccio, 2006; Johnson and Mitton, 2003; and Khwaja and Mian, 
2005). The possible reasons for what makes lenders more willing to extend credit to 
politically connected firms could be that lenders obtain direct economic support from 
the governments to which the firms are connected. Or it could be that lenders are 
compelled to provide economically questionable loans to politicians’ friends. Or, it 
could be that lenders rely on an implicit government guarantee that politically 
connected borrowers or lenders will be bailed out should they suffer financial distress 
(Faccio et al., 2006). However, there are conflicts of interest between shareholders and 
bureaucrats when monitoring the firm, with the latter likely pursuing social objectives 
or private gains at the firm’s expense, which would further reduce firm value (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1994). 
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Under the background of economic transition with particular fiscal decentralization and 
performance evaluation system for local officials in China, some firms, on the one hand 
enlarge the scale of investment at all costs in order to meet ambitions of local 
government, on the other hand, they try to build close relationship with the government 
to form a “political connection” and rely on such informal alternative mechanism to 
obtain sufficient external funding and to overcome the problem of financing constraints. 
This chapter examines the role of government in China’s listed companies and provides 
a comprehensive look at corporate political connections in China. Due to the property 
rights remain weak and the product and financial markets are far from liberalized, 
theory predicts that government intervention significantly affects the performance and 
governance quality of firms. Complementary to previous studies that capture political 
connections using the CEO’s past experience in central government, local government 
or military, my study also include connections with National People’s Congress and 
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, such history is a positive signal of 
a CEO’s deeper connection to the policymakers. This chapter uses the CEO’s political 
connection as a proxy for government intervention in the firm, which is defined as a 
current or former government bureaucrat – that is, current or former government 
officials, a former CEO/chairman of SOEs, representative of the Communist Party of 
China, current or former deputy of NPC or member of CPPCC. 
Since Krueger (1974) firstly stated that entrepreneurs spend time and money building 
relationships with government officials bring benefits to firms, both theoretical and 
empirical studies on the influence of political connection are continually growing, most 
of these studies focus on the links between political connection and firm value or 
corporate behaviour, which leaves the field political effects on the firm’s switching 
behaviour unexplored. This study contributes to the broad literature on Chinese 
executive characteristics and corporate governance, as well as CEO political 
connections. 
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the role and effects 
of political connection. Section 3 discusses the institutional background in China and 
introduces various types of political connection. Section 4 describes the model 
framework, develops the hypotheses and describe the data and sample. Section 5 
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addresses the influences of the CEO’s political connections on listed firms switch 
behaviour. Section 6 concludes. 
 
5.2 Literature Review 
Allen at al. (2005) argue that inadequate institutional support, underdeveloped investor 
protection legislation, overarching government intervention and control, and weak 
implementation of contracts and property rights bring numerous challenges for Chinese 
business. Hence, establishing close ties to the government often become an effective 
strategic mechanism for businesses to overcome market failures (Li et al., 2008). 
 
Political connection refers to the links between the business and all levels of 
government departments and auxiliary support authorities. Faccio (2006) provides a 
precise identification of politically connected firms and summarized political 
connections in two forms. Firstly, definition of a company is identified as being directly 
connected with a politician if at least one of its large shareholders (anyone controlling 
at least 10 percent of voting shares) or one of its top officers (CEO, president, vice-
president, chairman, or secretary is: (a) a member of parliament (MP), (b) a minister, 
or the head of state, or (c) closely related to a top politician or party. Secondly, indirect 
connections can also be observed in several ways: (a) if a relative with the same last 
name as a head of state or minister is a top officer or a large shareholder, as defined 
above, and (b) if a top executive or a large shareholder has been described by The 
Economist, Forbes or Fortune as having a “friendship” with a head of state, government 
minister, or a member of parliament.    
 
Different from the political intervention that government’s intervention in the 
enterprise (especially the SOEs) to achieve public goals or social goals, or government 
officials’ private interests through various ways (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994, 1998), the 
political connection is that the enterprise actively seeks to establish a relationship with 
the government, judicial organisations, and other political institutions in order to seek 
certain interests or for other purposes (Zhao and Ma, 2011). Political intervention’s 
initiator is the government while the initiator of political connection is the enterprise. 
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Political connections do not necessarily lead to political interference, but political 
connections between companies and governments may bring political intervention 
more likely. 
 
The effect of political connection is theoretically ambiguous. Benefits come from faster 
information transmission while costs may be incurred by rent-seeking. Various studies 
have shown that firms with political connection have preferential access to debt 
financing. For example, Johnson and Mitton (2003) find that politically connected firms 
in Malaysia have greater access to debt financing, Khwaja and Mian (2005) shows 
similar findings even though these politically connected firms exhibit significantly 
higher default probability, but pay interest rates no higher than other non-connected 
borrowers; and Cull and Xu (2005) document that Chinese firms that make informal 
payments to government officials borrow more from banks. A lot of empirical evidence 
relevant to the China context show that politically connected firms easily access more 
loan with longer duration but less external finance constraints, and political links is 
particularly important for private enterprises also significant in the region that lack of 
legal system and with lower level of financial development32.  
 
To complement these studies of the behaviour of lenders toward politically connected 
borrowers, Faccio et al. (2006) investigate a particular form of government support for 
politically connected firms: corporate bailouts, and show that political connections lead 
to preferential corporate bailouts. Their evidence indicates that politically connected 
firms borrow more and are more likely to be bailed out than non-connected firms. Due 
to connected firms’ higher frequency of bailout implies a lower expectation of loan loss, 
this pattern is consistent with connected firms experiencing more favourable loan 
conditions such as lower loan requirement and interest rates. The implication of being 
a politically connected firm is that shareholders gain because their firms are able to 
borrow at below-market rates, and lenders can also benefit when their borrowers are 
bailed out. Other advantages for being politically connected firms have been also found 
in preferential tax policies and subsidies (Pan et al., 2009), lower barriers to entry (Luo 
and Liu, 2009), legal protections (Li et al., 2008) and government contracts (Goldman 
et al., 2013).  
                                                 
32 See e.g., Chan et al. (2012); Luo and Zhen (2008); Xin and Song (2014); Yu and Pan (2008). 
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However, there is some evidence that political connections can be detrimental to a 
company, the opposite effect could arise due to the politicians or government will 
extract at least some rents through this connection, and corporate value will be 
improved only when the marginal benefits of the connections outweigh their marginal 
costs. It has been argued that the political connections significantly reduce investment 
efficiency in state-owned enterprises (Chen et al., 2011) and make firms lose 
independence from the government, which impedes firm’s decision-making (Marquis 
and Qian, 2013). Shleifer and Vishny (1994) document that rent-seeking usually occurs 
if politicians can bring profits to the firm, and as long as the resources allocation is 
distorted, a social welfare loss may incur. In addition, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) 
indicate the “grabbing hand” that bureaucrats or politicians extract resources from listed 
SOEs under their control to fulfil political purposes that are not consistent with firm 
value maximization. In particular,  Fan et al. (2007) point out that a politically 
connected CEO is highly likely having political allies on the board, these boards show 
low degrees of professionalism, as fewer directors have relevant professional 
backgrounds, fewer academicians and women serving as directors, and older directors 
on average. Moreover, they also find that the accounting and stock return performance 
of the firms run by politically connected CEOs is poor relative their politically 
unconnected peers.  
 
Other disadvantages of being politically connected firms also have been found in high 
cost of rent-seeking (such as over-employed employees, paying high wages, making 
large amounts of inefficient investment, etc.) thereby reducing company value (He and 
Zhou, 2011; Liang and Feng, 2010), poor firm performance (Deng and Zeng, 2009). 
Basically, enterprises have expended a lot of energy and resources in the process of 
establishing, maintaining and promoting political connections, which may reduce their 
investment in capacity building, and may also present excessive employees and 
investment. In general, the efforts to establish political connections distort corporate 
behaviours in some circumstances, generate rent-seeking costs, and ultimately impair 
the efficiency of resource allocation of enterprises and society. 
 
Although the performance of many majority-state-owned enterprises was converging 
to that of private enterprises due to corporatization and associated reforms in the reform 
era, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) continue to receive a disproportionately large share 
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of credit extended from the main and large state-owned banks (also known as Big5 or 
SOBs) in China (Lin and Zhu, 2001; and Xu et al., 2005). Empirical research shows 
that state banks become less efficient in allocating credit because have been 
increasingly cored into bail out poorly performing state-owned enterprises (Lardy, 1998; 
Cull and Xu, 2000). These bailouts usually come in the form of stability loans to 
maintain SOEs afloat, as many of most of them keep excessive employment. Thus loans 
extended by state-owned banks to state enterprises can be viewed as having a strong 
bailout component rather as true external finance awarded based on creditworthiness. 
 
5.3 Institutional Background 
Before turning to the empirical study, it is essential to review the institutional 
background, particularly in terms of regulation, political systems and corruption. China 
is a socialist economy with characteristics of capitalist enterprises, where the state has 
a dominant position in the firm-level decision. Although the autonomy of firms’ 
decision marking and operation is improving in the current context of economic 
transition, the government still has significant power to influence firms’ operations 
through policy support and interference. Although political connections are particularly 
important in China that a country’s economy run by the state with many public firms 
being state-owned, controlled or influenced. SOEs is an important material and political 
basis for socialism with Chinese characteristics and an important pillar and reliable 
force for the Communist Party of China’s governance of the country, therefore Party 
leadership and enhancing the role of the Party are “the root and soul” for SOEs.  
 
The Chinese government launched a program that decentralized managerial decision 
rights of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) from the central government down to the local 
firm level during the early reform stage in the 1980s. The decentralization was 
motivated by the central government’s desire to accelerate markets and to gradually 
weed out its central planning function. The reform of SOEs in the 1990s allowed SOEs 
to be partially privatized by issuing a minority allocation of shares to individual 
investors, who could trade their shares freely in newly established stock markets set up 
in Shenzhen and Shanghai process in 1990. Ideologically, this partial privatization was 
officially called corporatization, prohibited the government from selling its controlling 
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stake in the firms. In relation with the corporatization process in the 1990s, the central 
government further decentralized its power by specifying the exact decision rights to 
the SOE level including those rights mainly related to operating decision and the use of 
retained funds. While largely granting operating decision rights to SOE managers, the 
government kept ultimate decision rights regarding mergers and acquisitions, the 
disposal of shares and assets of these listed firms, and the appointment of CEOs as well.  
 
The information about the quality of the firm’s management and the extent of checks 
and balances on managerial decisions can be revealed by a board of directors. The level 
of professionalism and overseeing required by a firm is likely driven by the institutional 
environment to which the firm adapts (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). The property 
regulations in China’s privatization process led to boards characterized by strong 
bureaucratic influence, weak governance, and low professionalism. Specifically, firms 
with government appointed, and politically connected CEOs have more directors with 
political ties and fewer directors with business experience or professional backgrounds, 
mainly due to politically connected CEOs need allies on the board to enhance their 
policies and objectives. While non-political professionals, or directors representing 
investors’ interests, might violate the objectives of politicians (Fan et al., 2007).  
Therefore, firms in China face the property rights constraints, namely the non-
transferability of state ownership and the right of the government appoint CEOs, which 
could impair firm performance as well as board professionals and governance to some 
extent. With this institutional background, it is easy to predict that the non-transferable 
state-owned shares/assets would bring intractable incentive problems between 
government officials and firm manager. Under these circumstances, the governance of 
the firms would likely be weak and firm value would likely be dissipated, due basically 
to the lack of a free market that would release the firms from state ownership (Fan et 
al., 2007).  
 
Although non-state-owned firms may not have board members or directors that 
currently work for the government, they may have retired officers, which due to 
Chinese culture virtually guarantees them a significant level of political connection, 
which leads to these firms are usually very aggressive in hiring former high ranking 
officials. Private enterprises and family-owned enterprises actively seek to political 
connection, which is a process of active rent-seeking. Although enterprises consume a 
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lot of resources in the process of establishing, maintaining and promoting political 
connections, they can also obtain a large number of scarce resources, property rights 
protection, and enhance corporate value (Xiong, 2012).  
5.3.1 Connection with Communist Party of China Committee  
China has one ruling political party, which is the Communist Party of China (CPC). 
The CPC was founded in 1921 and was originally formed to promote 
communist ideology in the country. The Party believes that the nation is best served by 
political unification both geographically and socially. Since the early 1980s, the CPC 
has placed a lot of emphasis on economic development and engaging with the rest of 
the world. The Party is especially keen on remaining control over the state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) managed by State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission (SASAC) on both central and local level. Some of these SOEs are the 
largest Chinese enterprises, accounting for most of the Chinese companies on the 
Fortune Global 500 list of the world’s largest companies. These SOEs — often called 
‘national champions’ – dominate the strategic sectors of the Chinese economy, such as 
aerospace, telecoms, power generation, automaking and shipbuilding. The leaders of 
these largest companies are not appointed by SASAC, but rather by the Party’s 
Organisation Department. They are part of the Party’s nomenklatura system and are 
cadres ranked at vice-ministerial level, which implies that many business executives 
are subject to cadre rotation and are moved to take up government or Party positions 
(Brødsgaard, 2018).  
 
In general, the Party is playing a core role in an organized, institutionalized and concrete 
way, and providing direction, managing the overall situation, this phrase has been 
injected into the articles of association recently. Chinese President Xi Jinping, also the 
general secretary of the CPC Central Committee, stresses the CPC’s leadership in SOEs 
is a “major political principle” during a recent national meeting held in October, 2016. 
The statement can be summarized in the following five points. First, the Party should 
lead SOEs in political, ideological and organizational aspects and Party organizations 
in SOEs should take charge of the direction and general aspects of SOEs’ development 
and the implementation of policies. Second, the power and responsibilities of the Party 
in SOE decision-making, implementation and supervision processes should be clearly 
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defined, reminding on Party organizations and other corporate governance bodies of 
enterprises to perform their duties properly. Third, the CPC organization should be an 
inbuilt part of the corporate governance structure and the legal status in SOEs should 
be clear and properly observed, and reform to establish a modern enterprise system 
within SOEs should be adhered to as well. Fourth, while ordering strengthened 
grassroots Party organization in SOEs, the Party organizations should be in a key role 
of SOE personnel selection and efforts should be made to cultivate a number of quality 
corporate executives. Finally, Party committees at local levels should incorporate SOE 
Party organization building into their overall work plans, also ordering greater efforts 
to fight corruption, extravagance, embezzlement of state assets and other malpractice 
in SOEs33. 
 
The Party’s Constitution mandates the establishment of a Party committee in any 
organization, including privately owned firms in China that has more than three full 
Party members. State-owned enterprises have their own CPC committee, even some 
private firms launch their CPC committee as well 34 . The private sector Party 
committees are more than a reflection of the CPC’s engagement with the public, it’s 
also expected to help promote the companies’ growth. The committee does not 
intervene in the company’s operations, but it is important because it ensures the 
enforcement of government policies. The party organization of a company generally 
carries out activities that revolve around operations management, can help companies 
promptly understand relevant national guiding principles and policies, coordinate all 
parties’ interests, resolve internal disputes, introduce and develop talent, guide the 
corporate culture, and build harmonious labour relations. 
5.3.2 Connection With Central or Local Government 
If the company’s senior executives previously or currently have government 
background, that means previously or currently working for the government or 
government authorities on either central or local level, or a non-politically connected 
CEOs now are promoted to the government official. Under the culture of advocating 
“born kinship”, such officials are more motivated and capable of caring for “maiden” 
                                                 
33 See Xinhuanet at: http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-10/11/c_135746608.htm 
34 For example, Xiaomi Corporation, Transfer Group, Huawei, JD Group. 
  125  
  
enterprises by taking advantage of their government connection. CEO’s government 
connection in this sample based on their current or former experience of being officers 
of government or government bureaus under State Council or Ministries such as 
Development and Reform Commission, Discipline Inspection Commission, Taxation 
Bureau, Supervision Bureaus at central and local level, as well as mayors at provincial, 
city, or county level.  
 
CEO who used to working for or currently working for the government at the level of 
a city mayor or higher are defined as politically connected. The positions and 
government agencies identified from my sample include: provincial governors, city 
mayor, government tax bureau, and economic commission, discipline inspection 
commission, director of the central or local economic planning committee, and director 
of the central and local SASAC and so on. It is not easy to identify in more details 
which connection is the strongest because even though the central government and its 
agents have the ultimate power over decisions made by provincial or local governments, 
it is the provincial or local governments that have the strongest incentives to help the 
rent-seeking firms so as to fulfil local fiscal goals. 
5.3.3 Connection with State-owned Enterprises 
The SOEs play an important role in the Chinese economy, as they dominate China’s 
strategic sectors and pillar industries. They are also key instruments for the 
implementation of CPC’s policies and strategic initiatives. State firms that have the 
central government of its agents as the controlling shareholder and State-Legal Entity 
firms that have other SOEs as the controlling shareholder. Both State and State-Legal 
Entity firms are state-owned enterprises and by constitution belong to the central 
government and should in theory operate in a way that is beneficial to all Chinese 
citizens. But in terms of profitability, they are widely regarded as less profitable than 
privately-owned companies. But since then reform within this area has stalled and 
even gone backward. Instead of being divided into smaller, mutually competitive 
companies, China’s large SOEs have experienced a process of consolidation that has 
created even bigger companies, many of China’s large SOEs grew into huge enterprises 
with significant economic and political clout. The executive elite in charge of these 
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enterprises had vice-ministerial status and often outranked the state administrative 
organizations and bureaus that were supposed to regulate them.  
 
Hence, there is a natural relationship between state-owned enterprises and the 
government, as well as the Party. They can easily obtain a large number of scarce 
resources controlled by the government, but they also bear a large number of political 
and social burdens, which may influence corporate value. Even though some state-
owned enterprises went public during the corporatization process in SOE reform period, 
the state remains the controlling shareholder, therefore it is quite often that the directors 
or members of the board of directors are also government officials. According to the 
Company Code of 1993, the board members of state-owned companies are assigned by 
the State Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State 
Council (SASAC). All boards of directors of state-owned companies are assigned and 
compensated by SASAC and thus have a certain degree of political connection. Apart 
from this, firms with boards that have stronger ties with the government indicating that 
these firms would be more politically connected. 
 
Cross-appointment has become a key concept in the Party’s management of state-
owned businesses and government institutions. The Party controls SOEs in various 
ways. All enterprises must have a Party organization headed by a Party secretary. Party 
documents stipulate that all important decisions must first be discussed by the Party 
committee of the enterprise. Only after that committee has forwarded a 
recommendation can the matter be decided by the board and an action implemented. 
This ensures that the Party has a decisive say on enterprise operation and management. 
In enterprises where a board has been established, the company Party secretary and 
chairman of the board should be the same person. Members of the company’s Party 
committee should also serve on the board of directors, management team and 
supervisory board. The principle of overlapping positions and cross appointments has 
been commonly observed in enterprise management, which is an effective measure to 
combine corporate governance with the Party, which is the political core of the 
company. In the same way, the government or its authorities can send people directly 
to sit on the board of state firms, while both the board of directors and the top managers 
of State-Legal Entity firms are assigned by their parent SOEs. Hence, a former leader 
of SOEs implies a certain level of political connection.  
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5.3.4 Connection with National People’s Congress and Committee of Chinese 
People’s Political Consultative Conference  
Apart from connection with the Party, government officials and SOEs, the political 
connection also includes connections with National People’s Congress (NPC) and 
Committee of Chinese’s People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). Being 
a member of the NPC and the CPPCC might signal managerial talent and economic 
qualities, but it is very crucial to control for the role of political factors. Since both the 
NPC and the CPPCC are political bodies of state power, the procedures and criteria of 
their membership selection are less transparent, winning a seat on the NCP or the 
CPPCC means that the connection to politics is closer. These two mechanisms carry 
some commonalities, the NPC is the legislative body of the State, which is responsible 
for electing key central government officials, amending the Constitution and other legal 
documents, supervising the implementation of the Constitution and other legislation, 
and determining other major state affairs as well (Conyon et al., 2015). Typically, 
representatives of NPC are elected from 35 provincial levels of the People’s Congresses 
and are nominated by the standing committee members of provincial congresses. NPC 
representatives hold a term of 5 years and there is no limit on the maximum number of 
terms.  
 
On the other side, CPPCC is an institution of multiparty cooperation and political 
consultation led by the Communist Party of China, and its main responsibilities are 
conducting political, economy and social consultation, democratic supervision, and 
participation in the deliberation and administration of national affairs. Members are 
nominated by the standing committees of each Chinese region, affiliated political 
parties or organizations, and ethnic groups. Subsequently, the approval of membership 
made by the Chair’s Council of proceeding CPPCC national committee and no election 
is required. The member of CPPCC holds a term of 5 years and there is no restriction 
on the maximum number of terms either. A concurrent national meeting is jointly held 
by the NPC and CPPCC every 5 years, known as “Lianghui” or “Two meetings”. Their 
scarcity and status enable NPC deputies and CPPCC members do gain the highest 
recognition (Li et al., 2006, 2008). Moreover, due to the unique nomination and 
selection procedures, obtaining membership in the NPC or the CPPCC literally implies 
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winning a state-led contest, therefore being a member of NPC or CPPCC confers status 
and esteem to individuals. 
 
The signal transmission mechanism indicates that the identity of the entrepreneur’s 
NPC deputy or CPPCC member, on the one hand, signals that the enterprise especially 
the private enterprises have the strength and scale to be played, and on the other hand, 
the contribution to the economy made by these enterprises has been recognized by the 
society and government. In this sense, the political identity of these enterprises 
particularly the private enterprises conveys the signal of corporate quality, which helps 
them to obtain external funds easily and additional development opportunities, and 
promote the development of private enterprises (Hu, 2006). 
 
Under the context of transition economies, whether preferential policies really can be 
put in place timely depends largely on “the efficiency of communication” between 
business and government bureaus. As a result, many enterprises hire ever government 
officials or experiences of deputies of NPC or members of CPPCC to work for them to 
develop or retain close ties with government and form a political connection. In fact, 
considering China’s special conditions, their actual political influence is significantly 
different.  
 
 
5.4 Methodology 
5.4.1 Model Framework and Hypotheses 
A standard Logit model is employed in this chapter, which is a typical example of 
Limited Dependent Variable Model with a binary dependent variable that takes only 
two values, zero and one. Consider a binary response model with response probability 
of the following form: 
 P(y = 1|x) = 𝐺(𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥1 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑘) = 𝐺(𝛽0 + 𝑋𝛽) (1) 
where G is a function taking on values strictly between zero and one: 0 < G(z) < 1 for 
all real numbers z to make sure that the estimated response probabilities are strictly 
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between zero and one. X is a vector of covariates and 𝛽  is a vector of regression 
coefficients Here 𝑧 = 𝑋𝛽 = 𝛽1𝑥1 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑘. Specifically, for the logit model: 
𝐺(𝑧) =
exp(𝑧)
[1 + exp(𝑧)]
 
(2) 
where G is the logistic function which is between zero and one for all real numbers z,  
this is the cumulative density function (CDF) for a standard logistic random variable. 
The odds defined as the ratio of the probability to its complement, or the ratio of 
switching to not-switching in this case: 
𝑂𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑖 =  
𝑧𝑖
1 − 𝑧𝑖
= exp {𝑥𝑖
′𝛽} (3) 
If the probability of switching is a half, the odds are one-to-one or even. If the 
probability of an event is1/3, the odds are one-to-two. When the logistic CDF employed, 
the probability ( 𝑧𝑖)  of y =1 (here means a switch occurs), conditional on X is 
exp(𝑋𝛽) /(1 + exp(𝑋𝛽), Taking the logarithms, this function may be inverted to yield 
logit or log-odds: 
𝜂𝑖 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝑧𝑖) = log
𝑧𝑖
1−𝑧𝑖
= 𝑥𝑖𝛽  (4) 
This expression is termed the logit of 𝑧𝑖, with that term being a contraction of the log 
of the odds ratio. The odds ratio shows the probability in terms of the odds of y =1, 
which implies that for a one-unit change in the 𝑗𝑡ℎ x, holding other x constant, is merely 
exp (𝛽𝑗). If the odds ratio exceeds one, an increase in that x increases the likelihood that 
y = 1, and vice versa. As the probability goes down to zero the odds approach zero and 
the logit approaches −∞. At the other extreme, as the probability approaches one the 
odds approach +∞ and so does the logit. Hence, logits map probabilities from the range 
(0,1) to the entire real line. Solving for the probability 𝑧𝑖in the logit model in Equation 
4 gives the more complicated model: 
𝑧𝑖 = logit
−1(𝜂𝑖) =
exp {𝑥𝑖
′𝛽}
1 + exp {𝑥𝑖
′𝛽}
 
(5) 
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The left-hand side is the probability scale, the right-hand-side is a non-linear function 
of the predictors, and there is no simple way to express the effect on the probability 
increasing a predictor by one unit while holding the other variables constant. That 
complexity arises from the nonlinearity of the relationship. 
There are two options for reporting the effect size of covariates in logistic regression. 
The first one is simply reporting the expected change in odds for one unit change in x 
by using odds ratios, and the other is reporting the expected effect at the mean of the x 
in the sample, which is known as the marginal effect. 𝛽𝑗 indicates the change in the 
logit of the probability associated with a unit change in the j-th predictor holding all 
other predictors constant. The coefficient directly shows the direction of covariate 
effects such as increasing or lowering the likelihood of switching, but it does not show 
the magnitude of the covariate effect. Thereby, marginal effects are presented in the 
result section to identify magnitude s of partial effects.   
Generally, the Logit model can be derived from an underlying latent variable model. 
Let 𝑦∗ be an unobserved, or latent variable and suppose that: 
𝑦∗ = 𝛽0 + 𝑥𝛽 + 𝜇,       y = 1[𝑦
∗ >  0] (6) 
where the error term 𝜇 is independent of x. Although 𝑥𝑗 has a linear effect on 𝑦
∗, it will 
not have a linear effect on the resulting probability that y=1. To estimate the effect of a 
continuous variable 𝑥𝑗 on the probability of switching P(y = 1| x), this partial effect can 
be obtained by taking partial derivatives: 
𝜕P(y = 1|x)
𝜕𝑥𝑗
= 𝑔(𝛽0 + 𝑥𝛽)𝛽𝑗, where g(z)  ≡
𝑑𝐺
𝑑𝑧
(𝑧) (7) 
Again, G is the cdf of a continuous random variable, g is a probability density function 
(pdf). In the logit model, 𝐺(∙) is a strictly increasing cdf, and so g(z)  >  0 for all z. 
Thus, the marginal effect of 𝑥𝑗  on P(𝑦 = 1|x)  depends on x through the positive 
quantity 𝑔(𝛽0 + 𝑥𝛽), which implies that the marginal effect always have the same sign 
as 𝛽𝑗.  
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If 𝑥1is a binary explanatory variable, say whether a firm is a state-owned enterprise 
(SOE) or not, then the partial effect from changing 𝑥1 from zero to one, holding all 
other variables fixed, is: 
𝐺(𝛽0 + 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑥2 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑘) − G(𝛽0 + 𝛽2𝑥2 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑘) (8) 
In a binary choice model, the marginal effect of an increase in factor 𝑥𝑗 cannot have a 
constant effect on the conditional probability that (y = 1| x) since 𝐺(∙) differs through 
the range of x values. In a linear regression model, the coefficient 𝛽𝑗 and its estimate 
𝑏𝑗 measures the marginal effect 𝜕𝑦/𝜕𝑥𝑗, and the effect is constant for all values of x. 
While in a binary model, the probability that y = 1 is bounded by {0,1} interval, the 
marginal effect may vary. Compared with the linear probability model, the partial 
effects in Equation 7 by using the Logit model are harder to summarize because of the 
scale factor. Using the scale factor results from averaging the individual partial effects 
across the sample, leading to what is called the average partial effect (APE) or, 
sometimes, the average marginal effect (AME). For a continuous explanatory 
variable 𝑥𝑗 , the average marginal effect is  𝑛
−1 ∑ [𝑔(?̂?0+𝑥𝑖?̂?)?̂?𝑗] =
𝑛
𝑖=1
[𝑛−1 ∑ 𝑔(?̂?0+𝑥𝑖?̂?)]?̂?𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 . The term multiplying ?̂?𝑗 acts as a scale factor: 
𝑛−1 ∑ 𝑔(?̂?0+𝑥𝑖?̂?)
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
 (9) 
Equation 9 is easily computed after logit estimation, where 𝑔(?̂?0+𝑥𝑖?̂?) =
exp(?̂?0+𝑥𝑖?̂?) /[1 + exp(?̂?0+𝑥𝑖?̂?)]
2
. 
 
This chapter attempts to understand why firms borrow from other (non-relationship) 
banks for their repeat credit needs, and how this decision affected by CEO’s political 
connection. A key variable of interest is Switch, a dummy variable that identifies if the 
deal involves a new banking relationship for the borrowing firm.  A bank-firm 
relationship is defined as a pairing between a lending bank and a borrower. To construct 
the dependent variable – Switch, I examine all the previous loan deals of the borrowing 
firm available in the CSMAR database. Coding Switch equal to 1 if the firm obtains a 
new loan from a bank which it did not have lending relationship in the previous 12 
months, and 0 otherwise. In China, a firm may establish a new banking relationship 
  132  
  
either because it wants to maintain multiple banking relationships or because it wants 
to switch to a new bank entirely by severing its relationships with its existing bank.  
 
The empirical model mainly examines the effect of CEO’s political connection on a 
firm's propensity to switch. To analyse this choice, this chapter estimates panel logit 
regression that controlling for firm factor, management factor, bank factor, and 
environmental factor, the Logit model is designed as follows: 
 
𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖  =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 + 𝛾𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 + 𝛿𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖 + 𝜃𝐸𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑡
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑠 + 𝜇𝑖 
 
(10) 
Where 𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖 is a dummy variable and captures firm i’s switch behaviour, 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 is 
a set of variables that related to firm-level characteristics, including the age, size, 
leverage, profitability, cash flows, growth, collateral, opaqueness of firm i and also 
control for industrial effect. 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖  is a set of variables that related to the 
CEO’s characteristics of the firm, including age, gender, tenure and political ties of 
CEO. 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖  indicates the types of lending banks of firm i, types of lending banks 
includes five large SOBs (Big5), Joint-Stock Commercial Banks (JSCBs), City 
Commercial Banks (CCBs), Policy Banks, Foreign Banks, and Other. Environment 
denotes external effect such as financial crisis and geographical location. In addition, 
this model also includes interactive terms to estimate the cross effects of multiple types 
of political connection on the firm’s switch behaviour. 
 
Comprehensively consider the views of the existing scholars and combine with the 
reality of China background, firm’s political connection is defined as whether its CEO 
is a  (1) current or former representative of the Communist Party of China; (2) current 
or former government officials (officer of the central or local governments, state 
authorities and military); (3) former leader of SOEs35; (4) current or former deputy of 
National People’s Congress (NPC); (5) current or former member of Chinese People’s 
Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). CEO has at least one of these types of 
connection thus considered as a politically connected firm.  
 
                                                 
35 Former chairman or CEO of state-owned enterprises. 
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Previous studies have found the political effect on firm value, preferential treatment 
such as bank loans (Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Luo and Zhen, 
2008; Yu and Pan, 2008), corporate bailout (Faccio et al., 2006), tax policies and 
subsidies (Pan et al., 2009), barriers to entry (Luo and Liu, 2009), and legal protections 
(Li et al., 2008), the first hypothesis is developed to investigate the political effects on 
firm’s behaviour of changing their loan provider. The CEO’s political connection is 
expected to have a significant effect on the firm’s corporate decision in terms of 
switching loan provider. 
 
In spite of China’s economy experienced a rapid growth in the involvement of firms 
belonging to the private sector during the transition period from a centrally controlled 
to a market-determined one, most of the listed companies are state-owned enterprises 
that are partially privatized. To distinguish the type of politically connection, this study 
uses an index to categorize the connection into five types that includes five dummies. 
The second hypothesis address the differentials of CEO’s different types of political 
connection and the effect of multiple political connections. The influence of different 
types of political connection is different and a government connection is expected to 
have a stronger impact on firm’s switching behaviour relative to connecting to NPC or 
CPPCC.   
 
In fact, the three positions of chairman, CEO and Party secretary of firm’s Party 
committee are the top positions of a wholly state-owned enterprise or state capital 
holding company registered under the Company Law, which could be the same person 
for two of these top positions. One of the most common management features of SOEs 
is that the three positions are held by the two leaders of the SOEs, one of whom holds 
two positions. If the two positions are held by the same person, he or she will be the 
top leader of the company. The usual situation is that the chairman of the board of 
directors is also the Party secretary of firm’s Party committee, as the “chief”, while 
another SOE leader is the “second-in-charge” as CEO, or it could be the case of the 
CEO is also the company’s Party secretary. Details of variables are displayed in Table 
5.1. 
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Table 5.1: Variable description 
Variables Description Unit 
Switch Dummy variable takes value 1 if a firm starts to borrow 
from a new bank that did not have relationship with it in 
the past 12 months, 0 otherwise. 
- 
Age Age of the firm when the firm switches. Month 
Size Natural logarithm of year-ended total asset deflated by 
the Chinese GDP deflator. 
CNY 
SOE Dummy variable that takes value 1 when the firm is 
state-owned enterprise; 0 otherwise. 
- 
Profit Ratio of net profit on total assets. % 
Leverage Ratio of long-term debt to total assets. % 
Cash flows Ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets. % 
Growth Ratio of sales growth.  
Collateral Ratio of tangible assets to total debt. % 
Opaqueness Ratio of intangible assets to total assets. % 
Industry Eight sector dummies that take value 1 when the firm is 
operating in the sector of Agriculture /Mining 
/Manufacture /Construction /Energy /Transport /Real 
estate /Service, 0 otherwise. 
- 
CEOage Age of CEO when the firm switches. Year 
Gender Dummy variable that takes value 1 when the firm is run 
by a male CEO, 0 otherwise. 
- 
Tenure Tenure of CEO when the firm switches. Month 
Change Dummy variable takes value 1 if there is a change in 
CEO in a current relationship, 0 otherwise. 
- 
Political connection Dummy variable takes value 1 if the CEO meets one of 
the following requirements: 1) current or former 
representative of the Communist Party of China; 2) 
current or former government officials (officer of the 
central or local governments, state authorities, and 
military); 3) former CEO or chairman of SOEs; 4) 
current or former deputy of National People’s Congress 
(NPC); 5) current or former member of Chinese 
People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), 
0 otherwise. 
- 
Party Dummy variable takes value 1 if the CEO is current or 
former representative of the Communist Party of China, 
0 otherwise. 
- 
Government Dummy variable takes value 1 if the CEO is current or 
former current or former government officials (officer 
of the central or local governments, state authorities and 
military, 0 otherwise. 
- 
SOE’s CEO Dummy variable takes value 1 if the CEO is former 
CEO or chairman of SOEs; 0 otherwise 
- 
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NPC Dummy variable takes value 1 if the CEO is current or 
former deputy of National People’s Congress (NPC), 0 
otherwise. 
- 
CPPCC Dummy variable takes value 1 if the CEO is current or 
former member of Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference (CPPCC), 
0 otherwise. 
- 
SOB Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the lending bank 
is the five largest state-owned commercial banks (also 
known as Big5), 0 otherwise. 
- 
JSCB Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the lending bank 
is joint-stock commercial bank, 0 otherwise. 
- 
CCB Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the lending bank 
is city commercial bank, 0 otherwise. 
- 
Policy Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the lending bank 
is policy banks, 0 otherwise. 
- 
Foreign Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the lending bank 
is foreign banks, 0 otherwise. 
- 
Other Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the lending bank 
is other types of banks, 0 otherwise. 
- 
Crisis Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the year of 
switching in crisis year 2008 and 2009, 0 otherwise. 
- 
City Dummy variable takes value 1 if the firm locates in the 
most developed tier-1 cities include Beijing, Shanghai, 
Guangzhou and Shenzhen, 0 otherwise. 
- 
Govt* SOE’s CEO Cross effect of CEO’s multiple political connection of 
government and SOEs. 
- 
Govt*NPC Cross effect of CEO’s multiple political connection of 
government and National People’s Congress. 
- 
NPC*CPPCC Cross effect of CEO’s multiple political connection of 
National People’s Congress and Chinese People’s 
Political Consultative Conference. 
- 
 
5.4.2 Data and Sample 
Instead of using the board members, this study focuses on the firm’s CEO’s political 
connection and therefore narrows the range of directors and obtains the data on types 
of connection by manually identifying the background of CEO. For each listed 
company, the characteristics of executives such as their age and gender, as well as the 
profile of the CEO and board of directors can be obtained from the category of 
executive information from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research 
(CSMAR) database. In addition to the CEO’s (director’s) name, the profile typically 
contains information on age, gender, education, professional background, employment 
history, and start and end date of the position. From the profile, the CEO’s political ties 
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can be traced by identifying whether he or she was currently or formerly an officer of 
the central government, a local government, state authorities, the military, or a former 
CEO/chairman of SOE, or a representative of the Party, NPC or CPPCC. For listed 
companies in the sample that with missing CEO’s data, I manually collected CEO 
personal information and profiles by looking at the “Directors, Supervisors, Senior 
Management and Employees” section of listed firms’ annual report from the website of 
company’s official site, Juchao, Sino Finance and Fenghuang (Phoenix) Finance 
Channel.  
Finally, this study obtains CEO data for 2,102 listed companies during the 2000-2016 
period and covering 3,268 CEOs in that period. In addition to the CEO data, this study 
also obtains loan data, financial data, ownership data, industry and regional data from 
the CSMAR database. Table 5.2 reports information on the sample of listed companies, 
almost 36% of the sample listed firms appointed politically connected CEOs who were 
current or former government bureaucrats, deputies NPC or members of CPPCC, which 
suggests that the government remains direct influence on the considerable portion of 
firms through its CEO appointments.   
The sample description has been displayed in Table 5.2. Different panels in this table 
report the sample by different criteria. For example Panel A shows that the listed 
companies in the sample on the year basis, Panel B shows the sample by firm’s 
ownership structure, Panel C shows the sample by firm size, Panel D breaks down the 
sample by industry sector. There is no specific pattern in the percentage of politically 
connected CEOs on a year-by-year basis or among different sizes of firms, but there is 
an ownership variation, and cross-industry variation in the appointment of politically 
connected CEOs. It is easy to understand that the state-owned firms have a higher 
proportion of politically connect CEOs relative to the non-state owned firms, which is 
56% and 21%, respectively, though this is the statistics that observed from the CEO 
profile of SOEs that meets at least one type of the political connections. Moreover, the 
highest percentage politically connected CEOs occurs in the transport sector (60%), 
followed by the energy sector (58%), agriculture sector (47%), construction sector 
(41%), mining sector (40%), real estate sector (37%), manufacture sector (36%) and 
service sector (23%). 
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Table 5.2: The Sample 
Note: Columns 1 reports the number of firms in the sample, Columns 2 and 3 report numbers 
on the subsample of firms led by politically connected CEOs. Panel A, B, C, and D report the 
sample by year, firm’s ownership, size and industry sector respectively. 
 
 Total sample 
number 
Firms with political connected CEOs  
  Number % of the total sample by 
year/ownership/size/sector 
Panel A: By year    
2000 57 7 12.28% 
2001 119 9 7.56% 
2002 220 20 9.09% 
2003 222 30 13.51% 
2004 192 47 24.48% 
2005 69 22 31.88% 
2006 75 16 21.33% 
2007 243 56 23.05% 
2008 402 105 26.12% 
2009 445 130 29.21% 
2010 457 144 31.51% 
2011 497 137 27.57% 
2012 867 232 26.76% 
2013 1,129 282 24.98% 
2014 1,287 302 23.47% 
2015 1,217 262 21.53% 
2016 70 16 22.86% 
 
Panel B: By ownership 
   
SOEs 944 524 55.50% 
Non-SOEs 
 
1,158 241 20.81% 
Panel C: By size    
Large 1,326 490 36.95% 
SMEs 
 
776 275 35.44% 
Panel D: By industry     
Agriculture 38 18 47.37% 
Mining 136 54 39.71% 
Manufacture 1,238 448 36.19% 
Construction 58 24 41.38% 
Energy 78 45 57.69% 
Transport 70 42 60.00% 
Real estate 150 56 37.33% 
Service 334 78 23.35% 
    
Total 2,102 765 36.39% 
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5.5 Results 
The regression analyses have been performed to examine the effects of the CEO’s 
political connections on the firm’s switching behaviour. To examine whether the effect 
of political connection is significant in firms’ switch behaviour and the difference 
between five types of political connection, running the regression separately with one 
using an indicator to measure CEO’s political connection, and the other using an index 
(with five dummies) to capture the influences from five types of political connection. 
The results of Logistic regressions particularly focus on the effects of political 
connection are shown in Table 5.3 that consists of two panels, where the marginal 
effects values reported. The column of lower bound reports the marginal effects of 
political connection indicators that using the sample with CEO’s political connection 
characterized by the definition mentioned above, while the results are shown in the 
column of upper bound using the data that make all state-owned enterprises’ CEO 
default as having political connection, thus the dummy variable of political connection 
codes as 1 if it is an SOE, even though the CEO’s profile information show none 
previous or current experience in government bureaucrats or military, NPC or CPPCC. 
The reason to include an upper bound is that, under the condition of China economy, 
the most important executives of SOEs must be appointed by the state or government, 
this could be either chairman, or CEO, or party secretary, and it could be the same 
person to take two of these positions. An SOE’s CEO’s profile shows no experience 
that related to the government or meets none of the five political connections 
requirement above does not mean that this SOE has no political connection, it is 
possible the case of the chairman or company’s Party secretary are politically connected. 
Under this special circumstance, an upper bound is necessary to be included to examine 
the scale of politically connected CEO’s effect. 
The difference between Panel A and B is that regression in Panel A only controls for 
the firm-level specific characteristics, including firm’s age, size, ownership, 
profitability, leverage, cash flows, growth, ability of pledge collateral, level of 
opaqueness and management characteristics such as CEO’s age, gender, length of term, 
political connection and their turnover. Additionally, Panel B also controls for the 
ownership characteristics of banks, and environment factor, as well as the interactive 
terms. The estimated results show that the CEO’s political connection lowers the 
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likelihood of firm’s switch behaviour, the probability of switching of these politically 
connected firms is 2% lower than non-connected firms, which confirms the first 
hypothesis of CEO’s political connection has a significant impact on firm’s switching 
behaviour. Using an index to categorize the political connection into five types of 
connection, the direction of different types of political connection effect is consistent 
with the overall indicator of political connection, though this effect is only significant 
in two of these types of connections. For example, when firm’s CEO is a former SOE’s 
CEO or member of Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), 
these firms have 4.04% or 7.30% lower switch probability relative to firms that do not 
have these types of political connections, respectively. This result supports the first part 
of the second hypothesis. On the other side, the results in the upper column shown in 
Table 5.3 indicates that measuring CEO’s political connection in a way that making the 
CEOs of all SOEs default to have a political connection, therefore the political 
connection indicator takes the value of 1 for all SOEs in this sample. Though this new 
sample generates an insignificant result for political connection indicator, it does show 
the same direction of this political effect and a significant result of being a member of 
CPPCC, which is partially in line with the results shown in the lower bound.  
Adding additional sets of variables such as bank factors, environment factors and 
interactive terms generate slightly different results, which can be seen from Panel B.  
CEO’s political connection is insignificant in both of the lower and upper bound by 
using two ways to measure CEO’s political connection. Although the signs of different 
types of political connection are consistent with the results shown in Panel A, they are 
not significant, except for a connection with the NPC. A politically connected firm that 
has CEO is a former or current deputy of Nation People’s Congress more likely to 
switch credit provider compared to firms without these types of connection when 
considering all sets of covariates. 
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Table 5.3: Effect of Political Connection 
 Lower bound Upper bound 
Panel A   
Political connection -0.0192** 
(0.0093) 
-0.0094 
(0.0144) 
Connection Index   
1. Party  -0.0110 
(0.0120) 
-0.0160 
(0.0116) 
2. Government -0.0126 
(0.0163) 
-0.0118 
(0.0163) 
3. SOE’s CEO -0.0404* 
(0.0241) 
-0.0227 
(0.0559) 
4. NPC -0.0085 
(0.0215) 
-0.0039 
(0.0215) 
5. CPPCC -0.0730*** 
(0.0247) 
-0.0723*** 
(0.0247) 
Panel B   
Political connection -0.0062 
(0.0103) 
-0.0194 
(0.0154) 
Connection Index   
1. Party -0.0137 
(0.0134) 
-0.0125 
(0.0134) 
2. Government -0.0209 
(0.0209) 
-0.0182 
(0.0209) 
3. SOE’s CEO -0.0704 
(0.0467) 
-0.0289 
(0.0528) 
4. NPC 0.1025*** 
(0.0284) 
0.1050*** 
(0.2836) 
5. CPPCC -0.0160 
(0.0276) 
-0.0159 
(0.0276) 
Note: ***, **, * indicates significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Marginal effects are 
reported, the standard errors are reported in the parentheses. Party denotes current or 
former representative of the Communist Party of China; Government denotes current or 
former government officials (officer of the central or local governments, state authorities 
and military); SOE’s CEO denotes former CEO/chairman of SOEs; NPC denotes current 
or former representative of National People’s Congress CPPCC denotes current or former 
member of Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. 
 
Table 5.4 presents the results of Logistic regressions that analyse the effects of 
politically connected CEOs, characteristics of both firms and banks as well as an 
environment factor for the benchmark model and different groups of subsamples. In 
addition, interactive terms are also included to capture the effect of CEO’s multiple 
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types of political connections. This chapter considers CEO’s affiliation with the 
government as an indication of political interference. A government can be the central 
government (i.e. State council, the Communist Party of China), a local government that 
governs the geographic region within which the firm is located. It is commonly 
observed that listed firms’ CEOs have multiple political links from this sample. To 
investigate whether the effects of political connections are concentrated in two or more 
specific types of political ties, interactive terms of separate political connection 
variables are incorporated. The combination of multiple political links is selected to 
form the interactive terms based on what I have observed from CEO’s profile in the 
sample. Table 5.4 reports the interactives terms only with the significant result. 
Although the dummy variable of CEO’s political connection shows insignificant effect 
when considering bank factor, environment change and interactives, the interactive 
terms show that multiple political connections significantly reduces the probability of 
firm’s switching, this effect is also significant on firms’ switching behaviour for the 
subsamples of state-owned firms, non-state-owned firms, large firms and SMEs with 
three main features. First, firms with a CEO is current or former government officials 
also a former leader of SOEs are less likely to switch, especially in the subsamples of 
SOEs and large firms and this effect is stronger for large firms. Second, firms with a 
CEO is current or former government officials also deputy of National People’s 
Congress (NPC) are less likely to switch, particularly in SOEs and small firms, and this 
effect is stronger for small firms. Third, firms with CEO is current and former deputy 
of NPC and also member of Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference 
(CPPCC) are also less likely to switch lenders, this effect is particularly significant in 
the subsamples of non-state-owned firms and large firms.  
Therefore, firms that with politically connected CEOs are less likely to change their 
loan provider and these firms probability of switching is about 21.7% (average of the 
above combination of multiple types of political connections) lower relative to firms 
without politically connected CEOs. The interactive result (with 28.5%, 20.7%, and 
15.9% for Govt*SOE’s CEO, Govt*NPC, and NPC*CPPCC, respectively) indicates 
that the effect of connecting with government bureaucrats is greater than connecting 
with the NPC or CPPCC, because the government in both central and local level, as 
well as government agencies are more powerful than institutions like NPC and CPPCC, 
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which supports the second hypothesis. In particular, the effect of multiple political 
connections is stronger for the subsample of small firms, leads to a 71% lower in the 
probability of switching compared to non-connected small firms. This may due to these 
political relationships provide explicit government guarantee that may ensure them to 
obtain loan renewal from their existing relationship bank thereby less likely to switch 
to others.  
These results are consistent with the evidence found that political connection has 
positive impacts on accessing bank loans. Having connection with the government 
department, especially multiple political ties, enables the firm to access bank loans 
more easily. If this could be achieved through renewing loan contracts with their 
existing banks, they would be less likely to consider changing their loan provider. This 
evidence confirms the broad theoretical and empirical agreement on the view that closer 
and stable firm-bank relationships efficiently develop a unique management structure. 
It not only reduce the level of information asymmetry between the firm and the bank, 
but also enables firms to access bank credit easily with lower loan rates and better loan 
conditions (e.g. Berger and Udell, 1995; Bharath et al, 2011; Boot and Thakor, 1994; 
Cole, 1998; Elsas and Krahnen, 1998). 
In addition, the regression results show that small, non-SOEs and firms with high 
profitability, cash flows more likely to switch their credit provider. Large firms that 
have already build long bank-firm relationship prefer to stay with their incumbent bank. 
Apart from this, firms with older CEOs and CEO change, run by male CEO are more 
likely to switch lender, which confirms the finding of Faccio et al. (2016) suggesting 
that CEO gender plays a crucial role in corporate decision making. According to Faccio 
et al (2016), there are gender-related differences in risk-aversion, where women display 
a lower propensity for risk-taking than men, and tend to avoid choices that are (from 
their perspective) “too risky”. In particular, female CEOs tend to avoid risker 
investment and financing opportunities, and are less likely to undertake all positive net 
present value projects. The age of the CEO affects his/her risk tolerance, which in turn 
affects the company’s investment and financing decisions. As suggesting by the 
existing literature, the older the executives, the more inclined they are to avoid risks 
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and be more robust in corporate decision-making and corporate behaviour36, which 
contradicts my empirical finding, though this effect is too small to consider. 
Moreover, firms do not have bank relationship with five large state-owned commercial 
banks (SOB) or joint-stock commercial banks (JSCB) have higher tendency to change 
their loan provider compared to firms that have loan relationships with major SOBs and 
JSCBs. Besides, firms located in the most developed cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, 
Guangzhou and Shenzhen less likely to switch to other lenders. Overall, most of these 
covariates results in this chapter are consistent with the results found in Chapter 3 using 
the survival analysis, to complement these results, this chapter also provides evidence 
that CEO’s political tie has an impact on firm’s switch behaviour, as well as the effect 
of CEO’s gender. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
36 See Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001); He and Liu (2010). 
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Table 5.4: Estimate Results of the Logistic Regression Model 
Note: ***, **, and * indicates significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Marginal effects are reported. The definition of large, medium and small firms based on the 
classification of firm’s size made by National Bureau of Statistics of China (See Appendix 
B-Table B1). 
 
 
 
Variable 
 
Benchmark 
 
 
SOEs 
 
non-SOEs 
 
Large Firms 
 
SMEs 
Firm      
Age 0.000*** -0.001*** 0.000** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
Firm size -0.043*** -0.025*** -0.066*** -0.039*** -0.047*** 
SOE -0.024***   0.004 -0.088*** 
Profit 0.002** -0.002 0.007*** 0.001 0.004** 
Leverage 0.001 -0.001 0.002** -0.001 0.004*** 
Cash flows 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.000 
Growth 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.000 0.001 
Collateral 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000 
Opaqueness -0.000*** -0.003*** -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Management      
CEO age 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002 0.003*** 0.002 
Gender 0.042** 0.020 0.036 -0.003 0.106*** 
Tenure 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Change 0.262*** 0.272*** 0.236*** 0.281*** 0.221*** 
Political connection -0.006 -0.032** -0.002 -0.024 0.026 
Bank      
SOB -0.224*** -0.132*** -0.336*** -0.224*** -0.208*** 
JSCB -0.112*** 0.001 -0.241*** -0.100*** -0.124*** 
CCB -0.012 0.037 -0.079** 0.006 -0.034 
Policy -0.029 0.071** -0.161*** -0.019 -0.033 
Foreign 0.019 0.089*** -0.063 0.060** -0.113** 
Other 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Environment      
Crisis -0.016 -0.021 -0.024 -0.022 0.006 
City -0.028*** -0.054*** 0.002 -0.025** -0.011 
Interactive terms       
Govt* SOE’s CEO -0.285*** -0.304*** 0.000 -0.359*** -0.079 
Govt*NPC -0.207*** -0.403*** -0.115 -0.132 -0.707*** 
NPC*CPPCC -0.159** 0.000 -0.164*** -0.166*** 0.151 
Observation 16,776 8,472 8,304 12,146 4,630 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has documented a significant presence of politically connected CEOs in 
publicly listed companies in China. Firms with politically connected CEOs are less 
likely to change their loan provider. Overall, the analysis of the particular types of 
political connection suggests that these measures reasonably capture the effects of 
government intervention in publicly traded firms in China. Even though the measures 
do not capture all possible channels of CEO’s political connections, this study still finds 
that they have important influences on firm’s switching behaviour. In addition, having 
a connection with government bureaucrats on both central and local levels implies that 
firms have the strongest type of political connection, which brings the largest influence 
on firms’ switching behaviour by maintaining stable relationships with their incumbent 
banks and lowering likelihood of changing to other banks. Moreover, the significant 
interaction terms show that multiple political ties also lower the likelihood of switching, 
and this effect is stronger for the relatively small firms. 
Various studies show that companies with political connections can obtain more loans, 
more favourable loan conditions and longer debt maturities, which are mainly due to 
the institutional substitution (Cull and Xu, 2005; Yu et al., 2010), implicit guarantee 
(Sun et al., 2006), and signal transmission of political connection (Hu, 2006; Sun et al., 
2005). When the judicial system is inefficient and private property rights cannot be 
effectively protected, the informal system of substitution of political connections can 
reduce firms’ operational risks and infringements, thereby reducing the difficulty of 
obtaining loan (Xiong, 2012). Implicit guarantees indicate that firms with political 
connections can get more government bailouts (Faccio et al., 2006), more financial 
subsidies (Luo and Tang, 2009; Yu et al., 2010), and preferential tax (Wu et al., 2009). 
The signal transmission mechanism describes that the political identity of the 
entrepreneur reflects favourable impression of the company that may obtain more 
investment and growth opportunity (Hu, 2006). 
Generally speaking, from the perspective of rent-seeking, foreign scholars usually find 
that political connections bring a lot of rent-seeking benefits to enterprises, which 
influences their performance. From the perspective of the informal system substitution, 
domestic scholars believe that political connections protect enterprise property rights, 
  146  
  
reduce government plunder, and thus influences enterprise performance. In the China 
context,  and given that the mix results of political connection and firm value from 
previous literature, firms should fully consider the benefits of political connection 
brings to the firms as well as the management risk. Meanwhile, progress in SOE reform 
and development should be the criteria for assessing the performance of Party 
organizations in SOEs, stressing they should aim to improve corporate profitability, 
competitiveness and preserve or increase the value of state assets. 
The heterogeneity of state-owned enterprises and private enterprises in terms of 
survival conditions, development goals and the way in which executives are appointed 
will result in large differences in their political strategies. Therefore, it is necessary to 
consider the influence of the enterprise mechanism on the political relationship. On this 
basis, the specific ways and mechanisms of political connection to the value of the 
enterprise can be further considered. In this way, a more comprehensive study of 
corporate remediation can be conducted in the future   
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6 Conclusion 
 
6.1 Summary of Key Findings 
What causes firms to switch to different loan provider in China? Using 18,233 firm-
bank loan relationship matched data during 1996-2016, survival analysis has been 
applied in to examine the determinants of a firm switch to new banks and firm-bank 
relationship change in China. A Switch is defined as a firm obtains a loan from a new 
bank with which it did not have a lending relationship during the previous 12 months. 
As it is commonly recognized that firms in China borrow from multiple banks 
simultaneously and thereby changing from one bank to another does not necessarily 
mean that weakens the relationship with previous banks, or even terminates this current 
relationship. Forming a new relationship when a past loan deal with firm’s current bank 
is outstanding is also considered as a switch through adding a new bank relationship. 
Hence, a firm's switch behaviour could be defined either by moving to other banks 
(terminating current relationship) or adding a new bank relationship in or after a current 
deal with its current bank.  
Controlling for time-varying and time-invariant covariates of firm’s characteristics, 
management characteristics, bank type-ownership and the economic environment, 
hazard functions from Chapter 3 show that small and young firms, and less leveraged 
firms are more likely to switch to other banks. These firms are considered as riskier and 
less profitable firms that obtain funds more difficultly relative to large firms, thereby 
switching may occur when their credit needs cannot be fulfilled by their incumbent 
banks. Firms operating in the real estate sector are found to be more likely to switch 
loan provider, compared to other sectors, this may due to the rapid development of 
China real estate industry in the 2000s with an increasing credit demand to support their 
expanding investments. In addition, the probability of switching will be higher if firms 
experience a CEO switch during the relationship period, and their tenure will increase 
the likelihood of switching banks.  
As regards the effect of supply side, bank ownership shows a significant impact on 
firms switching behaviour.  Firms that borrow from non-SOBs have a higher 
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probability of changing their bank loan provider (switching), while firms that have a 
loan relationship with the five large-scaled state commercial banks (SOBs) are more 
likely to stay longer in a stable bank relationship and less likely to change loan 
providers. Changing the economic environment could bring reasonable change to firm's 
switch. Increasing the PBoC’s benchmark lending rate and reserve requirement ratio 
during the tight monetary policy period may push firms to switch, this may be due to 
an increase in bargaining power from the lending side. Likewise, all firms are less likely 
to switch in times of economic crisis as in the 2008-2009 period. Moreover, the more 
bank relationship a firm has, the higher its probability of switching.  
These covariate effects are also consistent and robust in Chapter 4 and 5. To 
complement the main drivers of firms switching behaviour, Brand Performance 
Measures (BPM) generated from the Dirichlet model in Chapter 4 suggest that smaller 
bank group not only have far fewer borrowers than the larger bank group but also 
somewhat lower average borrow frequencies (i.e. lower repeat borrowing, less loyal 
borrower). Borrowers of the five large SOBs are the most loyal firms with the highest 
borrowing frequency and repeat rate. Besides, the highest duplication rate of SOBs 
indicates that most of the borrower of other bank groups also borrow from five large 
SOBs, which implies that SOBs are still very powerful and competitive in China’s 
banking industry today. In addition to the external switching, firms are also observed 
to switch internally within a group of the bank. Using the Big5 as an example, 
borrowers of one SOB is also the customer of another SOB, the duplication level of 
borrowing from these five large SOBs does not vary too much as their market share 
and penetration level is very similar to each other. An extension of Dirichlet approach 
by adding covariates shows that SOEs are more likely to choose to borrow from SOBs 
than other types of banks, and this effect is significant for both subsample period of 
pre-crisis and post-crisis. It is unsurprising that SOEs’ borrowing choices favour to 
SOBs due to historical reason and their natural close relationships, SOEs are perceived 
to have government to support them and also SOBs may have some preference 
internally in order to meet their ‘quotas’.  In general, the borrowing patterns of listed 
companies in China are mostly consistent in both pre and post-crisis period. The loyalty 
level to the SOBs declines considerably in the post-crisis period, which could be made 
up by an increase in the market shares of Joint-stock commercial banks (JSCBs) and 
City commercial banks (CCBs), as well as other groups of banks and their improving 
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customers’ loyalty, indicating China’s banking sector is moving towards a more 
commercial base.  
Furthermore, Chapter 5 has confirmed the role of political connection in China’s 
borrowing and lending relationship between firms and banks. Firms with politically 
connected CEOs are found to be less likely to change their loan provider. To some 
extent, some of these types of political connection suggest that these measures 
reasonably capture the effects of government intervention in publicly traded firms in 
China. In particular, having a connection with government bureaucrats on both central 
and local levels implies that firms have the strongest type of political connection, 
compared to the relationship with NPC or CPPCC, which brings the largest effect on 
firms’ switching behaviour by maintaining stable relationships with their incumbent 
banks and lowering likelihood of changing to other banks.  
To summarize. SOBs and SOEs have super stable firm-bank relationships, as for the 
rest, small, young and non-SOEs, firms with lower leverage, and multiple bank 
relationships, and operating in the real estate, and non-politically connected firms are 
more likely to switch. Firms that borrow from non-SOBs are also more likely to switch. 
Significantly, a long CEO tenure and a CEO switch during the lending relationship 
increase the likelihood of a switch.  
 
6.2 Discussion and Policy Implication 
What do these results tell us about the Chinese banking system and the lending 
relationship with the company sector? It tells us that political connection is important, 
guanxi is important37, the decision of switching also credit provision in China is not 
just the same as Western countries, which is mainly decided on the commercial ground, 
but on political connection, ownership characteristics, management characteristics and 
economic environment condition as well. It also tells us that even in an environment of 
increasing commercialization, an environment fostered by the continuous reforms to 
the banking sector, the firm-bank relationship between SOEs and SOB s remain strong, 
                                                 
37 The state ownership of the firm and bank represents one type of ‘guanxi’. The political ties of CEO 
also indicates a ‘guanxi’ in the borrowing and lending activities and switching behaviour. 
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but the credit needs of the firm put a strain on it. A change in the CEO increases the 
likelihood of a firm changing its loan provider but a change to whom? It is possible that 
in the case of the SOE-SOB relationship the change is to another SOB through the 
political connection route, this has been partially confirmed in Chapter 5 which 
emphasizes the role of top executive’s political connection. The within SOB group 
duplication analysis suggests that SOEs tend to change their loan providers internally 
between SOBs only indicating the strength of relationship within state-owned 
businesses. Another interpretation is that the increased commercialization of 
relationships in recent times has partially pushed firms away from the traditional 
‘guanxi’ type of relationship in business, but these relationships especially in the state-
sector remain strong 38 . However, SOBs play a significant role in funding SOEs, 
resulting in nature and close relationship that impedes the business of good banking to 
some extent.   
Managing and marketing of loan activities are crucial areas of research because of a 
stable and more commercialize firm-bank relationship is pursued by both firms and 
banks in China. Nearly half of firms maintain a multiple bank relationship and changing 
their loan provider does not cut them off from resurrecting a past bank relationship in 
the future. The fit of the Dirichlet model to firms borrowing from multiple groups of 
lending banks suggests that the well-known double jeopardy pattern observed in 
consumer-packaged goods can be extended to borrowing and lending relationships, 
which recommends that the NBD-Dirichlet model may apply to other context and data, 
for example, other financial activity behaviours – mergers and acquisitions, public 
listings, bond issuance etc. My exploration and findings provide great potential and 
possible implications for policy makers, banks and professional, as well as guidance 
policy on the firm-bank relationship, helps banks and other financial intermediaries to 
understand changes in these relationships and offers an insight for academic researcher 
and marketer to extend it to other fields. 
                                                 
38 On the one hand, as the empirical evidence shows that SOE-SOB relationship remain super stable, 
thus switch (change) behaviour is less likely to happen in the state-owned enterprises. On the other hand, 
firms with ‘guanxi’ in terms of political ties have higher propensity to switch, because these ‘guanxi’ 
allows them to access credit from new loan providers easily. From the bank’s perspective, having 
political connection gives them a strong signal that their loans contracts are implicitly and explicitly 
guaranteed by the government. 
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The policy implications from this study may be obvious to those of a poor 
understanding of the Chinese political economy. To some extent, a super stable SOE-
SOB relationship seems like a roadblock which may bring impediment for Chinese 
development in various aspects, such as market competition, institutional environment 
and the development of non-state banking sector and non-state corporate sector. But 
China’s commercial and banking system, while modern in many respects, this is a 
foundation on relationship norms developed over centuries. In fact, doing business in a 
transitioned economy like China is full of risks and uncertainty, even in the post-WTO 
era. A famous Chinese quote saying “Crossing the river by feeling the stones” was 
borrowed to represent a scientific working method, indicating that it is necessary to 
conduct a safe attitude in the face of new things and seek-stability. This also represents 
the second generation of the national leader Deng Xiaoping’s attitude and method of 
leading China’s reform and opening up, and it has been continually used today as a 
long-term guideline in the future. It vividly and accurately expresses the need to explore 
progress in the absence of experience, and suggests that reform must rely on certain 
theoretical research, economic statistics and economic forecasting. More importantly, 
the reform should be more trials and more summaries. The trials are successful and then 
promoted, which emphasizes both stability and exploration. As a result, the historical 
achievement in the past 40 years of reform and opening up is a full affirmation of the 
reform principle of “crossing the river by feeling the stones”. Hence, it is an effective 
reform guideline with Chinese characteristics and in line with China’s national 
conditions. Further reform and development are necessary to process in order to achieve 
a more commercialize and developed economy. Meanwhile, this study suggests the 
policymakers focus on removing the financial constraints and creating flexibility in the 
financial market, reducing the ideological discrimination against private sector by 
encouraging more SOBs to lend to non-SOEs to solve the small firms’ problem of 
difficult financing to balance lending bias issue. 
 
6.3 Limitations and Further Research 
There are limitations of this study which could be further improved in a few ways and 
numerous extensions of this study could be done in the future. Firstly, although the 
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survival analysis provides significant determinants of firm’s switching behaviour, and 
the Dirichlet approach explains well of the loan borrowing patterns of listed firms, these 
do not reflect the borrowing behaviour of all types of companies in China, especially 
those non-listed firms. This calls for future research to use a dataset that includes non-
listed companies to verify the NBD-Dirichlet model patterns are evident for actual 
engagement in loan activity as well as the main driver of switching. Secondly, although 
the borrowing patterns and what else banks firms also borrow from have been addressed 
in this study, the question of where do firms switch to has not been completely solved, 
because firms are observed to switch either to a single lender or to multiple lenders, or 
both happen simultaneously in this sample, which brings challenges to fully address 
this issue. A proper measurement is possibly needed to be considered to identify deeply 
which bank group (or particular bank) firms switch to. Thirdly, broader applications 
were sought (i.e. by looking at frequency and duration combined, or replications across 
different countries), while there were many challenges with obtaining data that is in the 
correct format to apply the Dirichlet model. Since firms’ borrowing behaviour is multi-
faceted, suggests that future research investigate differences in the various types of 
lending banks and other types of credit providers (i.e. private banks, shadow banks, etc) 
option available, to understand whether marketing strategy should focus on promoting 
loan products broadly, or particular types and/or combinations of lending activity. 
Finally,  a benefit and cost analysis can be conducted to investigate the post effects of 
switching, for example how loan features and subsequent performance are impacted 
over time, do banks have less power to profit its clients?  
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Appendix 
Appendix A – for Chapter 2 
Table A1: NPLs ratios of commercial banks (percentage %) 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
SOB 10.5 9.7 8.0 2.8 1.8 1.3 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.7 1.7 
JSCB 4.2 2.3 2.1 1.3 1.0 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.5 1.7 
CCB 7.7 4.8 3.0 2.3 1.3 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.2 1.4 1.5 
RCB 6.0 5.9 4.0 3.9 2.8 1.9 1.6 1.8 1.7 1.9 2.5 2.5 
FB 1.1 0.8 0.5 0.8 0.9 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.8 1.2 0.9 
Note: Note: SOB indicates five large-scaled State-owned commercial banks (Big5); JSCB 
indicates Joint-stock commercial banks; CCB indicates City commercial banks; RCB indicates 
Rural commercial banks; FB indicates foreign banks. 
Source: China Banking Regulatory Commission (Annual report 2006-2012) 
 
Table A2: Interest coverage ratio of state and private industrial enterprises, 
1996–2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China (2013), Lardy (2014). 
 
State 
enterprises 
Private 
enterprises 
1996 1.30 5.03 
1997 1.32 3.23 
1998 1.35 2.91 
1999 1.73 3.68 
2000 3.00 4.13 
2001 3.10 4.59 
2002 3.31 5.29 
2003 4.54 5.72 
2004 5.62 5.75 
2005 6.32 6.43 
2006 6.95 7.13 
2007 6.90 7.77 
2008 4.62 8.41 
2009 4.93 9.22 
2010 6.57 10.84 
2011 5.28 9.96 
2012 4.30 9.56 
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Figure A1: Flow of enterprise loans by ownership, 2010-12 
(% of total enterprise loan) 
 
Sources: China Banking Association (2011, 2012, 2013), Lardy (2015). 
 
Figure A2: Stock of enterprise loans by ownership, 2009-12 
Loans outstanding, 2009                 Loans outstanding, 2012 
  
Sources: China Banking Association (2010, 2013)   , Lardy (2014). 
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Figure A3: Interest coverage ratio of state and private industrial enterprises, 
1996-2012 
 
Note: Interest coverage ratio = (EBT +Interest Expense) / Interest Expense 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China (2013), Lardy (2014). 
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Appendix B – for Chapter 3 
Table B1: Statistical definitions of large, small and medium sized firms 
Industry 
category 
Index Unit Large Medium Small 
Farming, forestry, 
animal husbandry 
and fishing 
Operating 
income(Y) 
10,000 Y≥20000 500≤Y＜20000 50≤Y＜500 
Industry 
Employees(X) People X≥1000 300≤X＜1000 20≤X＜300 
Operating 
income(Y) 
10,000 Y≥40000 2000≤Y＜40000 300≤Y＜2000 
Construction 
Operating 
income(Y) 
10,000 Y≥80000 6000≤Y＜80000 300≤Y＜6000 
Total assets(Z) 10,000 Z≥80000 5000≤Z＜80000 300≤Z＜5000 
Wholesale 
Employees(X) People X≥200 20≤X＜200 5≤X＜20 
Operating 
income(Y) 
10,000 Y≥40000 5000≤Y＜40000 1000≤Y＜5000 
Retail 
Employees(X) People X≥300 5≤X＜300 10≤X＜50 
Operating 
income(Y) 
10,000 Y≥20000 500≤Y＜20000 100≤Y＜500 
Transport 
Employees(X) People X≥1000 300≤X＜1000 20≤X＜300 
Operating 
income(Y) 
10,000 Y≥30000 3000≤Y＜30000 200≤Y＜3000 
Storage 
Employees(X) People X≥200 100≤X＜200 20≤X＜100 
Operating 
income(Y) 
10,000 Y≥30000 1000≤Y＜30000 100≤Y＜1000 
Post 
Employees(X) People X≥1000 300≤X＜1000 20≤X＜300 
Operating 
income(Y) 
10,000 Y≥30000 2000≤Y＜30000 100≤Y＜2000 
Hotels 
Employees(X) People X≥300 100≤X＜300 10≤X＜100 
Operating 
income(Y) 
10,000 Y≥10000 2000≤Y＜10000 100≤Y＜2000 
Catering service 
Employees(X) People X≥300 100≤X＜300 10≤X＜100 
Operating 
income(Y) 
10,000 Y≥10000 2000≤Y＜10000 100≤Y＜2000 
Information 
transmission 
Employees(X) People X≥2000 100≤X＜2000 10≤X＜100 
Operating 
income(Y) 
10,000 Y≥100000 1000≤Y＜100000 100≤Y＜1000 
Software and 
information 
technology 
services 
Employee (X) People X≥300 100≤X＜300 10≤X＜100 
Operating 
income(Y) 
10,000 Y≥10000 1000≤Y＜10000 50≤Y＜1000 
Real estate 
Operating 
income(Y) 
10,000 Y≥200000 1000≤Y＜200000 100≤Y＜1000 
Total assets(Z) 10,000 Z≥10000 5000≤Z＜10000 2000≤Z＜5000 
Property 
management 
Employees(X) People X≥1000 300≤X＜1000 100≤X＜300 
Operating 
income(Y) 
10,000 Y≥5000 1000≤Y＜5000 500≤Y＜1000 
Leasing and 
business services 
Employees(X) People X≥300 100≤X＜300 10≤X＜100 
Total assets(Z) 10,000 Z≥120000 8000≤Z＜120000 100≤Z＜8000 
Unspecified 
industry 
Employees(X) People X≥300 100≤X＜300 10≤X＜100 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China (2011). 
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Table B2: Window guidance policy stance 
Source: Quarterly China Monetary Policy Report, and Chen et al. (2017).
Indicator Stance Period Definition 
-2 Strongly discouraging 2003Q1-2004Q4 
2006Q2-2008Q2 
2009Q2-2010Q1 
CMPR explicitly discourage 
growth of total credit. 
-1 Weakly discouraging 2005Q1-2006Q1 
2010Q1-2012Q2 
CMPR points the target of 
optimizing credit structure, 
provides risk warning, and/or 
mentions that banks should 
control the pace of credit growth. 
0 No explicit direction 2001Q1-2002Q4 
2012Q3-2014Q2 
CMPR only mentions the target of 
optimizing credit structure and 
separately listing the sectors that 
should be both discouraging and 
encouraging or no explicit 
direction of credit growth. 
1 Weakly encouraging 2014Q3-Present CMPR only lists sectors that to be 
encouraged for the target of 
optimizing credit structure. 
2 Strongly encouraging 1998Q1-2000Q4 
2008Q3-2009Q1 
CMPR explicitly encourages the 
growth of total credit. 
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Appendix C – for Chapter 4  
 
 
Table C1: Markets shares of major groups of banks (measured by the bank's asset, unit: %) 
Source: China Banking Regulatory Commission Annual report (2007, 2017). 
 
 
 
 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
State-owned banks (Big5) 58.03 56.91 56.06 55.15 53.66 51.58 51.31 49.20 47.34 44.93 43.34 41.21 39.21 37.29 
Joint-stock commercial banks 10.70 11.54 11.92 12.39 13.69 13.99 14.86 15.64 16.22 17.61 17.80 18.21 18.55 18.72 
City commercial banks 5.29 5.40 5.44 5.90 6.29 6.54 7.14 8.24 8.81 9.46 10.03 10.47 11.38 12.16 
Rural commercial banks 0.14 0.18 0.81 1.15 1.15 1.47 2.35 2.90 3.75 4.70 5.63 6.69 7.64 8.73 
Policy banks 7.68 7.63 7.82 7.90 8.05 8.94 8.73 8.03 8.22 8.39 8.28 9.18 9.67 9.90 
Foreign banks 1.50 1.84 1.91 2.11 2.36 2.13 1.70 1.83 1.90 1.78 1.69 1.62 1.34 1.26 
Other banks 16.65 16.50 16.06 15.40 14.80 15.35 13.90 14.16 13.74 13.12 13.23 12.63 12.20 11.95 
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Table C2: Profit levels of major groups of banks (measured by return on equity, unit %) 
Source: China Banking Regulatory Commission Annual report (2007, 2017). 
 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
State-owned banks (Big5) -0.49 6.01 16.26 14.59 15.58 18.07 18.22 18.00 19.70 19.09 18.88 16.79 14.58 13.17 
Joint-stock commercial banks 14.99 15.39 21.65 22.80 16.64 19.06 16.40 16.63 18.58 19.22 18.42 16.76 14.53 13.21 
City commercial banks 10.86 14.97 14.59 14.89 13.18 15.28 13.84 15.96 16.28 16.94 16.46 14.91 12.88 12.21 
Rural commercial banks 18.00 30.00 18.85 16.43 12.97 13.71 13.36 13.82 15.43 15.94 15.91 14.84 12.40 11.77 
Policy banks 10.92 11.71 18.00 18.02 13.93 6.04 8.68 8.96 10.95 13.81 14.61 14.52 8.09 8.19 
Foreign banks 4.07 4.76 5.86 7.72 5.19 8.39 3.85 4.20 7.95 6.40 5.91 6.38 4.35 3.44 
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Table C3: Estimate results of the Dirichlet model (Within SOB group) 
Note: ***, **, * indicates a 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, marginal effects are reported. 
Note: BOC indicates Bank of China; ICBC indicates Industrial and Commercial Bank of China; 
CCB indicates China Construction Bank; BOCOM indicates Bank of Communications; ABC 
indicates Agricultural Bank of China.  
 
 
 
BOC ICBC CCB BOCOM ABC 
Panel A: Full sample      
SOE -0.0093 0.0028 0.0056 0.0088 -0.0078 
CEO change 0.0011 -0.0184 -0.0153 0.0312 0.0014 
Firm size 0.0154 0.0116* 0.0105 0.0108** -0.0057 
Firm age 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 
Profit 0.0018 -0.0014 0.0001 0.0016 0.0013 
Leverage -0.0010 0.0001 0.0006 0.0007 -0.0003 
Cash flows 0.0008 0.0000 0.0005 0.0003 0.0000 
CEO number 0.0173 0.0016 0.0134 0.0039 0.0062 
N 833     
Panel B: Pre – Crisis   
 
 
SOE 0.007 0.006 -0.026 0.015 -0.002 
CEO change 0.024 -0.017 0.049 -0.035 -0.021 
Firm size 0.011 -0.005 0.016 -0.012 -0.010 
Firm age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Profit 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.002 0.001 
Leverage -0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.000 
Cash flows 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 
CEO number -0.018 0.005 -0.029 0.025 0.016 
N 260     
Panel C: Post – Crisis    
 
 
SOE 0.002 -0.018 0.005 0.017 -0.006 
CEO change -0.006 0.002 -0.021** 0.011* 0.014 
Firm size 0.005 0.013 -0.010 -0.007 -0.001 
Firm age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Profit 0.002 -0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.001 
Leverage -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 
Cash flows 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.001 
CEO number -0.013 -0.011 0.016 0.007 0.002 
N 710     
